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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 696 Records
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1966 (12) TMI 2 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
It is well settled that the test whether a certain order is final within the meaning of Art. 133(1)(b)of Constitution of India is whether that order finally disposed of the rights of the parties covered by the proceeding
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1966 (12) TMI 1 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
Net wealth - section 2(m) - Whether debt owned liable to be deducted
... ... ... ... ..... ets or his net assets may be much below the taxable limit though for a good part of the accounting year he was in possession of vast assets. We are accordingly of the opinion that no deduction on account of wealth-tax could be allowed to the petitioner-assessee in arriving at his net assets for the purpose of computing the wealth-tax payable by him for the various years under reference. In view, however, of our finding that the petitioner was entitled to deductions on account of expenditure-tax and gift-tax, the orders of the wealth-tax authorities to that extent cannot be sustained, and we direct the respondent-authorities to rectify the orders in view of the observations made by us above so as to give the petitioner relief for the amount paid by him on account of expenditure and gift taxes. All the four petitions are accordingly accepted to the extent indicated above. In the circumstances of the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. SHAMSHER BAHADUR J.-I agree
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1966 (11) TMI 97 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e for whose benefit they exist are safeguarded. Therefore, courts must possess the power to sustain proper proceedings by them in appropriate cases and grant relief in the interests of and for the express benefit of the trust imposing such conditions as may be called for. We think that this is pre-eminently a case where the principle laid down by the Supreme Court should be made to apply. In our opinion, the plaintiffs, even though they are found to be de facto trustees, were in the circumstances of the case entitled to bring the present suit to recover the properties of the Shri Laxminarayan Bhagwan Mandir from the hands of the defendants who have no right, title or in interest thereto. Thus both the contentions upon which the defendants claim that the plaintiffs' suit should be thrown out fail. 33. In the result we affirm the judgment and decree of the trial Court and dismiss the First Appeal No. 573 of 1963. 34. The rest of the judgment is not material to this report.
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1966 (11) TMI 96 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... quot; includes ---- (a) any instrument whereby a person obliges himself to pay money to another, on condition that the obligation shall be void If a specified act is performed, or is not performed, as the case may be; (b) any instrument attested by a witness and not payable to order or bearer, whereby a person obliges himself to pay money to another; and (c) any instrument so attested, whereby a person obliges himself to deliver grain or other agricultural produce to another." 6. A promissory note which is not expressed to be payable to order or bearer certainly becomes a bond under Clause (b) above if it is attested. But if a promissory note is expressed to be payable to order or bearer then it cannot fall under Clause (b) above or under any other clause of Section 2 (5). 7. I accordingly allow the revision application and dismiss the suit of the plaintiff. In the circumstances of the case I direct that parties shall bear their own costs of these proceedings throughout.
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1966 (11) TMI 95 - HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
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... ... ..... t lying in the custody of the court was concerned, that had already been dealt with and released from custody by the court, by its order dated May 11, 1965, passed under Section 523, Cr. P.C. There was no revision filed against that order, and, therefore, by the time the application was made by the petitioner on May 19, 1965, for the relief under Section 132 of the Income Tax Act that order had become final and there was nothing left thereafter to be dealt with in connection with the cash by that court. In that view of the matter the Court of the learned Special Magistrate had by that time in regard to the cash amount become functus officio. 6. For these reasons I have no doubt in my mind that no relief could be given to the petitioner in regard to the application filed by him ; and if that application was not maintainable in the Court of the Special Magistrate, much less there can lie any revision against the order in this court. 7. Accordingly this application is dismissed.
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1966 (11) TMI 94 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... it jurisdiction to consider the evidence for itself and reach its own conclusions in matters which have been left by the legislature to the decisions of specially constituted tribunals." 61. To our mind, the same principles should apply to this case and in making our order we have also taken into consideration the order of Sinha, J. in , which was a case, inter alia, under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 read with the Land Customs Act of 1924. 62. The result it that this appeal is allowed. The Rule is made absolute and the order of the Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs, Calcutta, dated the 12th December, 1951 is quashed and or set aside by a Writ in the nature of Certiorari and there will be a Writ in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondents not to give effect to the same. The Respondents may, however, if they are so minded, proceed with the show cause notice in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs. Ghose, J. 63. I agree.
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1966 (11) TMI 93 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hare of it, another indication is to be found in the clause, "the sthanam property held by him shall devolve" ; it does not seem reasonable to construe this as descriptive, that is, as meaning "sthanam property which was held by him prior to division." As a result, it seems proper and reasonable to hold that section 7(3) of the Hindu Succession Act has enacted a rule of distribution of sthanam property upon the death of the sthanamdar, and not of passing of such property, the object in so enacting being to do away with sthanam property for the future, on the death of existing sthanamdars. It has to be observed in passing that section 7(1) of the Estate Duty Act, under which assessments of sthanam property used to be made, has not been amended after the passing of the Hindu Succession Act. Speaking with respect, for the reasons stated above, I find myself unable to agree with the judgment of Srinivasan J. on this point in K.C. Manavedan's case (supra).
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1966 (11) TMI 92 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... om the petitioners since the amount already paid by the petitioners was in pursuance of the Circular of the Collector dated 18th March 1960. The plea was in substance and effect a plea of estoppel but it is now well settled that an estoppel cannot be pleaded against a statute. This contention urged on behalf of the petitioners must, thereof, be rejected and it must be held that the State was entitled to demand the difference in entertainments duty from the petitioners on a correct obstruction of the provisions of the Act. The petitioners in some of the petitions also challenged the vires of section 3 of the Act but in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Western India. Theatres Ltd. V. Cantonment Board Poona. AIR 1959 SC 582 the contention as to vires was not pressed on behalf of those petitioners. Nothing, therefore, need be said about that contention (11) The result therefore is that the petitions fall and the rules are discharged with costs. (12) Rules discharged.
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1966 (11) TMI 91 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... they should have made a in application within a reasonable time thereafter. Merely because the Chief Engineer had espoused their cause and was writing letters from time to time to the State Government to do something for them did not mean ;that they could rest upon their oars if they were really being discriminated against. As we cannot hold that the appellants were entitled to any particular indulgence or concession, the only way ,of meting out equality to all surveyors who had been promoted to the cadre of Assistant Engineers would be to say that promotions ,should in all cases be effective from the date of the notification. This is obviously beyond our powers. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed, but on the facts ,of this case, we make no order as to costs of this appeal. This order will also govern the case of S.A. Muni Reddy who alone out of 37 persons was allowed to intervene in this appeal by our order made on 11th October, 1966. V.P.S. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (11) TMI 90 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... appeal by the said Hazra against the said preliminary decree was pending in, the High Court, the doctrine of lis pendens must apply to his purchase and as aforesaid he was bound by the result of that suit. In the view we have taken that the final foreclosure decree was competently passed by the Trial Court, his right to equity of redemption was extinguished by that decree and he had therefore no longer any right to redeem the said mortgage. His appeal against the said final decree was misconceived and the High Court was in error in allowing it and in passing the said order of remand directing the Trial Court to reopen the question of redemption and to allow the respondent to participate in proceedings to amend the said preliminary decree. In the result, we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the High Court and restore the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court. The respondent will pay the appellants' costs all throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1966 (11) TMI 89 - SUPREME COURT
the doctrine of equality in the matter of appointment and promotion'
If the preferential' treatment of one source in relation to the other is based on the differences between the said two sources - the said recruitment can legitimately be sustained on the basis of a valid classification.
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1966 (11) TMI 88 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... igarh is the capital of the two States need not detain us, because we are of the view that no discrimination by unseating members from the Haryana area can be deemed to be practised against the appellants of which they can complain. The appellants were not sitting members of the Legislative Council of the old State of Punjab and no personal right of the appellants is infringed by unseating the members whose names are set out in the Seventh Schedule. Again the new State of Punjab is a bi-cameral Legislature. The new State of Haryana is uni-cameral. It is not claimed,, and cannot be claimed, that a resident of the State of Haryana is,. merely because of that character, entitled to sit in the Punjab Legislative Council. By allowing the members from the Chandigarh area to continue to remain members of the Legislative Council of the new State of Punjab, no right of the residents of Haryana is therefore violated. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Y. P. Appeal dismissed
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1966 (11) TMI 87 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... pecific Provinces, municipalities, boards or authorities." The proviso clearly shows that the section enabled the Dominion Legislature to make a contrary provision if in the financial year ending March 31, 1939, there was in force a tax on professions, trades, callings or employments the rate of which exceeded ₹ 50/-. The Dominion Legislature could not authorise under the proviso a fresh imposition exceeding ₹ 501-. In view of our above conclusions it is not necessary to deal with the point whether the word "imposed" in item 4 of the Schedule to the Profession Tax Limitation Act, 1941, would include "deemed to be imposed" because by virtue of s. 3 of the Berar Laws (Provincial) Act,1941, the tax would be deemed to be imposed not under the Central Provinces Municipalities Act, 1922, but the Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922. In the result the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. One hearing fee. Appeals dismissed..
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1966 (11) TMI 86 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the overtime wages paid to an employee by the appellants are "wages" within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 ?
Held that:- The Legislature by defining `employee', having had the knowledge of the payment of the remuneration for overtime work done by the employee and having excluded it in Section 2(9), the omission thereof in the definition of Section 2(22) excluding items A to D, would be eloquent and meaningful. Whatever remuneration, paid or payable for overtime work, forms wages under an implied term of the contract. The object thereby is clear that the overtime work done by the employee is an implied contract to do overtime and the remuneration paid therefore does form part of the wages under Section 2(22).
. Since it is not obligatory for the employees to work, remuneration paid towards overtime work amounts to mutual payment not as part of wages but as remuneration for services rendered outside the contract of employment of the employees. Therefore, it will not come within additional remuneration, if any, paid at intervals not exceeding two months within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Act. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (11) TMI 85 - SUPREME COURT
Whether a sale of immovable property in execution of a money decree ought to be confirmed when it is found that the ex parts decree which was put into execution has been set aside subsequently?
Held that:- Appeal is allowed. The order of the High Court is set aside and that of the executing court affirmed as on the facts of this case, the sale must be confirmed.
Although we have noticed some decisions where the right of the auction-purchaser decree-holder in circumstances similar to the case before us was discussed or the right of a purchaser in regard to a sale held after the setting aside of the decree was touched upon, our judgment must not be taken as adjudication upon any of these points.
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1966 (11) TMI 84 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tractor , since, in my opinion, it is too well-known as to what a tractor means. The Madras High Court has rightly observed that tractor is not a thing which is employed to carry either persons or goods on land . Unless a trolly is attached to a tractor, it cannot be used for the purpose of conveying anything. It is employed for agricultural operations only. 9.. Due to the reasons stated above, these petitions would succeed. In the order passed by the Assessing Authority in Civil Writ No. 68 of 1966, although it has not held in so many words that a tractor is a motor vehicle, since he has proceeded to charge tax at the enhanced rate on the sale of spare parts of tractors, the case is identical with the other three cases. I would, therefore, set aside the impugned orders in all the four petitions. The Assessing Authority is directed to proceed afresh in accordance with law laid down in this judgment. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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1966 (11) TMI 83 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... by the Government in their counter-affidavit and that there is no need to make any assumption of the said fact. We are, however, not impressed with this argument and we would have been disinclined to entertain this writ petition holding that the petitioner should file an appeal before the appellate authority, but for the fact that the case has been referred to a Division Bench by Jaganmohan Reddy, J. (as he then was) on the ground that it involves an important question of law. We therefore quash the order of assessment No. G.I. 5436 made by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Nandyal. It is undoubtedly open to the said authority to make a fresh assessment in the light of the above decision. It will be open to the petitioner to let in evidence of the fact of payment of tax by the crushing millers and the assessing officer should receive such evidence in proceeding with the assessment. The writ petition is therefore allowed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
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1966 (11) TMI 82 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the rupee. There is also a surcharge under the Kerala Surcharge on Taxes Act, 1957, which is not attempted to be supported in respect of works contract by the department. 2.. In these circumstances, we think that the proper course will be to quash the assessment and leave the department to make a fresh assessment, if possible, in accordance with law. In the view we have taken, the other contentions of counsel for the petitioner do not arise for consideration and are not considered in this judgment. This tax revision case is allowed as above. No costs. Petition allowed.
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1966 (11) TMI 81 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ntract of sale is, in our opinion, no other than a notional sale which the State Legislature is incompetent to tax. Similar reasoning also answers the other postulate that the works contract must be treated as a combination of two contracts one for sale and the other for repair. It is unnecessary for us to say anything more than what the Madras High Court has already stated in dealing with a similar argument addressed to it in the case already cited. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, and in view of the clear principles of law well established by a series of decisions, we have no hesitation in holding that the order including within the assessable turnover of the petitioner the above sums of Rs. 24,713.90 and Rs. 2,408.43 is illegal and should be set aside. We order accordingly. The excess tax, if any, collected in that regard will be refunded to the assessee. The assessee-petitioner will have the costs of this petition. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
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1966 (11) TMI 80 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f of the respondents to the effect that the order of the revising authority in this case was an order against which an appeal could have been preferred to this Court. It is no doubt so. The petitioner explains that he thought that he could get the Commissioner to correct his mistake by moving the revising authority under rule 38 of the Mysore Sales Tax Rules to rectify or review his order. Whether or not it was quite prudent on his part to have done so, we do not think that we should decline to interfere in this case because the clear opinion we entertain in respect of the revisional order is that the revisional authority has interfered in a case in which it should not have interfered. Its order is, therefore, wholly without jurisdiction. The writ petition is allowed, the order of the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes impugned in this petition is set aside, and the appellate order of the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Belgaum Division, is restored. Petition allowed.
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