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Showing 201 to 220 of 237 Records
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1988 (12) TMI 37
The High Court of Bombay delivered a judgment on the issue of entitlement to development rebate for plant and machinery installed in earlier years without creating a reserve due to lack of profits. The court referred to a previous decision and ruled in favor of the assessee. No costs were awarded. (Case citation: 1988 (12) TMI 37 - BOMBAY High Court)
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1988 (12) TMI 36
The High Court of Bombay ruled that the proposed dividend reserve of Rs. 1,09,03,751 does not constitute 'Other reserves' under the Super Profits Tax Act, 1963. The decision favored the Revenue, citing the Supreme Court's judgment in Vazir Sultan Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1981] 132 ITR 559. No costs were awarded.
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1988 (12) TMI 35
The High Court of Bombay ruled in favor of the assessee regarding the computation of capital for surtax purposes under the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964. The court cited the case of CIT v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1978] 111 ITR 6 in support of its decision.
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1988 (12) TMI 34
The High Court of Bombay ruled in favor of the assessee regarding the computation of development rebate on machinery installed in a year of loss. The decision was based on precedent from Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. S. Rajagopalan, ITO [1973] 92 ITR 241. No costs were awarded.
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1988 (12) TMI 33
The Bombay High Court held that the accretion content of Rs. 13,175 is assessable as income for the assessment year 1972-73. The judgment was delivered by Judge S. P. Bharucha.
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1988 (12) TMI 32
Issues: 1. Whether silver utensils are personal effects of the assessee under section 2(14)(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961? 2. Whether the surplus on the sale of silver utensils is liable to capital gains tax?
Analysis:
Issue 1: The case involved a dispute regarding the classification of silver utensils as personal effects of the assessee for the assessment year 1977-78. The assessee claimed that the silver utensils were for personal use and not capital assets, therefore the profit from their sale should not be taxed as capital gains. The Income-tax Officer disagreed, asserting that the utensils were owned for decoration rather than personal use, citing the purchase of stainless steel utensils as contradictory evidence. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner sided with the assessee, stating that the utensils were for personal or household use based on societal norms. The Tribunal also supported the assessee, emphasizing that the nature of the utensils indicated personal use. Referring to past judgments, the High Court agreed with the Tribunal, concluding that the silver utensils qualified as personal effects under the Income-tax Act, exempting them from capital gains tax.
Issue 2: Regarding the second issue of whether the surplus from the sale of silver utensils is subject to capital gains tax, the High Court ruled in favor of the assessee, aligning with the decision on the first issue. As the silver utensils were deemed personal effects, the profit from their sale was not liable for capital gains tax. The Court's decision was based on the nature of the utensils and their intended personal use, as established by the Tribunal's findings. Consequently, the surplus from the sale of the silver utensils was exempt from capital gains tax.
In conclusion, the High Court determined that the silver utensils in question were considered personal effects of the assessee under the Income-tax Act, thereby excluding the profit from their sale from capital gains tax liability. The decision was supported by past judgments and the nature of the utensils indicating personal use, leading to a favorable outcome for the assessee.
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1988 (12) TMI 31
Issues involved: The issue involves the imposition of penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 based on the disclosure petition filed by the assessee under section 271(4A) and the subsequent assessment proceedings.
Judgment Details:
Imposition of Penalty: The Income-tax Officer initiated reassessment proceedings under section 147(a) and imposed a penalty under section 271(1)(c) after the assessee made a disclosure petition admitting undisclosed income. The Inspecting Assistant Commissioner imposed a penalty of Rs. 54,667 after considering objections raised by the assessee.
Tribunal's Decision: The Tribunal canceled the penalty, stating that the assessee voluntarily disclosed the income to the Department, indicating no concealment. The Tribunal found no admission of concealment in the disclosure petition filed by the assessee.
Legal Principles: The court referred to a previous case where it was held that if an assessee discloses income under section 271(4A) and the conditions are met, relief cannot be denied. Imposition of penalty should consider all facts and circumstances, not just the admission of concealed income.
Reframed Question: The court reframed the question to focus on whether the Tribunal erred in law by holding that no penalty was applicable based on the disclosure petition filed under section 271(4A).
Final Decision: The court answered the reframed question in the affirmative, against the Revenue, indicating that the penalty was not justified in this case. The court also mentioned a similar view taken in a previous case.
Conclusion: The judgment highlights the importance of considering all aspects before imposing a penalty for concealed income, emphasizing that voluntary disclosure by the assessee should be taken into account. The court's decision underscores the need for a comprehensive assessment of facts and circumstances before penalizing an assessee for alleged concealment of income.
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1988 (12) TMI 30
The High Court of Bombay considered a case involving weighted deduction under section 35B(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The court was unable to answer the question due to uncertainty regarding the facts surrounding the expenditure on foreign publicity by the Engineering Export Promotion Council. The reference was returned unanswered.
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1988 (12) TMI 29
Issues: - Deductibility of city compensatory allowance under section 16(v) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for assessment years 1971-72 and 1972-73.
Analysis: The High Court of BOMBAY addressed the issue of whether the city compensatory allowance received by the assessee was deductible under section 16(v) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The court referred to a previous judgment in the case of CIT v. D. R. Phatak where it was held that compensatory (city) allowance was exempt under section 10(14) of the Income-tax Act and not considered a perquisite under section 17(2). The court noted that the language of section 10(14) and section 16(v) during the relevant period was not significantly different. Section 10(14) provided for exemption of special allowances while section 16(v) allowed for deduction of amounts actually expended by the assessee. The court emphasized that compensatory (city) allowance was not a source of profit to the recipient as it was regulated based on the expenses incurred due to posting in a particular place. Despite the insertion of an Explanation to section 10(14) by the Legislature, section 16(v) remained unchanged. The court held that the observation made in the previous case regarding section 16(v) still applied. The judgment was supported by the decision of the Calcutta High Court in CIT v. R. R. Bajoria, where a similar conclusion was reached after considering relevant case law.
Therefore, the court answered the question in the affirmative, ruling in favor of the assessee. No costs were awarded in this matter.
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1988 (12) TMI 28
Issues involved: Determination of whether the expenditure on barbed wire fencing is an allowable revenue expenditure and entitlement to depreciation on the cost incurred.
Issue 1 - Expenditure on Barbed Wire Fencing: The assessee, a company, claimed an expenditure of Rs. 20,246 for putting up barbed wire fencing at its factory premises. The Income-tax Officer initially disallowed the claim, deeming it of capital nature. However, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner accepted the claim, stating the fencing was necessary to prevent various issues such as entry of animals, theft, and disputes with neighbors. The Tribunal, on the other hand, viewed the expenditure as securing an enduring advantage, although not a capital asset. The assessee argued that the expenditure was on revenue account, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Empire Jute Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1980] 124 ITR 1, emphasizing that the fencing did not add value to capital assets. The court agreed with the assessee, concluding that the expenditure facilitated efficient business operations and was thus of revenue nature.
Issue 2 - Entitlement to Depreciation: As the first issue was resolved in favor of the assessee, the question of entitlement to depreciation on the cost of the fencing did not need to be addressed, and thus remained unanswered.
In conclusion, the court held that the expenditure on barbed wire fencing was of revenue nature, allowing the assessee's claim. The second issue regarding depreciation was not addressed due to the resolution of the first issue.
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1988 (12) TMI 27
The High Court of Bombay delivered a judgment regarding technical know-how fees paid to foreign collaborators. The court ruled in favor of the assessee, allowing depreciation on the technical know-how as plant under the Income-tax Act. The first question was not answered as it was not pressed by the counsel. No costs were awarded. (Case citation: 1988 (12) TMI 27 - BOMBAY High Court)
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1988 (12) TMI 26
Issues involved: The judgment addresses the entitlement to weighted deduction u/s 35B(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the deduction of business loss for imported electrical spare parts not taken delivery of.
Entitlement to Weighted Deduction: The Tribunal referred a question regarding the assessee's entitlement to weighted deduction u/s 35B(1)(a) for the assessment year 1971-72. A similar question was previously unanswered due to a lack of facts. The court returned the question unanswered again due to the same reason.
Deduction of Business Loss: The Tribunal referred two questions regarding the deduction of business loss for imported electrical spare parts not taken delivery of. The assessee decided not to take delivery of rusted spare parts and incurred expenses for tracing the consignment. The Income-tax Officer, Appellate Assistant Commissioner, and Tribunal disallowed the claim, considering it more of a penalty or fine than a business loss. The Tribunal also noted the absence of an inspection report to prove the condition of the goods.
Court's Decision: The court found in favor of the assessee, emphasizing that the decision not to clear the consignment was a business decision made after the consignment was traced by the assessee's agents. The court held that the departmental authorities had no grounds to question this decision without valid reasons. Therefore, the court answered both questions in the negative and in favor of the assessee, allowing the deduction of the business loss.
Conclusion: The court's judgment favored the assessee's claim for deduction of business loss for imported electrical spare parts not taken delivery of, highlighting that it was a valid business decision and not subject to questioning without substantial reasons.
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1988 (12) TMI 25
Issues: 1. Entitlement to weighted deduction under section 35B(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. 2. Entitlement to development rebate in respect of air-conditioners and electrical lighting installations.
Analysis:
Issue 1: The first issue pertains to the entitlement of the assessee to a weighted deduction under section 35B(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The court declined to answer this question due to the inadequacy of the statement of facts, similar to a previous reference. As a result, the question remained unanswered, and the judgment did not delve further into this issue.
Issue 2: The second issue revolves around the entitlement to development rebate concerning air-conditioners and electrical lighting installations. The Income-tax Officer and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner disallowed the development rebate on the cost of air-conditioners and electric installations based on the premise that they were not used for the purposes of the factory. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal upheld this view, emphasizing the different purpose of these installations. However, the court noted the lack of clarity regarding the purpose of the conference hall where the air-conditioners were installed, whether for office or factory use. Consequently, the court could not ascertain the dominant use of the air-conditioners and denied the development rebate for this expenditure.
Regarding the dispensary building within the factory premises, the court considered the purpose of providing medical assistance to factory workers. It was argued that the dispensary's primary function was to offer medical aid beyond urgent first-aid, especially considering the larger number of factory workers. The court found that the dispensary's dominant purpose was to provide medical assistance to factory workers, making it eligible for development rebate. The claim for development rebate on lighting in the factory yard was not pursued by the Revenue, and the court did not address this aspect further.
In conclusion, the court answered the second question affirmatively in favor of the assessee concerning the cost of electrical lighting installations in the dispensary building and factory yard. However, the claim for air-conditioners installed in the conference hall was denied, ruling in favor of the Revenue. No costs were awarded in this judgment.
This comprehensive analysis highlights the court's reasoning and decision-making process regarding the entitlement to development rebate for specific installations within the factory premises, emphasizing the dominant use and purpose of each facility in determining eligibility for tax benefits.
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1988 (12) TMI 24
The High Court of Bombay ruled that the dividend reserve and gratuity reserve were not considered 'reserves for the purpose of capital computation' under the Surtax Act of 1964. The decision was based on previous court rulings. The excess amount over the known or determinate liability of the assessee in respect of gratuity would be treated as reserve for capital computation. The judgment was delivered by Judge T. D. Sugla. No costs were awarded.
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1988 (12) TMI 23
Issues Involved: 1. Whether the Tribunal erred in law in disallowing the amount of Rs. 1,08,088 written off as a deduction in arriving at the taxable income of the company.
Judgment Summary:
1. Tribunal's Disallowance of the Amount: The Tribunal disallowed the amount of Rs. 1,08,088 written off by the assessee-company, stating that it did not fall u/s 28, u/s 36, or u/s 37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal held that the amounts were not shown to be loans to be adjusted against future rent and were not advanced in the course of banking or money-lending business. Additionally, the amounts were advanced in earlier years and thus could not represent the expenditure of the year in question.
2. Assessee's Argument: The assessee argued that the amounts were advanced to the landlord to facilitate the construction of factory premises for its existing business. The agreements indicated that the premises were to be leased for ten years with an option to renew for five more years. The assessee contended that the acquisition of property on lease was a business asset, and any expenditure incurred in connection therewith should be allowable as business expenditure. Reliance was placed on various court decisions, including CIT v. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd., CIT v. Bombay Cycle and Motor Agency Ltd., and CIT v. Cinceita Private Ltd., which held that expenditure on lease deeds was business expenditure.
3. Department's Argument: The Department argued that there was no material on record to show that the factory premises were required for the assessee's existing business. Even if they were, the advances had no proximate connection with the carrying on of the business. The Department distinguished the cases cited by the assessee, stating that those involved actual executed leases, whereas the present case involved advances made before the execution of the lease deed.
4. Court's Analysis: The Court reviewed the agreements and found that the factory premises were being acquired for the assessee's existing business. The Tribunal had rejected the claim on the ground that the amounts were advanced in earlier years, not on the ground that the premises were not for the existing business. The Court held that the period of the lease was not of much relevance and that the amounts advanced for acquiring the factory on lease were for the purpose of the assessee's business.
5. Conclusion: The Court concluded that the amounts advanced by the assessee to the landlord for acquiring the factory premises on lease were for the purpose of business. Therefore, the loss of these advances should be treated as a business loss and not a capital loss. The question posed was answered in the affirmative and in favor of the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1988 (12) TMI 22
The High Court of Bombay ruled that interest payable by the Government under section 214(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is to be calculated based on the amount of tax determined on the first or original assessment made by the Income-tax Officer. The decision followed the Full Bench judgment in CIT v. Carona Sahu Co. Ltd. [1984] 146 ITR 452. No costs were awarded.
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1988 (12) TMI 21
Issues: 1. Interpretation of section 187(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 regarding assessing the assessee-partnership. 2. Interpretation of the effect of the partnership deed and retirement of a partner on the partnership dissolution. 3. Determining if a change in the constitution of the firm occurred due to a partner's retirement.
Analysis: The judgment by the High Court of Bombay involved a reference made by the Revenue regarding the assessment year 1971-72. The court noted that the assessee was a registered partnership with four partners governed by a partnership deed. The deed allowed one partner, Vijaykumar, to unilaterally terminate the partnership. Vijaykumar exercised this right on December 31, 1970, leading to the dissolution of the old firm and the formation of a new one with three partners. The Income-tax Officer initially accepted this dissolution and made separate assessments for the two broken periods. However, the Additional Commissioner of Income-tax intervened under section 263, directing a single assessment for the year ended March 31, 1971, citing a mere change in the firm's constitution due to one partner's retirement.
The court analyzed the facts and found that there was indeed a dissolution of the old firm, as evidenced by the closure of old books and the start of new ones. The court upheld the Tribunal's decision that the new firm succeeded the old one, necessitating separate assessments for the broken periods under section 188. The court rejected the Revenue's argument that the old firm continued with three partners, emphasizing the actual dissolution and formation of a new firm. Consequently, the court answered the posed questions in the negative and in favor of the assessee, ruling that separate assessments were appropriate for the broken periods.
In conclusion, the court's judgment clarified the legal implications of partnership dissolution, retirement of a partner, and the formation of a new firm. It underscored the importance of correctly interpreting partnership deeds and statutory provisions to determine the tax implications of such events. The decision provided clarity on the application of relevant sections of the Income-tax Act in cases of partnership changes, ensuring proper assessment and compliance with tax laws.
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1988 (12) TMI 20
The High Court of Bombay ruled in favor of the assessee regarding relief under section 80-1 and against the Revenue regarding proposed dividends deduction. Citing previous judgments, the court answered questions accordingly. No costs ordered.
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1988 (12) TMI 19
Issues involved: 1. Whether section 140A(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is confiscatory and violative of article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India as held by the Madras High Court in the case of A. M. Sali Maricar v. ITO [1973] 90 ITR 116? 2. Whether the Tribunal was justified in relying upon the decision of the Madras High Court in A. M. Sali Maricar v. ITO [1973] 90 ITR 116?
Summary: The High Court addressed two questions raised by the Revenue. The first question was not answered, while the second question was answered in favor of the assessee based on the court's judgment in a previous case. The Tribunal was deemed justified in following the Madras High Court's decision in A. M. Sali Maricar's case as there was no contrary decision from any other High Court at that time. The Tribunal did not rule on the validity of section 140A(3) in the current judgment, and the High Court stated it was not within its jurisdiction to decide on the constitutional validity of a provision in a reference case.
No costs were awarded in this judgment.
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1988 (12) TMI 18
The High Court of Bombay ruled in favor of the assessee, stating that the units set up for manufacturing monochloracetic acid and denatured spirit were considered new industrial undertakings eligible for benefits under section 80J of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The decision was based on a previous court ruling and no costs were awarded.
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