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Showing 101 to 120 of 1439 Records
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2015 (7) TMI 1346
Dividend income as exempt u/s.10(34) - Whether dividend income is considered as part of income of Life Insurance Business and is included as an 'income' by the actuary? - HELD THAT:- Appeal by the revenue in respect of Assessment Year 2005-06 [2015 (7) TMI 972 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] was not entertained by us today. Accordingly, Question No.5 is not entertained.
Surplus available in Share Holders Account - to be taxed as income from other sources - HELD THAT:- The impugned order while allowing the assessee's appeal holds that income earned on shareholders' amount has to be considered as arising out of Life Insurance Business. Moreover, in terms of Section 44 of the Act, such income has to be taxed in accordance with First Schedule as provided therein. None of the authorities under the Act nor even before us is it urged that the assessee is carrying on separate business other than life insurance business. Accordingly, the impugned order holding that the income from shareholders' account is also to be taxed as a part of life insurance business cannot be found fault with in view of the clear mandate of Section 44 of the Act. Accordingly Question No.8 also does not raise any substantial question of law. Thus not entertained.
Appeals admitted on Question Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6.
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2015 (7) TMI 1345
Refund of deducted amount of service tax from bills of the petitioner - Clause 13(a) of the Notification No. 12/2012-Service Tax dated 17th March, 2012 - HELD THAT:- It is well settled that under Article 265 of the Constitution of India no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law. In view of the exemption it is evident that the respondents have no authority to collect service tax which is not at all leviable under the law.
All the writ applications are allowed and the concerned respondents are directed to refund the entire amount of service tax deducted from the bills of the petitioners after the issuance of the aforesaid Notification dated 17.3.2012.
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2015 (7) TMI 1344
Addition u/s. 14A r.w. rule 8D (subject to relief on investment in debentures) - whether no satisfaction had been recorded by Assessing Officer for making the disallowance in respect of the submissions made before him - whether no expenditure had been incurred by the appellant to earn the exempt income and also the Assessing Officer has not pointed out any expenditure having been incurred by the appellant? - HELD THAT:- New investments have definitively been made in various mutual funds and some of the funds are designated as dividend plans which itself means that assessee is going to earn dividend which is exempt from tax. Further, wherever no dividend is received from the market fund the sale of funds also may be exempted in the case of long term funds. In some cases there may not be any exempted income. This aspect was examined by Ld. CIT(A) and he has remitted the matter back to the file of Assessing Officer for examination of the issue whether disallowance under Rule 8D(2)(iii) is properly computed with respect to the contention that on certain investments no exempt income would arise.
Once the above aspect has been remanded, we find nothing wrong with the order of Ld. CIT(A). At best, the Assessing Officer can also point out how he is not satisfied with the correctness of the accounts with reference to the disallowance of ₹ 50,000/- made by the assessee in respect of section 14A of the Act. Resultantly the appeal stands dismissed.
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2015 (7) TMI 1343
Revision u/s 263 - assessee is not a Co-operative Bank and Section 80P(4) has no application - Tribunal set aside order u/s 263 denying benefit of exemption granted also confirmed by HC - HELD THAT:- Delay condoned. Leave granted.
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2015 (7) TMI 1342
Depreciation on goodwill being intangible assets - HELD THAT:- We find from the record that the assessee has rightly claimed depreciation on goodwill being intangible assets. We also find from the record that similar issue was raised by the assessee in the assessment year 2008-09, which was decided in favour of the assessee and thus, the issue is squarely covered in favour of the assessee by its own case in the earlier years.
FAA for the assessment year 2008-09 decided in favour of the assessee holding that the assessee was entitled to depreciation on goodwill by following the decision of Apex Court in the case of Smifs Securities Ltd [2012 (8) TMI 713 - SUPREME COURT]. We, therefore, are of the considered opinion that the case of the assessee stands covered by the earlier decision by the order of FAA - Decided against revenue.
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2015 (7) TMI 1341
TDS u/s 194C on deductee (RSAMB) as registered u/s 12A - CIT (A) held that the provisions of the section 194J were not applicable in respect of the payments made by the assessee to RSAMB, on account of statutory contribution, against which the assessee received professional and technical services from RSAMB - HELD THAT:- In the instant case, there was no loss to the revenue as the deductee (RSAMB) was not liable to pay tax (the income being loss and RSAMB being registered u/s 12A).
In view of the above, it is held that the assessee cannot be treated as an assessee in default. The A.O. is directed to delete the demand raised u/s 201(1) & 201(1A).
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2015 (7) TMI 1340
Claim of deduction u/s 35(2AB) - HELD THAT:- DR as well as ld. AR of assessee agreed before us the issue in dispute is squarely covered by the decision of ITAT in assessee’s own case for AY 2009-10. On perusal of the order of the coordinate bench [2014 (10) TMI 171 - ITAT HYDERABAD] the operative portion of which has been reproduced by ld. CIT(A) in her order, it is very much clear that the issue in dispute has been decided in favour of assessee by holding that assessee is entitled for deduction u/s 35(2AB ). Therefore, ld. CIT(A) having decided the issue by following the aforesaid order of Tribunal, we do not find any infirmity in the impugned order of ld. CIT(A). Accordingly, we uphold the same by dismissing the grounds raised by the department.
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2015 (7) TMI 1339
Demand of Bribe - Sections 7 and 13 read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - prosecution case is that the complainant who was examined at the trial as PW-1, appeared before the Lokayukta Police to allege that the Appellant had demanded a bribe of ₹ 500/- from him for issue of a copy of a certain resolution dated 13th March, 1998 passed by the Sabbanakruppe Grama Panchayath - HELD THAT:- This appeal must, in our opinion, succeed on the short ground that in the absence of a valid previous sanction required Under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the trial Court was not competent to take cognizance of the offence alleged against the Appellant.
The legal position regarding the importance of sanction Under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption is thus much too clear to admit equivocation. The statute forbids taking of cognizance by the Court against a public servant except with the previous sanction of an authority competent to grant such sanction in terms of Clauses (a), (b) and (c) to Section 19(1). The question regarding validity of such sanction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The competence of the court trying the accused so much depends upon the existence of a valid sanction. In case the sanction is found to be invalid the court can discharge the accused relegating the parties to a stage where the competent authority may grant a fresh sanction for prosecution in accordance with law. If the trial Court proceeds, despite the invalidity attached to the sanction order, the same shall be deemed to be non-est in the eyes of law and shall not forbid a second trial for the same offences, upon grant of a valid sanction for such prosecution.
A careful reading of Sub-section (3) to Section 19 would show that the same interdicts reversal or alteration of any finding, sentence or order passed by a Special Judge, on the ground that the sanction order suffers from an error, omission or irregularity, unless of course the court before whom such finding, sentence or order is challenged in appeal or revision is of the opinion that a failure of justice has occurred by reason of such error, omission or irregularity - The rationale underlying the provision obviously is that if the trial has proceeded to conclusion and resulted in a finding or sentence, the same should not be lightly interfered with by the appellate or the revisional court simply because there was some omission, error or irregularity in the order sanctioning prosecution Under Section 19(1). Failure of justice is, what the appellate or revisional Court would in such cases look for. And while examining whether any such failure had indeed taken place, the Court concerned would also keep in mind whether the objection touching the error, omission or irregularity in the sanction could or should have been raised at an earlier stage of the proceedings meaning thereby whether the same could and should have been raised at the trial stage instead of being urged in appeal or revision.
In the case at hand, the Special Court not only entertained the contention urged on behalf of the accused about the invalidity of the order of sanction but found that the authority issuing the said order was incompetent to grant sanction. The trial Court held that the authority who had issued the sanction was not competent to do so, a fact which has not been disputed before the High Court or before us - The only error which the trial Court, in our opinion, committed was that, having held the sanction to be invalid, it should have discharged the accused rather than recording an order of acquittal on the merit of the case.
The High Court has not, in our opinion, correctly appreciated the legal position regarding the need for sanction or the effect of its invalidity. It has simply glossed over the subject, by holding that the question should have been raised at an earlier stage. The High Court did not, it appears, realise that the issue was not being raised before it for the first time but had been successfully urged before the trial Court.
Appeal allowed.
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2015 (7) TMI 1338
Winding up petition - Cancellation of a lease deed - A lease deed was said to have been entered into between the parties on 22.1.2000, which is 1 month and 22 days before the presentation of the winding up petition and therefore in terms of Section 531A of the Act, it was clearly void and hence, the present application - HELD THAT:- The question whether the official liquidator is in a position to claim avoidance of a transfer on the ground that the transfer is void in terms of Section 531-A can also plead that the period of limitation in seeking such adjudication or seeking recovery of possession pursuant to that transfer of the property in question can plead exemption from the application of the law of limitation. This would necessarily have to be answered in the negative.
Incidentally, it is on record that the applicant is receiving rent from the respondent in terms of the lease deed. Therefore, to characterize the lease deed as being void is akin to approbating and reprobating, which is not permissible. This is one other aspect that is ignored by the Official Liquidator in making the claim that the lease deed was void.
Insofar as the contention of the learned Counsel for the Official Liquidator that this court has come down heavily on the respondent in observing that the lease deed is tainted with dishonesty and the lease deed is contrary to Section 531A of the Act and the transaction between the lessor and the lessee is tainted with dishonesty is concerned, that order having been challenged in appeal, the appellate bench has, insofar as the above said observations of the company judge are concerned, has observed that the learned Company Judge was not justified in making certain observations especially when the present application was pending and therefore any such observations cannot be held as precluding the respondent from contesting the claim of the Official Liquidator.
Application dismissed.
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2015 (7) TMI 1337
Business Auxiliary Services - nature of subsequent sale - Benefit of section 6(2) of CST Act - it was held in the case that benefit of section 6(2) of CST Act cannot be denied for subsequent sale made to predetermined buyer - HELD THAT:- There are no good ground to interfere with the judgment and order passed by the Tribunal - appeal dismissed.
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2015 (7) TMI 1336
Maintainability of petition - jurisdiction of Settlement Commission - prime stand of the Appellants is that the Writ Petition filed by the Respondent/Petitioner is not perse maintainable because of the reason that as against the Impugned Order revoking license granted to the Customs House Agent, Appeal is provided under Section 129A (1) of the Customs Act, 1962, which lies to the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal within 90 days from the date of receipt of copy of the Order.
HELD THAT:- It is to be borne in mind that Section 127-H of the Customs Act, 1962 confers power on the Settlement Commission to grant immunity from prosecution - for any offence under this Act or the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or under any other Central Act for the time being in force and such immunity may be either in whole or in part from the imposition of a penalty, fine and interest under the Customs act, 1962, in regard to the case covered by the Settlement.
The offence discussed in Section 127-H of the Act means an offence pertaining to the case, covered by the Settlement. Even the power 'Waiver' is expressly conferred by Legislative to the Settlement Commission - Furthermore, as per Section 127-J of the Customs Act, 1962, 'every order' of settlement passed under Sub-Section 5 of Section 127-C shall be conclusive as to the matters stated therein and no matter covered by such order shall save as otherwise provided in this chapter (Chapter, 14-A) be reopened in any proceeding under this Act or under any other law for the time being in force - Also it cannot be forgotten that as per Section 127-M of the Customs Act, 1962 the proceedings before the Settlement Commission shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228 and for the purposes of Section 196 of Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).
In the instant case, there is no two opinion of the fact that the importer was guilty of under valuation etc., and he was let out with the nominal fine, but the punishment of revocation its license and the forfeiture of security deposit of the Respondent/Petitioner, in the considered opinion of this Court is the excessive, arbitrary and capricious one - When the importer had escaped liability and when its case was concluded by the Settlement Commissioner, the Respondent/Petitioner is also to reap similar benefits in the considered opinion of this Court.
This Court comes to an inescapable and resultant conclusion that the Learned Single Judge had rightly allowed the Writ Petition filed by the Respondent / Petitioner - Appeal dismissed.
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2015 (7) TMI 1335
Pension - benefit of revision of the pay scale - Rajasthan Civil Services (Revised Pay Scales for Government College Teachers) Rules, 1988 - HELD THAT:- The antiquated notion of pension being a bounty a gratuitous payment depending upon the sweet will or grace of the employer not claimable as a right and, therefore, no right to pension can be enforced through court has been swept under the carpet by the decision of the Constitution Bench in Deokinandan Prasad v. State of Bihar [1971 (5) TMI 65 - SUPREME COURT] wherein this Court authoritatively ruled that pension is a right and the payment of it does not depend upon the discretion of the Government but is governed by the rules and a government servant coming within those rules is entitled to claim pension. It was further held that the grant of pension does not depend upon anyone's discretion. It is only for the purpose of quantifying the amount having regard to service and other allied matters that it may be necessary for the authority to pass an order to that effect but the right to receive pension flows to the officer not because of any such order but by virtue of the rules.
It will be appropriate and apposite on the part of the employers to remember the same and ingeminate it time and again so that unnecessary litigation do not travel to the Court and the employers show a definite and correct attitude towards employees. We are compelled to say so as we find that the intention of the State Government from paragraph 5 of the circular/memorandum has been litigated at various stages to deny the benefits to the Respondents. It is the duty of the State Government to avoid unwarranted litigations and not to encourage any litigation for the sake of litigation.
Appeal dismissed.
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2015 (7) TMI 1334
Deduction u/s 80IC - reducing the profit eligible for deduction for Duty Draw Back and Misc. Receipts - HELD THAT:- We are of the view that no interference is called for in the matter. Under Section 80IC, deduction is allowable to the assessee where the gross total income of the assessee includes any profits and gains derived by an undertaking or an enterprise from any eligible business referred to in the said Section. The Duty Draw Back is paid by the government under various incentive schemes and thus, are not derived from eligible business.
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Liberty India Vs CIT [2009 (8) TMI 63 - SUPREME COURT] held that, “The connotation of the words “derived from” is narrower as compared to that of the words “attributable to”. By using the expression “derived from” Parliament intended to cover sources not beyond the first degree.” The issue is, therefore, covered against the assessee by judgement of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Liberty India (supra). This ground of appeal of the assessee is accordingly, dismissed.
Brokerage on account of ocean freight is business income as was already held by the Tribunal in the case of the same assessee vide order dated 10.02.2015. Therefore, assessee would be entitled for deduction under section 80IC of the Act on said amount. The orders of authorities below are accordingly, set aside and Assessing Officer is directed to grant deduction under section 80IC to the assessee.
Reducing the profits eligible for deduction u/s 80IC being 70% of excess provisions written back - HELD THAT:- CIT(Appeals) noted that Assessing Officer has not held that the provisions written back are not eligible for deduction under section 80IC of the Act because Assessing Officer has merely disallowed 70% claim of the assessee. The submissions of the assessee show that when provision was created in the previous year, it would result net profit of the assessee reduced in preceding assessment year 2006-07. Therefore, assessee would have also got lesser deduction under section 80IB of the Act, as such, the income of the assessee was reduced in preceding assessment year. Therefore, assessee correctly claimed that when provision was taken care in the year under appeal, it would enhance the income of the assessee. Since the income earned by the assessee was not disputed by the Assessing Officer and Assessing Officer allowed part claim of the assessee to the extent of 30%, would clearly show that assessee was entitled for deduction under section 80IC of the Act on the entire amount of provisions written back in the year under consideration. We, therefore, set aside the orders of authorities below and direct the Assessing Officer to allow claim of assessee under section 80IC of the Act on the entire claim made by the assessee.
Not calculating minimum alternate tax to be carried forward to subsequent year in the correct manner - admission of additional ground of appeal - HELD THAT:- Since this issue is not arising out of the order of ld. CIT(Appeals) and assessee has not shown any justification for admission of the additional ground of appeal, therefore, the oral request of ld. counsel for the assessee cannot be accepted at this stage. In the absence of any request in writing for admission of the additional ground of appeal, ld. DR was justified in contending that department would be seriously prejudiced in their contention because no opportunity had been given to the revenue to counter the request of the assessee. This issue is also not arising from the order of the ld. CIT(Appeals) and that no reason or justification had been explained why such request should be admitted. Therefore, considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not find any justification to accept the oral request by ld. counsel for the assessee in admitting additional ground of appeal so raised in ground No. 4 of the appeal of the assessee.
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2015 (7) TMI 1333
Deduction u/s. 80IA - income from sale of Certified Emission Reduction (CER) - capital receipts OR Business and Profession - HELD THAT:- As per the Hon’ble High Court in M/S. MY HOME POWER LTD., [2014 (6) TMI 82 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT] the income on sale of excess Carbon Credits was a capital receipt and not a business receipt/income. Notably, even in the case of assessee before the Hon’ble Andhra Pradesh High Court, assessee had earned income on sale of Carbon Credits in the course of carrying on the business of power generation, which is also the fact-position before us. The Hon’ble High Court has held that the income received on sale of excess Carbon Credits was a capital receipt not chargeable to tax. Quite clearly, the said Judgment supports the plea of assessee in the instant case that the receipts on sale of CERs is a capital receipt not chargeable to tax. Following the said Judgment we uphold the plea of the assessee.
The Ground of appeal no. 1 relating to claim of exemption u/s. 80IA of the Act on the income from sale of Carbon Credits is rendered academic in view of our decision on Ground of appeal no. 2.
Disallowance u/s 14A - HELD THAT:- Representative for the assessee has not seriously disputed the disallowance made by the Assessing Officer on account of direct interest expenditure related to earning of exempt income. Ostensibly, the said working was provided by the assessee itself in the course of hearing before the Assessing Officer. Nevertheless, it is to be noted that the entire issue of the disallowance made by invoking section 14A is quite redundant because the CIT(A) agreed to an omnibus alternate plea of the assessee to the effect that the amount disallowed u/s 14A of the Act resulted in increased profits, which qualified for the benefits of section 80IA of the Act. The aforesaid decision of the CIT(A) is challenged by the Revenue by way of Ground of appeal No.2.
We find no reason to interfere with the same inasmuch as the same are unexceptional. The CIT (A) has factually concluded that the disallowance of administrative expenses u/s 14A r.w.r 8D(2)(iii) of the Rules leads to enhanced profits of the eligible business of the generation of power and, therefore, such enhanced profits have been rightly held to be eligible for benefits of section 80IA of the Act. No material has been lead by the Revenue before us which would enable us to distract from the above finding of the CIT(A), which is hereby affirmed and Revenue fails in Ground of appeal no. 2.
Whatever income was enhanced on account of disallowance computed u/s 14A of the Act, it has been offset by the exemption available on such enhanced profit in terms of section 80IA of the Act. Thus, on facts it is quite clear that the disallowance u/s 14A of the Act does not impact the net taxable profits as assessee becomes eligible to higher exemption u/s 80IA. Therefore, the dispute pertaining to the efficacy of the disallowance u/s 14A of the Act, r.w. rule 8D(2) of the Rules, which is manifested in Ground of appeal no. 4 of the assessee and in Ground of appeal no. 1 of the Revenue, is academic in nature. Thus, we refrain from adjudicating the same at the present.
Determination of ‘Book Profits’ for the purpose of section 115JB - HELD THAT:- Considering the entirety of facts and circumstances and the position of law explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of National Thermal Power Corporation [1996 (12) TMI 7 - SUPREME COURT] and by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of Pruthvi Brokers & Share Holders Pvt. Ltd. [2012 (7) TMI 158 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] we deem it fit and proper to admit the aforesaid Additional Ground of Appeal no. 2 also. Insofar as the merit of said ground is concerned, it would be in the fitness of things that the same is restored back to the file of Assessing Officer for adjudication, since the same was not before the lower authorities. Needless to say the Assessing Officer shall allow the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard in support of the aforesaid Additional Ground of Appeal and thereafter pass an order afresh as per law.
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2015 (7) TMI 1332
Issuance of speaking order - assessment of the aluminium scrap covered by Bills of Entry Number and Dates as specified in the Annexure to the writ petitions - Valuation of imported goods - enhancement of value - HELD THAT:- This Court finds no embargo to direct the third respondent-The Deputy Commissioner of Customs, to pass a speaking reasoned order. Accordingly, the third respondent is directed to pass a speaking reasoned order under Section 17(5) of Customs Act in respect of assessment of aluminium scrap covered by Bills of Entry specified by the petitioner-firm, within a period of one week from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
Petition disposed off.
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2015 (7) TMI 1331
Capital gain computation - AO rejecting market valuation as on 01.04.1981 as calculated by the Registered Valuer as against calculated fair market value without taking expert opinion - HELD THAT:- The assessee filed report of Registered Valuer in support of the market value as on 01.04.1981. AO was not having any evidence or material before him to contradict the report of the Registered Valuer. AO, if was not satisfied with the report of the Registered Valuer, could have made a reference to the Departmental Valuation Officer under section 55A for the purpose of computing income from capital gains.
AO has thus, not acted in accordance with law and without any basis or evidence in his possession, did not accept report of the Registered Valuer. In the absence of any material on record, AO should not have made his own calculation for the purpose of computing the capital gains. The orders of the authorities below, thus, cannot be sustained in law. We, accordingly, set aside the orders of authorities below and direct AO to accept valuation reported by the assessee as per report of the Registered Valuer as on 01.04.1981 and accept the computation filed by the assessee. - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2015 (7) TMI 1330
Business auxiliary service - Market promotion in India - Export of services or not - Difference of opinion - majority order - whether the appellant, who is subsidiary company and had entered in the market development agreement with foreign principal located at Singapore is liable to Service tax on the services so rendered by them to its principal company.
HELD THAT:- Appeal admitted.
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2015 (7) TMI 1329
Demand for payment of property tax on the suit property - coercive steps for recovery of the impugned amount of property tax - Right to file an appeal - HELD THAT:- A suit for its maintainability requires no authority of law and it is enough that no statute bars the suit - Courts have the jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature with the only limitation being the right expressly or impliedly barred by law.
Many statutes contain express bars with respect to the right to file a civil suit. For instance, Section 293 of the Income Tax Act contains such a bar. Similarly there are a number of other statutes containing such a bar - except where a civil suit is specifically barred under a particular statute there can be no bar to a civil suit. A suit for its maintainability requires no authority of law. It is enough that no statute bars the suit. The jurisdiction of civil court is all embracing. It is determined on the basis of pleadings of the plaintiff in the suit.
The mere fact that a statute provides for certain remedies is not sufficient to exclude jurisdiction of civil courts. The right to approach the civil courts is an inherent right which normally cannot be taken away or presumed to be taken away. The right is too strong to be denied by indirect means. Only a specific bar could take it away.
While on the question of express or implied bar to a civil suit, the Division Bench noted that elsewhere in the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, where the legislature intended to create a specific bar to exercise of right to file a civil suit, it had specifically provided for it. In this connection the Division Bench made a reference to Sections 347A, 347B and 347E of the Act, in matters relating to unauthorised construction in properties and demolition of such construction, the statute having established an Appellate Tribunal before which the parties were entitled to agitate their grievances. In all such cases appeals were provided to the Appellate Tribunal and further appeal was provided from the order of the Appellate Tribunal to the Administrator under Section 347B. Section 347E was providing for a complete bar on the power of a civil court to entertain any suit/application or other proceedings in respect of any order or notice appealable under Section 343 or Section 347B.
Since the learned Single Judge has not looked into the issue required by law to be looked into and the error in the impugned decision is to overlook the distinction where jurisdiction of a civil court is expressly barred under a statute and where the jurisdiction is impliedly barred due to a remedy available under a statute but the remedy is onerous and has also not looked into the pleadings to determine whether a limited window was opened to the plaintiffs to maintain the civil action - We dispose of the two appeals declaring that there is no absolute bar to the maintainability of a suit challenging assessment and levy of property tax under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, but the scope of the suit would be limited i.e. the challenge would be limited in light of the law declared.
The Registry is directed to list the suit for directions before the Roster Bench on August 10, 2015.
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2015 (7) TMI 1328
Registration as a charitable institution u/s.12AA rejected - assessee society to be formed for the benefit of the Christians community - HELD THAT:- Applicability or otherwise of s. 13(1)(b) as a valid ground while considering the issue of registration u/s. 12AA of the Act in-as-much as registration is a pre-requisite for availing the benefit of ss. 11 & 12
In the facts of the case, we have found the assessee society to be formed for the benefit of the Christians community and which therefore definitely could form a ground for denial of its registration in-as-much as its income is liable to be excluded for consideration u/ss. 11 and 12 of the Act. Nothing has been brought on record to exhibit, or otherwise any case made out of, the assessee-society undertaking any (charitable) project in a wholly impartisan manner, i.e., devoid of any consideration as to religion, either in terms of the people employed; provided support (refer Cl. 3(vi)), or served thereby. - Decided against assessee.
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2015 (7) TMI 1327
Charitable institution registration u/s.12AA withdrawn - assessee-society to be formed for the benefit of the Christian community - HELD THAT:- What is meant by or the scope of the words ‘primarily for Catholics’, to which he admitted is to imply a clear preference to the practitioners of the said faith in regard to the conduct and affairs of the institution, including the admission thereto and its management, even as sought to be clarified per its Charter.
Referring to words ‘secular and scientific’ as appearing in clause 3(b)(supra) of the object clause. That, to our mind, would be of little relevance inasmuch as the same concerns the nature or the qualitative aspect of the education, while the issue or the aspect being considered by us is the identity of the recipient of the education, i.e., who stand to benefit therefrom and to whom the same is targeted, i.e., its beneficiary. In this context, the expression ‘in particular’ came for the consideration by the Apex Court in CIT vs. Kamla Town Trust [1995 (11) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT]. In the facts of that case the object of the trust included construction of houses for workmen in general and, in particular, for the workmen, staff and other employees of the settler company - the provision relating to workmen in general did constitute a charitable object, the words ‘in particular for the workmen of the company’, negatived its public character, so that the trust could not be considered to have been established wholly for charitable purposes.
As consider the issue as to if the assessee could be denied registration in view of attraction of section 13(1)(b) of the Act, i.e., considering that the same is expressed to preclude sections 11 and 12 of the Act. We consider it as so inasmuch as the same forms an abiding or defining feature of the applicant, in which case, to what effect or purpose, one may ask, is the registration, i.e., if not toward grant of exemption u/ss. 11 and 12 of the Act.
In the case of CIT vs. Dawoodi Bohra Jamat [2014 (3) TMI 652 - SUPREME COURT] wherein the Hon’ble Court approved the applicability of s. 13(1)(b) as a valid ground while considering the issue of registration u/s. 12AA of the Act inasmuch as registration is a prerequisite for availing the benefit of ss. 11 & 12 (pg. 41), approving of registration on a finding of non-applicability of s. 13(1)(b). In the facts of the present case, we have found the assessee-society to be formed for the benefit of the Christian community, and which therefore could definitely form a ground for withdrawal of its registration inasmuch as its income is liable to be excluded for consideration u/ss. 11 and 12 - Decided against assessee.
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9911796707
