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2014 (3) TMI 1215 - SC - Indian LawsEviction from land - right to continue in possession even without renewal - right upon the grantees whose grant has lapsed by passage of time to stay in possession - Whether the Appellants are debarred from resisting eviction from the land in question on the ground that they have acquired the right to continue in possession even without renewal and a fresh grant in their favour under the 1966 Regulation? - HELD THAT - The doctrine is found in all legal systems of civilized society in the world. It is founded on a two-fold logic namely (1) that there must be finality to adjudication by competent Court and (2) no man should be vexed twice for the same cause. These two principles attract the doctrine of res judicata even to inter-parties decisions that may be erroneous on a question of law. Reference may also be made to the Constitution Bench decision in Direct Recruit Class-II Engineering Officers Assn. v. State of Maharashtra 1990 (5) TMI 223 - SUPREME COURT where this Court once again reiterated that the principles of constructive res judicata apply not only to what is actually adjudicated or determined in a case but every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated or which was incidental to or essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation - this Court no longer open to the Appellants to contend that the principles of constructive res judicata would not debar them from raising the question which as observed earlier could and indeed ought to have been raised by them in the previous round of litigation. The High Court was in that view of the matter perfectly justified in holding that the plea sought to be raised by the Appellants in the purported exercise of liberty given to them by the orders of this Court dated 9th April 2008 in Civil Appeal No. 5091 of 2004 was not legally open and should not be allowed to be urged. Whether the 1966 Regulations indeed confer any right upon the grantees whose grant has lapsed by passage of time to stay in possession till such time one of the grounds enumerated under Regulation 151 becomes available to the Administration for their eviction? - HELD THAT - Regulation 141 of the 1966 Regulations classifies classes of tenants while Regulation 142 and Regulation 143 deal with occupancy tenants and non-occupancy tenants respectively. It is common ground that the Appellants do not answer the description of occupancy tenants or non-occupancy tenants within the meaning of Regulation 142 and Regulation 143 - The expiry of the period of grant as in the case at hand would oblige the grantees to surrender the possession to the administration. That obligation or liability incurred under the 1926 Regulation continues to hold good notwithstanding the repeat of the 1926 Regulations by the Regulations of the year 1966. If a grantee of an expired grant had incurred the liability to surrender possession of the granted property such liability would remain enforceable notwithstanding the repeal of the Regulations under which such liability arose. The argument that the liability gets extinguished by reason of Regulation 144(1)(a) of the 1966 Regulations is in our opinion legally unsound. This is said for two reasons. Firstly because the contention flies in the face of Regulation 211 which continues the obligation incurred under the 1926 Regulations. So long as the liability incurred is recognized and continued by the repealing Regulation the same can be enforced in law. Secondly because the interpretation of Regulation 144(1)(a) itself does not admit of a situation where the liability to surrender possession not only becomes extinct but is enlarged into a right to stay in possession in perpetuity - The right to continue would however depend on whether the person in occupation has a valid grant in his favour even on the date the 1966 Regulations came into force. If the answer is in affirmative such grant may be treated to be a grant under the 1966 Regulations no matter it was in fact a grant under the 1926 Regulations. The grantee cannot stay in possession for more than 60 years. The argument that an old grantee can stay in possession in perpetuity so long as there is no violation of Regulation 151 therefore needs to be noticed only to be rejected. The Appellants in the present case no doubt may have protection under the 1966 Regulations because the grant in their favour was deemed to have been renewed upto 1994 was in existence in 1966 but such protection would cease with the expiry of the 60 years period in 1994 - there are no hesitation in answering the question in negative. Appeal dismissed.
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the appellants are debarred from resisting eviction based on acquired rights under the 1966 Regulation. 2. Whether the 1966 Regulations confer any right upon the grantees to stay in possession beyond the grant period. Detailed Analysis: Issue 1: Debarment from Resisting Eviction Background and Arguments: - The appellants argued that the order passed by the Supreme Court in the previous litigation allowed them to resist eviction on grounds other than renewal or fresh grant. They contended that they had acquired a right to continue in possession under the 1966 Regulations until one of the contingencies in Regulation 151 arose. - The respondents countered that this contention was an abuse of the process of law, as the appellants should have raised this issue in the previous litigation. Court's Analysis and Conclusion: - The court noted that the appellants had previously sought a fresh grant, which was declined by the Lieutenant Governor. The High Court had held that the appellants could not be evicted unless the land was needed for public purpose, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court. - The court emphasized that the appellants could and should have raised the issue of their right to continue in possession under the 1966 Regulations in the previous litigation. Since they did not, they are now debarred from doing so based on the principles of constructive res judicata. - The court cited several precedents to affirm that the principles of res judicata apply to writ proceedings, thereby barring the appellants from raising this new contention. Conclusion: - The appellants are debarred from resisting eviction on the ground that they have acquired the right to continue in possession under the 1966 Regulations. Issue 2: Rights Under the 1966 Regulations Background and Arguments: - The appellants relied on Regulations 141 to 146 and 151 of the 1966 Regulations, arguing that as grantees under the 1926 Regulations, they had rights and liabilities under the 1966 Regulations, and could not be evicted except on grounds enumerated in Regulation 151. - The respondents argued that the appellants' interpretation was flawed, as Regulation 151 applied to tenants, not grantees whose grant period had expired. Court's Analysis and Conclusion: - The court analyzed the relevant regulations, noting that the appellants were classified as grantees under Regulation 144, and that their grant had expired, obliging them to surrender possession. - The court highlighted Regulation 211, which preserved liabilities incurred under the 1926 Regulations, meaning the appellants' obligation to surrender possession continued despite the repeal of the 1926 Regulations. - The court rejected the appellants' argument that Regulation 144(1)(a) extinguished their liability to surrender possession, stating that this regulation only allowed grantees to continue under the same obligations and rights as under the 1966 Regulations, not in perpetuity. - The court concluded that the appellants could not stay in possession beyond the 60-year period allowed under both the 1926 and 1966 Regulations. Conclusion: - The 1966 Regulations do not confer any right upon the grantees to stay in possession beyond the grant period, and the appellants' protection ceased in 1994 with the expiry of the 60-year period. Final Judgment: The appeal is dismissed, and the appellants are debarred from raising new contentions regarding their right to stay in possession. The 1966 Regulations do not allow them to remain in possession beyond the grant period. No costs were awarded.
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