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1962 (9) TMI 54

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..... g to the first respondent. After the first appellant took over the business of the said partnership company including its leasehold interest in the said site, the first respondent recognized him ;is his tenant and was receiving the rent from him. It is alleged that the appellants constructed many valuable structures on the said site. The first responder i.e., Sri Sankaraswamigal Mutt, through its trustee, filed a suit, O. S. No. 103 of 1953, in the court of the District Munsif, Tanjore. for evicting the appellant company from the site; and on July 30, 1954 a compromisedecree for eviction was made therein giving six month s time for the appellant-company to vacate the site. The decreeholder filed an execution petition in the. said court against the first appellant for executing the decree. Pending the execution petition, Madras Act XIX of 1955 was passed empowering the State Government to extend the Madras City Tenants Protection Act, 1921 (III of 1922), hereinafter called the Principal Act , to any municipal town by notification in the Fort St. George Gazette. In exercise of the powers confer-red by Act XIX of 1955, the Government made an order notifying the Town of Tanjore to .....

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..... 1, 1952 and after the expiry of that period the first respondent was entitled to execute the decree and take possession of the site after removing the superstructures. Subsequently as already noticed, the provisions of the Principal Act were extended to the Town of Tanjore. Thereupon the appellant s father filed O. P. No. 43 of 1956 in the Court of the District Munsif, Tanjore, for an order directing the first respondent to convey the site in his favour on payment of the price to be fixed by the court. As in the first case, in this case also the proceedings dragged on till the Act of 1955 was passed. The appellant filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of judicature at Madras for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the District Munsif, Tanjore, to dispose of the application in accordance with the provisions of the Principal Act prior to its amendment by Act XIII of 1960. In both the petitions the appellants attacked the constitutional validity of Act XIII of 1960. The High Court, by a common order, upheld the constitutional validity of the said Act following the decision of a, division Bench of the same Court, in Suaminathan v. Sundara (I. L .....

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..... ccording So him, affords a reasonable basis for the classification. As regards the contention based on Art. 19, he contends that the rights conferred under Act XIX of 1955, namely, right to compensation on eviction under s. 3 of the said Act and the right to obtain a sale deed under s. 9 thereof, are only analogous to a right to sue or a right to purchase a property and they could not in any sense of the term be equated with property rights. Before we consider the arguments, it would be convenient to notice the scope of the relevant provisions of the Principal Act, Act XIX of 1955 and Act XIII of 1960. The Principal Act, as amended by Act XIX of 1955, was enacted, as its preamble shows, to give protection to certain classes of tenants who in municipal towns and adjoining areas in the State of Madras have constructed buildings on others lands in the hope that they would not be evicted so long as they paid a fair rent for the land. The gist of the relevant provisions of the Principal Act, as amended by Act XIX of 1955, may be stated thus: The Act applies to any building whether it is residential or non-residential. Every tenant shall on ejectment be entitled to be paid as compens .....

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..... tate of Madras and any specified village within five miles of the City of Madras or such municipal towns who have constructed buildings in others lands with the hope that they would not be evicted so long as they paid fair rent. In exercise of the power so conferred, the State Government issued on March 28, 1956, a notification extending the Principal Act to the municipal town of Tanjore. The result of the notification was that tenants like the appellants who were tenants of land over which they had put up non-residential buildings acquired a right to ask for compensation for the buildings so erected on ejectment or to apply to court for directing the decree-holder. to sell the land to the tenants after fixing the price in the manner prescribed in the Act. This Act was also extended to various other towns like Madurai, Coimbatore, Salem and Tiruchirappalli. The Legislature again changed its mind and passed Act XIII of 1960. By s. 3 of that Act the following amendments were made in s. 2 of the Principal Act: (i) for clause (1), the following clause shall be substituted, namely:- (1) Building means any building, hut or other structure, whether of masonry, bricks, wood, m .....

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..... inment of the compensation due in execution and for a fresh decree to be passed in accordance with s. 4 of the Principal Act, and (iv) he had also a right, at his option, to apply within the prescribed time to the court for an order directing the landlord to sell the land to him for a price fixed by the court, whether a decree for ejectment had or had not been passed. The tenants of non-residential buildings in places other than the City of Madras and the specified municipal towns lost the said rights after the 1960 Act came into force. The first question is whether the 1960 Act, in so far as it withdrew the rights conferred upon the tenants of nonresidential buildings in Tanjore, offends Art. 14 of the Constitution, or whether it can be justified on the doctrine of classification. The law on the subject is so well settled that it does not call for an extensive restatement : it would be enough if the relevant propositions in the judgment of this Court in Shri Ram Krishna, Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar([1959] S. C. R. 279, 297-298.) are noticed, and they are : (1) there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is up .....

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..... tects also the tenants of non-residential buildings in the aforesaid City and municipal towns. So stated the argument appears to be plausible, but a closer scrutiny reveals that the object of the Act is to protect not only tenants of residential buildings but also of other buildings, though it is mainly conceived to protect the tenants of residential buildings. The following is the statement of objects and reasons attached to Act XIII of 1960: The Madras City Tenants Protection Act, 1921, was enacted with the main object of safeguarding the tenants from eviction from residential quarters. In consistence with this object it is proposed to restrict the application of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act, 1921 (Madras Act III of 1922) to residential buildings only. It will be noticed from the above that the main object of the Act is to safeguard the tenants of residential buildings from eviction but it is not the sole object of that legislation. The objects of the 1960 Act only refer to the objects of the Principal Act. The objects and reasons of the Principal Act are given in the Fort St. George Gazette dated July 26, 1921, at p. 1491. The relevant part of the objects r .....

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..... arned judges of the High Court in Swaminathan v. Sundara (1. L. R. 1961 Mad. 976.),which was followed in the present case, adverting to this argument observed at p. 987 : It is apparent that having regard to the large population in the first five areas and the large scale commercial activities in these areas, the Legislature thought fit that nonresidential quarters occupied by tenants on lands belonging to others should also be offered relief from being evicted summarily and arbitrarily. This passage was criticized by learned counsel for the appellants and it was asked, what was the relevancy between the population of the different towns in the matter of eviction of tenants from non-residential buildings ? The population of a town is not a relevant circumstance though its density may be : the pressure on the buildings or on the sites suitable for building purposes does not depend solely upon population without reference to the area available for building purposes, so the argument proceeds. Mr. A. Ranganadhm Chetty, appearing for the state of Madras, attempted to place before us statistics to establish that towns preferred under. the Act are highly populated industrial and .....

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..... ded they should apply only to residential buildings. ............ having regard to the wishes of certain Hon. members that not only in the City but in other municipalities also there should be no distinction between residential and nonresidential buildings, he (the Chairman) proposed to add the four municipalities of Madurai, Tiruchirappalli, Salem and Coimbatore, in sub-clause (1) of the proposed clause (1). These passages disclose not only the legislative objects but also the political pressures for certain amendments. But we are not concerned with the political aspects of the legislation but only with its objects. The special treatment given to the City of Madras and the other specified town is based upon the fact that there are a number of small business establishments in Madras and other specified towns implying thereby that there are not so many such establishments in other towns. The correspondence between the Government of India and the Government of Madras throws light on this question. It is stated therein Most of the tenancies of non-residential buildings which enjoyed protection from eviction are in the City of Madras and the Municipal towns of Madurai, Coimba .....

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..... rappalli as selection grade municipalities on account of their size and importance: they have comparatively larger population and commercial potentialities; (3) in the said towns there are a large number of nonresidential buildings; and (4) except for some vague averments made in the reply affidavit, there is nothing on record to establish that the number of nonresidential buildings in Tanjore compares favorably with that in the preferred towns. These facts are, to some extent, supported by the statistical data furnished before us from authorized Government publications. In ,Madras District Gazetteers, Madurai it is stated at p. 172: Madurai is one of the very few districts in this State in which a comparatively large portion of the population, about 37 per cent., lives by industries, trade and other avocations. I This is no wonder, seeing that it has never had, in spite of irrigation works, any facilities like Tanjore for absorbing the great bulk of its population in agriculture. In fact it stands next to the Coimbatore district in possessing a considerable proportion of the nonagricultural population . Though the statement refers to the districts as a whole, it is well know .....

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..... nd dispose of property. Article 31. (1). No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. To seek the protection of either of these Articles it must be established that the tenants of residential buildings in Tanjore had acquired a right to property, for unless they had acquired such a right, the 1960 Act could not have deprived them of such a right or imposed any restrictions thereon. The question, therefore, is whether the rights created by the 1955 Act by extending the provisions of ss. 3 and 9 of the Principal Act to such tenants had given them a right to property. The argument of learned counsel for the State of Madras may be summarized thus: Art. 19(1) (f) deals with abstract rights of property, while Art. 31 (1) with concrete rights; under Art.31(1) there is no limitation on the power of the appropriate Legislature to make a law depriving a person of his property; the only restriction in the case of deprivation of property by a State is that it can be done only by a statutory law; if so, on the assumption that the Act of 1955 conferred a concrete right of property on the appellants, they have been validly deprived of it by the 1960 Act and, therefo .....

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..... this court has proceeded all along, in dealing with similar cases in the past, on the footing that article 19 (1) (f) applies equally to concrete as well as abstract rights of property. Though this Court has not finally expressed its opinion on the question raised, it has pointed out that it has proceeded all through on the basis that Art. 19(1) applies equally to concrete as well as abstract rights of property. In Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India([1950] s. C. R. 869), Mukherjea, J., as he then was, held that the right to hold property under Art. 19 (1) (f)meant the right to possess as well as enjoy all the benefits which were ordinarily attached to ownership of property. jagannadhadas, J., in The State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose([1954] S. C. R. 587, 597). dealing with this point observed at pp. 668-669: To me, it appears, that article 19(1) (f), while probably meant to relate to the natural rights of the citizen, comprehends within its scope also concrete property rights. That, I believe, is how it has been generally understood without question in various cases these nearly four years in this Court and in the High Courts . The phraseology used in A .....

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..... urged in support of the contention have been considered by this Court in Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni v. The State of Madra s([1960] 3 S. C. R. 887.), where it was held that a law depriving a person of his property must be a valid law and, therefore, it should not infringe Art. 19 of the Constitution. We have no reason to differ from the view expressed therein. Indeed that view has been followed in later decisions. We, therefore, hold that a law depriving a person of his property would be bad unless it amounts to a reasonable restriction in the interest of the general public or for the protection of the interests of Scheduled Tribes. We now come to the last question, namely, whether the 1960 Act deprived the appellants of their right in property. To state it differently, the question is whether a tenant of a non-residential building in Tanjore had acquired a right of property under the 1955 Act and whether he was deprived of that right or otherwise restricted in the enjoyment thereof by the 1960 Act. The 1955 Act, as we have already noticed, conferred two rights on such a tenant, namely, (i) every tenant on ejectment would be entitled to be paid as compensation the value of a .....

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..... them by exercising their right to purchase the site of the said buildings and that the impugned Act indirectly deprived them of their right to hold the said buildings. This argument mixes up two concepts, namely, (i) the scope and content of the right, and (ii) the effect and consequences of the deprivation of that right on the other properties of the appellants. Section 9 of the Principal Act, extended by the 1955 Act, only confers a right in respect of the land and not of the superstructure. If that Act held the field, the appellants could have purchased the land, but by reason of the 1960 Act they could no longer do so. Neither the 1955 Act conferred any right as to the superstructure under s. 9 of the Principal Act nor did the 1960 Act take that right away. If this distinction between the land and the superstructure is borne in mind the untenability of the argument would become obvious. The 1960 Act does not in any way affect the appellants fundamental right. Therefore, their prayer that the District Munsif should be directed to proceed with the disposal of the applications filed by them under s. 9 of the Principal Act could not be granted. In this view it is not necess .....

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