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Showing 81 to 100 of 696 Records
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1966 (11) TMI 10 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Assessee was liable for penalty under s. 22(2) and 22(4) and s. 18A(9) on the IT Act, 1922 for which the officer levied a consolidated penalty - whether it is legal to levy a composite penalty for more than one offence u/s 28 - held, yes
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1966 (11) TMI 9 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Diversion of income - share income - only 1/3rd of it was includible in the assessment of the assessee
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1966 (11) TMI 8 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Hotel - expenditure incurred - Whether the assessee was entitled to deduct the sum of Rs. 60,000 as revenue expenditure under clause (i) or (xv) of section 10(2) - Held, no
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1966 (11) TMI 7 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Renewal of registration - firm ... ... ... ... ..... of a minor if the contract is for the purposes mentioned above ... It need hardly be stated that the partnership deed must be construed reasonably. In Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shah Jethaji Phulchand the Supreme Court reiterated that the partnership deed must be construed reasonably. On the facts of the present case the partnership deed construed reasonably and as a whole cannot possibly lead to the conclusion that the minor was admitted as a full partner. It specifically stated that he was admitted subject to the provisions of section 30 of the Partnership Act only to the benefits of partnership and that his share in the profits was one-seventh and not in the losses. For the reasons given above the question referred is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The reference is answered accordingly. The department will pay the costs of the assessee which we assess at Rs. 250. Counsel s fee is also assessed at Rs. 250. Question answered in the affirmative
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1966 (11) TMI 6 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Appellate Assistant Commissioner can call for and receive additional evidence or material not available to the Income-tax Officer at the time of making the best judgment assessment and he has also jurisdiction to remand the matter under section 31(2), but only subject to the limitations
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1966 (11) TMI 5 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Assessee is a stock exchange company - General Public Utility - entitled to exemption u/s 4(3)(I) of the IT Act, 1922.
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1966 (11) TMI 4 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
IT Act of 1922 - IT Act of1961 - proceedings for enhancement of the petitioner's assessment, including the notice dated April 23, 1966, issued under s. 251(2) of the Act of 1961 are without jurisdiction
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1966 (11) TMI 3 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Penalty notice under section 28(3) - default in filing the return ... ... ... ... ..... and the legislature should prescribe a reasonable time-limit for completion of all penalty proceedings. The Lahore High Court in Vir Bhan Bansi Lal v. Commissioner of Income-tax nearly three decades ago, drew the attention of the Commissioner of Income-tax to the desirability of removing the ambiguity that exists in the language of section 28. For the reasons given above we would answer the question referred by saying that a penalty in respect of the assessment year 1945-46 as a matter of strict law could have been imposed in August, 1957, even though the assessment was completed in March, 1950, but propriety required the changed circumstances to be taken into consideration and the responsibility for the inordinate delay to be fastened before levying the penalty and upholding it. The reference is answered accordingly. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are, however, left to bear their own costs. Counsel s fee is assessed at Rs. 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1966 (11) TMI 2 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Kerala Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1950 - Petitioner was right in challenging the correctness of the order before the HC on the ground that section 36 which is the general section for rectification of mistake will not apply but only section 35
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1966 (11) TMI 1 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
It is settled law that in a statutory declaration, all the requirements of the section should be and must be strictly complied with literally - otherwise, it may prove fatal to the action proposed to be taken, especially in case where property rights are involved - on the date of the registration of the document there was no statutory declaration prohibiting the registering officer from completing the registration - document could be registered
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1966 (10) TMI 169 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... mediately. From this, it is impossible to spell out any agreement between the parties with respect to the bonus for the year 1964-65 or the allocation of capital and reserves of the company to the two units in calculating the bonus statement. 37. In our view, therefore, the parties were not bound by any agreement with regard to issue No. 1 and the Tribunal will have to take evidence to come to a finding on that issue. 38. In the result, the preliminary objection of the Management with regard to issues 3 and 4 succeeds while it fails on issue No. 1. 39. Appeals Nos. 2101 and 2102 of 1966 which are from the orders of the High Court are dismissed without any order as to costs. So far as Appeal No. 2100/1966 is concerned, the matter will go back to the Tribunal for decision in the light of the observations made above. In view of the divided success in this Court, there will be no order as to costs of this appeal. V.P.S. 40. Appeal No. 2100/66 remanded 41. Other Appeals dismissed.
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1966 (10) TMI 168 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ed with the encashment of the cheque were acting bona fide. There was no negligence on the part of the customer according to whose resolution, the cheque had to be signed jointly by two persons. The fraud could only be perpetrated because of the complicity of the employees of the bank, no doubt, with the help of one of the officers of the Union. The dishonesty of a particular officer of the Union was not the proximate cause of the loss to the bank. In our opinion, the case of G.C. Kurbar & Another v. Balaji Ramji Dange A.I.R. 1941 Bom 274 referred to in the judgment of the High Court has no application to the facts of this case. 17. In the result, the appeal succeeds, the judgment of the Patna High Court is set aside and that of the Subordinate Judge restored. The appellants do not want a decree against respondent No. 7. Consequently, there will be no decree as against the said respondent. The other respondents must pay the costs of this appeal. V.P.S. 18. Appeal allowed.
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1966 (10) TMI 167 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... 0(1)(f), the fact that the husband cohabited with the wife even after the knowledge that she had been guilty of cohabiting with another person would in our opinion be sufficient to constitute condonation, particularly, as in this case, the first respondent knew of the alleged adultery in May/June 1958 and still continued to cohabit with the appellant thereafter upto October 1958. Further the statement of the first respondent to the effect that he kept his wife after May/June 1958 at the instance of his friends is a clear indication of condonation even in the sense of forgiveness confirmed or made effective by reinstatement. We are therefore of opinion that the first respondent is not even entitled to a decree of judicial separation. 14. We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and restore that of the trial court rejecting the petition of the first respondent. The appellant will get her costs throughout from the first respondent. 15. Appeal allowed.
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1966 (10) TMI 166 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... gislature has chosen to impose tax on urban property only, it cannot be held that there has been discrimination between "urbanities" and "ruralities" contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution. On this point also, the petitioners have not chosen to place before us any material to show that the burden of property-tax under the Act falls unequally, in violation of article 14, on the owners of the urban property. We, therefore, decline to express any opinion on the plea of unconstitu-tionality of the Act resting on Article 14 of the Constitution. 16. For the foregoing reasons, the Madhya Pradesh Nagarlya Sthawar Sampatti Kar Adhiniyam, 1964, is held to be valid and constitutional, and all these petitions are dismissed with costs of the Respondent-State. Counsel's fee for the respondent-State in each case is fixed at ₹ 200/-. The outstanding amount of security deposit, if any after deduction of costs, shall be refunded to the petitioner in each case.
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1966 (10) TMI 165 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ediately before the death of the deceased coparcener. The share may now be determined on the aforesaid principle. In the notional partition, Joydeb, plaintiff No. 2, plaintiff No 1 and defendant No. 1 would be each entitled to Rs.-/4/ . On Joydeb's death his Rs. -/4/- interest would devolve upon the heirs being the relatives specified in Class 1 of the Schedule under Section 8 of the Act and the division among the heirs shall take place in accordance with the rules laid down in Section 10. The Rs -/4/- interest of Joydeb would thus be divided amongst all the eight persons (Plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 6 and defendant Nos. 1 and 2). Each of plaintiff No. 1 plaintiff No 2 and defendant No. 1 would get Rs. /4/6 and each of the rest would get Rs. -/-/6 interest. The learned trial court took the correct view. Rangubai v. Laxman AIR 1066 Bom 169 also takes the same view 7. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs throughout. Das, J. 8. I agree.
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1966 (10) TMI 164 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ed out that it had no intention of giving retrospective effect to the linkage for the following reasons (1) it had substantially increased the wages; (2) a long retrospective effect would unduly increase the burden on the Company; and (3) the workmen had been getting handsome bonuses. But, having regard to the fact that the Poona index figures had been published from April 1964, it held that the linkage should be from April 1, 1965 and not from the earlier date; that is to say, it had given, having regard to the aforesaid circumstances, a limited retrospective operation to the linkage. The employees have not made out any case for giving a further retrospective effect to the linkage. 65. In the result, Civil Appeal No. 406 of 1964 preferred by the Company is dismissed with costs; and Civil Appeal No. 407 of 1964 preferred by the Workmen is dismissed with costs, except that the Award is modified in regard to the age of retirement. G.C. 66. Appeals dismissed and award modified.
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1966 (10) TMI 163 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... n and their pronouncement with regard to the rate of interest prior to the date of the suit ought not to be disturbed. We also find no reason to interfere with the scaling down of the rate of interest to 6 per cent from the date of the filing of the suit. Although the reasons are not indicated, it seems fairly plain that their Lordships were using their discretion as regards interest pendente lite. We cannot overlook the fact that the mortgages -were executed as far back as 1936 and 1938 and that the creditor who had waited till 1950 for the institution of the suit would, in any event, get interest substantially exceeding the principal amount of the loans. In this view of things we are not prepared to interfere with the exercise of the discretion exercised by the learned Judges of the Madras High Court even though they have given no reasons for the reduction of rate of interest pendente lite. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. G. C. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (10) TMI 162 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... mulated and a consolidated single assessment was made on the best of judgment basis, on the ground that certain defects were noticed at an inspection and there was material that some of the returns were defective. Srinivasan, J. held that the procedure adopted was illegal, and that S. 7-A and the Rules would go to show that each return was independent of the rest and had to be assessed separately from the rest. In this case weekly returns were filed, accepted, tax levied and also collected from the petitioner. When such is the case, the petitioner cannot be called all of a sudden, may be after inspection, to pay accumulated tax, on the materials alleged to have been unearthed during a search of the premises. Unless the statute is amended, the taxing authorities will have no jurisdiction to call upon the petitioner to pay tax on escaped income or escaped turnover. The result is the petitioner succeeds and the rule is made absolute. There will however, be no order as to costs.
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1966 (10) TMI 161 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... at page 243 ). In the last mentioned case the disposition was for the benefit of a single member of the family who was given only a right of residence therein, and it was held that the instrument would fall within the definition of a settlement. The present is a stronger case where the document provides for annuities to be paid to the unborn children of the two daughters of the settlors and in a certain contingency for sale of the property and distribution of the sale proceeds among the children of the two daughters in equal proportion. ( 13. ) We are satisfied that the document in question was a settlement and correctly assessed to stamp duty by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority. The questions referred are accordingly answered as follows - (a) Yes. (b) Yes. (c) Doest not arise. A copy of this judgment shall be forwarded to the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority. The settlors shall pay the costs of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority. ( 14. ) Answered accordingly.
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1966 (10) TMI 160 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ade by the Crown free from restrictions as to alienation should not be the subject of a sale at the suit of a mortgagee." 12. With all respect to the learned Judges who decided AIR 1914 All 120, I do not see how the decision in (1906) 3 All LJ 628 was at all applicable to the facts of the case before them. At any rate it was not brought to their notice that Section 2 of the Crown Grants Act was applicable to a transfer of land or interest in land made by or on behalf of the Crown. A lease of immovable property is certainly a transfer of an interest in land. 13. The decision in Akram Mea v. Municipal Corporation Secunderabad, AIR 1967 Andh Pra 859 is of no help as it is based on the finding that the lease in question was not executed by or on behalf of the Government. 14. I am accordingly of the opinion that the decision of the court below is correct and dismiss the revision application. In the circumstances of the case, I leave the parties to bear their own costs of it.
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