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Showing 241 to 260 of 384 Records
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1990 (11) TMI 144
Whether car seat covers are articles adapted generally as parts and accessories of the motor vehicle?
Held that:- Car seat covers or upholstery are accessories as an addition; an adjunct; an accompaniment for comfortable use of the motor vehicles or for adding elegance to the seat. Admittedly the appellant manufactured car seat covers and upholstery for sale as an automobile part in the regular course of business. Therefore, they are exigible to sales tax at 13 per cent under Entry 3 of Schedule 1st read with Section 3 (3) of the Act. Therefore, we do not find any ground warranting interference. The appeals are accordingly dismissed
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1990 (11) TMI 143
Whether the goods, pipes, tubes and poles made of iron and steel, are liable to excise duty under Item 26AA or under Item 68, in the First Schedule to the Central Excises & Salt Act, 1944?
Held that:- The appellant's contention that the goods in question are assessable to duty under Item 26AA is correct and has to be upheld. The assessments in question will be modified accordingly and the appellant will be entitled to complete exemption or reduced duty in accordance with the provisions of Item 26AA read with the relevant notifications; if any, extant at the various points of time with which we are concerned. The appeals are followed accordingly.
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1990 (11) TMI 142
Whether the Tribunal is correct in classifying Tie Bar Nuts under Tariff Item 52?
Held that:- considering the fact that the `Tie Bar Nuts' function of fixing the platens as stated by the appellants and that of fastening, as argued by them, are not basically different, and the appellants themselves having called the goods as `nuts', we are of the view that the Tribunal is correct in classifying Tie Bar Nuts under Tariff Item 52. We, therefore, do not find any reason to interfere with the department's prospective modification of the classification. We find no justification for classifying those in the residuary Item 68. As was held in Dunlop India Ltd. v. Union of India (1975 (10) TMI 94 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA) if an article is classifiable under a specific item, it would be against the very principle of classification to deny it the proper parentage and consign it to the residuary item. Appeal dismissed.
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1990 (11) TMI 141
Issues:
1. Whether certain expenses incurred by the assessee should be treated as capital or revenue expenditure.
2. Whether the assessee is entitled to claim deduction under section 80J of the Income-tax Act for an assessment year where the factory commenced production only in the middle of the accounting year.
Analysis:
Issue 1:
The assessee claimed an expenditure of Rs. 24,384 as revenue expenditure under section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, although the expenses were for increasing the authorized share capital of the company. The Income-tax Officer disallowed the expenditure as capital in nature. However, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal held that the expenditure was incurred for the purpose of the business and thus should be treated as revenue expenditure. The court agreed with the Tribunal, emphasizing that the expenditure was incurred to comply with statutory requirements for carrying on the business and did not result in any enduring benefit to the company. Citing precedent cases, the court affirmed that expenses contributing to an increase in capital should still be allowable as revenue expenditure if they were wholly and exclusively used for business purposes. Therefore, the court answered the first question in favor of the assessee.
Issue 2:
Regarding the claim for deduction under section 80J of the Act, the dispute arose because the biscuit plant was not operational for the entire year as it was installed only during the year 1972. The court referred to relevant cases, including CIT v. Simpson and Co. and CIT v. Mysore Petro Chemical Ltd., which supported the view that relief under section 80J should not be pro-rated based on the operational period of the business during the relevant year. The court also highlighted a circular issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes, stating that the deduction under section 80J should not be reduced proportionately for the period the business was not operational. Relying on these precedents and the circular, the court held that the assessee was entitled to the relief under section 80J, even though the factory was operational for only part of the year. Therefore, the court answered the second question in favor of the assessee.
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1990 (11) TMI 140
Issues Involved:
1. Legality of the instructions issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) u/s 119 of the Income-tax Act.
2. Powers of the Commissioner of Income-tax u/s 279(2) of the Income-tax Act to compound offences.
Summary:
1. Legality of the instructions issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) u/s 119 of the Income-tax Act:
The petitioner challenged the instructions issued by the CBDT, specifically Instruction No. 1317 of 1980, which allegedly curtailed the powers of the Commissioner of Income-tax to compound offences u/s 279(2) of the Income-tax Act. The court observed that the instructions, particularly clauses (B), (C), and (D) and section 6, partially took away the discretion vested in the Commissioner by requiring the "previous approval of the Board before deciding to compound an offence." The court held that these instructions were in direct contravention of the statutory provisions and thus invalid. The court emphasized that executive instructions could not override or dilute statutory powers conferred by the Legislature.
2. Powers of the Commissioner of Income-tax u/s 279(2) of the Income-tax Act to compound offences:
The court analyzed section 279 of the Income-tax Act, which grants the Commissioner the authority to compound offences either before or after the institution of proceedings. The court noted that this power is discretionary and cannot be regulated or restricted by instructions from the CBDT. The court held that the instructions issued by the CBDT, which required the Commissioner to obtain prior approval from the Board before compounding an offence, effectively nullified the discretion granted to the Commissioner by the statute. The court concluded that the Commissioner must exercise his powers independently, without reference to the invalid instructions.
Conclusion:
The court allowed the petition, quashing the impugned instructions that curtailed the Commissioner's powers. It directed the Commissioner of Income-tax to consider the compounding of the alleged offence independently, as per the powers conferred by section 279(2) of the Act, without reference to the invalid instructions. The writ petition was disposed of with no order as to costs.
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1990 (11) TMI 139
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Vishakhapatnam.
2. Compliance with Section 127 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
3. Reasonable opportunity of being heard.
4. Communication of reasons for transfer.
5. Validity of the transfer order.
6. Appropriate jurisdiction for filing the writ petition.
Summary:
1. Jurisdiction of the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Vishakhapatnam:
The petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the third respondent, the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax (Inv. Circle-2), Vishakhapatnam, regarding the transfer of its file from Bombay to Vishakhapatnam, alleging it violated Section 127 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
2. Compliance with Section 127 of the Income-tax Act, 1961:
The petitioner argued that the conditions requisite u/s 127(2) of the Act were not complied with, as the respondents did not provide a reasonable opportunity of being heard, and the reasons for the transfer were not communicated.
3. Reasonable Opportunity of Being Heard:
The court emphasized that u/s 127, giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard and recording reasons for the transfer are essential. The Supreme Court in Ajantha Industries v. CBDT [1976] 102 ITR 281 held that non-communication of reasons is a serious infirmity, rendering the order invalid.
4. Communication of Reasons for Transfer:
The court noted that neither the notice dated November 22, 1988, nor the intimation dated February 13, 1989, contained any reasons for the transfer. The petitioner was never informed of any reasons for the transfer, which is a mandatory requirement as per the law.
5. Validity of the Transfer Order:
The court found that the final order of transfer, even as recorded in the file, did not contain the various reasons mentioned in the counter-affidavits. The transfer was, therefore, declared invalid and quashed.
6. Appropriate Jurisdiction for Filing the Writ Petition:
The objection raised by the respondent that the writ petition should have been filed in Bombay was dismissed. The court held that since the third respondent at Vishakhapatnam took action pursuant to the transfer order, a part of the cause of action arose within the State of Andhra Pradesh.
Conclusion:
The writ petition was allowed, declaring the order transferring the file from Bombay to Vishakhapatnam invalid. The court emphasized that this decision does not preclude the competent authority from taking further action in accordance with the law. There was no order as to costs.
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1990 (11) TMI 138
Issues:
1. Determination of the "previous year" for a newly set up business under section 3 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
2. Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal's interpretation of section 3 was legally correct.
3. Whether the assessee was required to file a return for the assessment year 1981-82.
Analysis:
The judgment addressed two applications under section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, filed by the assessee regarding the assessment years 1981-82 and 1982-83. The primary issue revolved around the determination of the "previous year" for a newly set up business under section 3 of the Act. The assessee, a partnership firm, contended that its "previous year" commenced on May 15, 1980, and ended on June 30, 1981, spanning 13.5 months. The Income-tax Officer disagreed, asserting that the firm should have filed a return for the assessment year 1981-82. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner sided with the assessee, recognizing a dissolution of the firm on March 31, 1980, and the formation of a new firm on May 15, 1980. However, the Revenue challenged this decision before the Tribunal.
The Tribunal acknowledged the dissolution of the firm but disagreed with the assessee's chosen "previous year" of 13.5 months. It held that the assessee was obligated to file a return for the assessment year 1981-82, covering the period from May 15, 1980, to March 31, 1981. The Tribunal directed a recalculation of income based on a "previous year" ending on March 31, 1982, falling within the assessment year 1982-83. The Tribunal's decision was based on a strict interpretation of section 3, emphasizing that the "previous year" could not exceed 12 months for a newly set up business.
The court analyzed the relevant provisions of section 3 and affirmed the Tribunal's decision. It clarified that the assessee's business did not qualify under clause (e) of the section and emphasized the limitation of the "previous year" to a maximum of 12 months. The court dismissed the application, highlighting that the questions raised by the assessee did not warrant a reference under section 256(2) as they did not present significant legal issues.
In considering precedents cited by the assessee's counsel, the court distinguished the facts of the present case from previous decisions where Income-tax Officers had permitted "previous years" exceeding 12 months. The court referenced the Supreme Court's decision in Esthuri Aswathaiah v. CIT and a judgment by the Madras High Court to support its conclusion. Ultimately, the court dismissed the applications, ruling against the assessee and emphasizing the adherence to the statutory provisions governing the determination of the "previous year" for tax assessment purposes.
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1990 (11) TMI 137
The High Court of Allahabad ruled in favor of the assessee in a penalty proceeding under section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal found that the assessee had discharged the burden to rebut the presumption of underreported income. The court upheld the Tribunal's decision, stating that it was based on evidence and not perverse. The penalty was overturned, and the question was answered in favor of the assessee.
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1990 (11) TMI 136
Issues Involved:
1. Requirement to apply afresh for registration as a valuer under the amended Wealth-tax Act.
2. Rejection of applications based on the income criterion.
3. Authority of the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) to set additional criteria for registration.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Requirement to Apply Afresh for Registration:
The petitioners argued that they were not required to apply afresh for continuation of their registration as valuers under the amended provisions of the Wealth-tax Act. However, the court noted that Section 34AE(1) of the Act, effective from June 1, 1988, mandated that existing registered valuers must apply afresh for continuation of their registration. Therefore, the petitioners were obligated to submit new applications under the amended provisions.
2. Rejection of Applications Based on Income Criterion:
The applications of both petitioners were rejected on the grounds that their income for the last ten years was less than Rs. 50,000 per annum. The petitioners contended that the Wealth-tax Rules did not stipulate any minimum income requirement for registration. The court examined Rule 8A, which prescribes the qualifications for registration as valuers, and found that it did not include any monetary criterion. The court held that the administrative decision of the CBDT to include a financial criterion was not incorporated in the Rules and, therefore, could not be legally enforced. Consequently, the rejection of the applications based on the income criterion was deemed illegal.
3. Authority of the CBDT to Set Additional Criteria:
The Revenue argued that the CBDT had the authority to set additional criteria under Section 46 of the Wealth-tax Act, which empowers the Board to make rules. The court acknowledged that while the CBDT has the power to make rules, any additional criteria must be incorporated into the Rules through proper legislative procedures. Since the financial criterion was not included in the Rules, the CBDT's decision to reject the applications based on this criterion was not valid. The court emphasized that the qualifications for registration must be as specified in the Rules, and the CBDT's administrative decisions could not override the statutory provisions.
Conclusion:
The court allowed the petitions, quashing the orders rejecting the applications of the petitioners for registration as valuers. The court directed the respondent to reconsider the applications in accordance with Rule 8A(2) of the Wealth-tax Rules, without considering the monetary receipts of the petitioners. The court concluded that the CBDT's decision to impose an income criterion was not supported by the statutory framework and, therefore, could not be enforced. The applications should be decided based on the qualifications and experience as prescribed in the Rules.
Separate Judgments:
The judgment was delivered by a single judge and applies to both petitions collectively. No separate judgments were delivered by different judges.
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1990 (11) TMI 135
The court held that in the case of reconstitution of a firm, there should be only one assessment, overruling a previous decision. The Full Bench decision in Vishwanath Seth's case remains good law. The question was answered in favor of the Revenue.
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1990 (11) TMI 134
The High Court of Allahabad quashed a notice issued by the Assistant Controller, Estate Duty, to reopen an assessment under the Estate Duty Act based on a report from the Audit Officer. The court held that the report cannot be the basis for reopening the assessment. The writ petition was allowed with no costs. (Case citation: 1990 (11) TMI 134 - ALLAHABAD High Court)
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1990 (11) TMI 133
Issues:
1. Quashing of prosecutions for non-deposit of tax deducted at source.
2. Legality of instruction No. 1317 issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes.
3. Power of the Commissioner of Income-tax to compound offences.
4. Violation of legislative mandate by the Central Board of Direct Taxes.
5. Binding nature of circulars issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes.
Analysis:
1. The petitioner sought the quashing of prosecutions for non-deposit of tax deducted at source for the years 1969-70 and 1970-71. The petitioner, a physician and surgeon, was associated with a company facing financial difficulties. The company had defaulted on tax payments due to financial crisis, leading to penal provisions being invoked by the Income-tax Department.
2. The legality of instruction No. 1317 issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes was challenged. The petitioner argued that the circular withdrew the powers of the Commissioner of Income-tax to compound offences. The petitioner contended that the circulars were issued unlawfully, violating the powers granted to the Commissioner under section 279 of the Income-tax Act.
3. The issue of the power of the Commissioner of Income-tax to compound offences was central to the case. The petitioner argued that only the Commissioner had the authority to compound offences under section 279(2) of the Act. The petitioner alleged that the Central Board of Direct Taxes overstepped its jurisdiction by issuing instructions that undermined the Commissioner's powers.
4. The petitioner claimed that the Central Board of Direct Taxes had violated the legislative mandate by issuing circulars that restricted the Commissioner's authority to compound offences. The petitioner contended that the circulars were in contravention of the specific provisions of the Income-tax Act, particularly section 279(2), which empowers the Commissioner in such matters.
5. The court noted a related case where it was held that the Central Board of Direct Taxes cannot impede the quasi-judicial functions of the Commissioner of Income-tax. The court found certain clauses of the circular to be ultra vires the provisions of the Act. Consequently, the court accepted the petition, remanding the case to the Commissioner for appropriate action on the compounding application.
In conclusion, the judgment favored the petitioner's arguments regarding the quashing of prosecutions and the legality of the circular issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes. The court upheld the powers of the Commissioner of Income-tax to compound offences and emphasized the importance of adhering to legislative mandates in such matters.
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1990 (11) TMI 132
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the interest income earned by the assessee on advances made to its members for constructing houses would be exempt u/s 80-P of the Income-tax Act.
2. Whether the assessee-co-operative society was carrying on the business of providing credit facilities to its members, although it was functioning as a co-operative housing society.
Summary:
Issue 1: Exemption of Interest Income u/s 80-P
The court examined whether the interest income earned by the assessee on advances made to its members for constructing houses would be exempt u/s 80-P of the Income-tax Act. The assessee, a co-operative housing society, claimed that its interest income should be deducted u/s 80P(1) and (2)(a)(i) of the Act, as it was engaged in providing credit facilities to its members. The Income-tax Officer initially rejected this claim, stating that the advances for house construction did not constitute the provision of credit facilities. However, the Tribunal later concluded that the assessee-society was indeed engaged in the business of providing credit facilities to its members and was entitled to the benefit of deduction u/s 80P(1) and (2)(a)(i) of the Act. The court upheld this view, noting that the activity of lending money to members for house construction was a distinct and independent business activity of the society, thus qualifying for the exemption.
Issue 2: Business of Providing Credit Facilities
The court also addressed whether the assessee-co-operative society was carrying on the business of providing credit facilities to its members. The Revenue argued that the primary object of the society was house building, and the extension of credit facilities was merely a means to that end. However, the court found that the objects of the society, as outlined in its bye-laws, included lending money to its members as a separate and independent activity. The court noted that the society provided credit facilities not only to members who secured sites from the society but also to those who had their own sites. This activity was carried out systematically as a business activity, making the society eligible for the benefits u/s 80P(1) and (2)(a)(i) of the Act. The court distinguished this case from others cited by the Revenue, where the primary object of the societies was different, and the provision of credit facilities was incidental.
Conclusion:
The court answered both questions in the affirmative and against the Revenue, affirming that the assessee-society was entitled to the benefits of deduction u/s 80P(1) and (2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act. The assessee was also awarded costs for the references.
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1990 (11) TMI 131
The High Court of Allahabad ruled in favor of the assessee in a case involving exemption under rule 6DD(j) of the Income-tax Rules for certain cash payments made during the assessment year 1972-73. The Tribunal accepted the explanations provided by the assessee for the payments, finding them genuine and in compliance with the rules. The Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, stating that there was no reason to reject the assessee's explanations.
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1990 (11) TMI 130
The High Court of Allahabad ruled in favor of the assessee in a penalty case under section 271(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal cancelled the penalties imposed due to the assessee's reasonable cause for delayed filing of returns, supported by a settlement agreement. The court agreed with the Tribunal's decision, emphasizing the assessee's bona fide belief as a valid reason. The judgment favored the assessee, with no costs awarded.
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1990 (11) TMI 129
Issues:
Penalty for concealment of income under section 271(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act.
Penalty for default in the original return despite filing a revised return.
Analysis:
The case involved an individual assessee engaged in the business of printing powerloom cloth and sarees. Initially, the assessee filed a return for the assessment year 1971-72, disclosing an income of Rs. 21,400 with estimated sales turnover and profit percentages. Subsequently, the Income-tax Officer estimated a significantly higher sales turnover and income, leading to penalty proceedings under section 271(1)(c) for concealment of income. The burden of proof shifted to the assessee due to the Explanation to section 271(1)(c) being applicable at that time.
The Tribunal, after unsuccessful appeals by the assessee, upheld the penalty imposed by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. The Tribunal rejected the assessee's explanation of not maintaining accounts and highlighted the substantial disparity in the sales turnover figures between the original and revised returns. The Tribunal's decision was in line with a Supreme Court ruling interpreting the burden of proof under the Explanation to section 271(1)(c).
The assessee contended that since the income was enhanced based on estimates, it was not a suitable case for levying a penalty. However, the Court emphasized that the Income-tax Officer had to rely on estimates due to the lack of maintained accounts by the assessee. The Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, stating that the burden of proof was not discharged by the assessee as required by the law.
In response to the assessee's reliance on certain precedents, the Court deemed it unnecessary to delve into those cases as they were fact-specific. Ultimately, the Court ruled in favor of the Revenue and against the assessee on both issues raised in the reference questions.
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1990 (11) TMI 128
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the appropriate authority u/s 269UD of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
2. Legality of the proposed sale transaction.
3. Issuance of a "no-objection certificate" u/s 269UL(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Summary:
1. Jurisdiction of the appropriate authority u/s 269UD of the Income-tax Act, 1961:
The challenge in this writ petition is to the orders dated July 20, 1989, and January 22, 1990, passed by the appropriate authority purportedly under Chapter XX-C of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The appropriate authority observed that the agreement to sell was not certain and was void as per section 29 of the Indian Contract Act. The authority concluded that the statement in Form No. 37-I was premature and invalid. The court held that the only right conferred on the appropriate authority u/s 269UD is to make an order for the purchase of the immovable property at an amount equal to the apparent consideration. The provision does not give jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the legality of the transaction.
2. Legality of the proposed sale transaction:
The appropriate authority contended that it could determine the legality of the proposed sale transaction. However, the court clarified that Chapter XX-C was incorporated to curb sales of immovable properties for apparent consideration less than the actual consideration. The appropriate authority cannot refuse to grant the certificate sought by the seller on grounds of alleged infringement of law. The authority can only decide whether to purchase the property or not.
3. Issuance of a "no-objection certificate" u/s 269UL(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961:
Section 269UL(3) mandates that if no order for purchase is passed, the appropriate authority shall issue a "no-objection certificate." The court found that the appropriate authority had not exercised its pre-emptive right of purchase within the stipulated period and its decision not to issue a certificate u/s 269UL(3) was without jurisdiction. The court issued a writ of certiorari quashing the impugned orders and a writ of mandamus directing the issuance of a "no-objection certificate" within four weeks.
Conclusion:
The court quashed the impugned orders and directed the appropriate authority to issue a "no-objection certificate" to the petitioners within four weeks, emphasizing that the authority's role is limited to deciding on the purchase of the property and not on the legality of the transaction.
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1990 (11) TMI 127
Issues:
1. Interpretation of section 34(3)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 regarding transfer of development rebate reserve to the capital account.
2. Whether the transfer of reserve fund to the capital account constitutes distribution of profits within the meaning of the Act.
Detailed Analysis:
1. The judgment pertains to the interpretation of section 34(3)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The case involved an assessee, a Hindu undivided family, who claimed a development rebate and created a reserve fund as required by the Act. The Income-tax Officer found that the reserve fund was transferred to the capital account within eight years, leading to a rectification of the assessment for a previous year. The Tribunal held that this transfer did not violate the conditions of section 34(3)(a), leading to a reference application by the Revenue.
2. Section 34(3)(a) mandates that a certain percentage of the development rebate should be debited to the profit and loss account and credited to a reserve account for business purposes, excluding distribution as dividends or profits. The court analyzed whether the transfer of the reserve fund to the capital account within eight years constituted a violation. The court noted that the transfer was for business purposes and did not fall under the prohibited categories of distribution specified in the section. The court emphasized that the transfer to the capital account did not amount to distribution or disbursement by way of profit, especially in the context of a Hindu undivided family where capital and revenue accounts are considered distinct.
3. The court distinguished the case from precedent where a clear violation of section 34(3)(a) occurred due to distribution of reserve amount as profits to partners. Additionally, the court referenced Supreme Court decisions emphasizing strict compliance with the statutory requirements of section 33 and section 34(3)(a) for availing benefits. Ultimately, the court answered the reference question in favor of the assessee, concluding that the transfer of the reserve fund to the capital account did not constitute a violation of the provisions of section 34(3)(a), thereby ruling against the Revenue.
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1990 (11) TMI 126
Issues Involved: The judgment addresses the issue of whether the Additional Commissioner of Income-tax applied his mind before initiating proceedings under section 263(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and whether he abdicated his function in favor of the Income-tax Officer.
Summary:
The judgment pertains to a partnership firm with two partners and two minors admitted to the benefits of partnership. The Income-tax Officer canceled the registration for certain assessment years due to the minors attaining majority without the necessary updates to the partnership deed. For the assessment year 1968-69, the Income-tax Officer sought cancellation of registration from the Additional Commissioner of Income-tax, who then initiated proceedings under section 263. The Tribunal found that the Commissioner did not apply his mind to the facts and practically abdicated his function to the Income-tax Officer. The High Court agreed with the Tribunal's conclusion, emphasizing that the Commissioner must properly consider all facts before invoking revisional powers under section 263.
In the judgment, it was argued that the Income-tax Officer had the authority to cancel the registration for the assessment year 1968-69 based on previous cancellations for preceding years. The High Court noted that the Commissioner should have questioned the need for his intervention when the Income-tax Officer approached him, rather than immediately invoking revisional powers. The Court agreed with the Tribunal's finding that the Commissioner initiated proceedings under section 263 without adequately considering all the circumstances of the case. Consequently, the High Court ruled in favor of the assessee and against the Revenue, affirming the Tribunal's decision.
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1990 (11) TMI 125
The High Court of Allahabad held that the Tribunal erred in canceling a penalty imposed on an assessee for delay in filing the return without recording a finding of reasonable cause for the delay. The Tribunal's reasoning that the assessee did not wish to evade tax was deemed irrelevant, and the penalty was reinstated in favor of the Revenue. The Tribunal was advised to reconsider the matter in light of the court's observations.
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