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2014 (12) TMI 1316
Principles of Natural Justice - grievance of the petitioner is that, though the petitioner has approached the 1st respondent seeking for copies of the relevant documents (which are sought to be relied on the part of the Department), they are still to be served to the petitioner and no opportunity of cross examination of the concerned witness has been given - Held that: - there will be a direction to the 1st respondent to serve copies of the entire documents contained in the assessment records to the petitioner at the expense of the petitioner, at the earliest, at any rate within 'two weeks' from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. The petitioner shall co-operate with the assessment proceedings - petition disposed off.
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2014 (12) TMI 1315
Disallowance of unabsorbed business loss and unabsorbed depreciation against business income and long term capital gains - whether the plant and machinery was put to use in the business of the appellant company? - scheme of amalgamation - Held that:- We, from the observation of the CIT, are clear that the section 72A and CBDT Circular explaining the above provision did not apply to the assessee company inasmuch as the fact that assessment company was the amalgamated company and not the amalgamating company. In such circumstances, according to us, the CIT(A) has not correctly interpreted this provision of section 72A of the Act.
Assessee is entitled for the claim of unabsorbed business loses and depreciation available for set off in the AY 2011-12. From the above, it is clear that the scheme of merger approved by Hon'ble High Court is in itself appreciation of facts that the merger and the amalgamation was carried out for the revival of the amalgamating company and that the amalgamation did serve genuine business purpose and hence, sec. 72A of the Act will not apply to the case of the assessee, being the amalgamated company and not the amalgamating company.
Disallowance of expenses debited on account of professional service charges for non-deduction of TDS u/s. 194J - addition u/s 40(a)(ia) - Held that:- The assessee stated that the assessee has deducted TDS on the above amounts of ₹ 2,62,492/- but could not produce the details before CIT(A) or before AO as the documents were not available or could not be traced at the relevant point of time. Accordingly, the assessee requested for setting aside the to the file of the AO. Ld. Sr. DR has not objected to the setting aside of this issue for verification of TDS deducted to the file of the AO. In term of the above, we remit this issue back to the file of the AO for verification of TDS deducted by the assessee. The AO will decide accordingly. This issue of assessee’s appeal is allowed for statistical purposes.
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2014 (12) TMI 1314
Denial of exemption u/s 11 - whether the activities of the appellant would qualify to be a charitable purpose as defined in Section 2(15)? - Held that:- It is undisputed that the appellant is charging fees for supervision and centage charges, permission for transfer of land, copy of records, cost of forms, cost of plans, booklets and that the income on this account during the assessment year 2009-10 was ₹ 1,23,11,413/-. It is also undisputed that the appellant has developed several commercial centers and rented it out and that the appellant itself is responsible for the maintenance, upkeep and the provision of common facilities. The total receipts of such letting out and maintenance charges during the assessment year came to ₹ 4,09,73,498/-. It is also admitted that the commercial space developed by the assessee is auctioned by it to the highest bidder. These activities that are carried on by the assessee are for consideration and purely on commercial lines and these are activities which any other real estate developer is engaged in.
Considering the nature of the activities that are carried on by the assessee, the factual correctness of which is undisputed, we can only endorse the view taken by the statutory authorities that in view of the proviso to Section 2(15), the activities of the assessee do not qualify to be charitable purpose as defined therein. In such a scenario, the assessing officer was justified in disallowing the exemption claimed and assessing to tax the income of the assessee and the appellate authorities were justified in confirming the same. - Decided against assessee.
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2014 (12) TMI 1313
Remand of matter to the Commissioner (Appeals) - Held that: - On remand, the Commissioner (Appeals) passed an order in favor of the Department. Hence, the matter may be dismissed as withdrawn. He has produced an affidavit dated nil March, 2011 by the Deputy Commissioner of Customs, Legal Section (Air), Air Cargo Complex, Chennai in which it is stated that this Civil Miscellaneous application my be permitted to be withdrawn.
Appeal dismissed as withdrawn.
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2014 (12) TMI 1312
Disallowance u/s.14A - investment in the subsidiary of the assessee - Held that:- There is no dispute that there is fresh investment during the year by the assessee and the investment was made in the earlier years that too in the subsidiary of the assessee. The assessing officer did not disallow the interest expenditure u/s.14A, in the Assessment years 2006-07 & 2007-08. It is pertinent to note that the use of borrowed fund has to be examined in the year of investment and if the AO has not disallowed any interest expenditure in the year investment then no disallowance can be made in the subsequent year when no fresh investment was made by the assessee. Therefore, AO can not take a different view in violation of rule of consistency when there is no change in the facts and circumstances of the case rather in the year under consideration there was no fresh investment.
Apart from no fresh investment for the assessment year 2008-09 it is also undisputed fact that investment in question is in the subsidiary of the assessee and further there was neither dividend income nor any claim of exempt income of the assessee. Thus issue was considered by the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in the case of CIT vs. Corrtech Energy (P) Ltd.(2014 (3) TMI 856 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT) and after following the judgment of Hon’ble P & H High Court in the case of CIT v. Winsome Textile Inds. Ltd.(2009 (8) TMI 220 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT) it was held that when the assessee did not claim of any exempt income, section 14A has no application.
The Coordinate Bench of this Tribunal in case of Garware Wall Ropes Ltd. v. ACIT (2015 (2) TMI 628 - ITAT MUMBAI) has taken a view that no disallowance can be made u/s.14A in the case of investment in the subsidiaries for the purpose of holding the controlling stack and not for earning dividend income. - Decided in favour of assessee.
Disallowance as u/s.40(a)(ia) for Short deduction of TDS - Held that:- the assessee deducted the tax under the belief that the rate of tax provided under the specific provision of chapter XVII applicable in the case of the assessee which was not accepted by the AO, therefore, the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) cannot be applied of Short deduction of TDS due to the bona fide belief of the assessee. In the case in hand the facts are not brought on record by the assessee as what is the reason for short deduction. Therefore, in the absence of complete and proper facts it is not possible to decide the issue conclusively. Accordingly, we set aside this issue to record of the CIT appeal for verification of the relevant facts and particularly the reason for short deduction of TDS by the assessee
Addition u/s 14A - Held that:- Though the disallowance of interest under rule 8D(ii) is not applicable, when the assessee is having its own fund which are more than the investment in question however when there is a direct connection of the borrowed fund used for investment then the decision in the case of Reliance Utilities & Power Ltd. will not help in the case of the assessee. Accordingly, the disallowance of interest of ₹ 2,15,753/- as a direct interest expenditure under Rule 8D(i) has to be made. In view of the above discussion we modify the order of the authorities below and restrict the disallowance to the extent of ₹ 2,15,753/- on account of interest expenditure u/s.14A. Accordingly, this ground is partly allowed.
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2014 (12) TMI 1311
Reference to taxability of CIDCO as assessee liable to tax - income to the assessee by way of remuneration received from the State Government - assessee should be held to be an “agent” of the State or an “arm” of the State and exempt from assessment of income in his hands - Held that:- In assessee’s own case for the assessment year 2006-07 [2012 (9) TMI 331 - ITAT MUMBAI], we found that all the addition made by the AO have been deleted except income of assessee by way of remuneration received from the State Government. In this regard, the Tribunal at para 48 has directed the AO to decide the case on merits with regard to the income of ₹ 5 lakhs received by the assessee, after allowing deduction for any expenses incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of earning the said income.
It is clear that only with respect to remuneration from State Government, the matter was restored back to the file of AO. All other additions were deleted. Respectfully following the order of the Tribunal, we delete all the additions except the amount of remuneration, if any received from the State Government and direct the AO to decide the taxability of such remuneration after allowing deduction for any expenses incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of earning the said income.
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2014 (12) TMI 1310
Disallowance of depreciation on certain equipment forming part of cogeneration system - Held that:- As we consider the contention of the assessee that the higher efficiency boiler and 12.65 KVA turbine have to be considered together along with other equipments necessary for generation of power, as the integrated cogeneration system. In our view, there cannot be two opinions that high efficiency boiler along with turbine and the associated equipments connecting them, increasing its efficiency etc., are to be considered as part of cogeneration system and are therefore eligible for higher depreciation allowance.
CIT(A) observed that RCC Chimney and Bagasse Drier are part of the higher efficiency boiler. This factual finding is not disputed before us by the revenue. Thus, both these items have to be considered as integral part of the cogeneration system. The very expression ‘cogeneration’ refers to simultaneous generation of two forms of power i.e. heat and electricity. Boiler is one component of such system wherefrom the root power i.e. steam is generated and it is this steam that is converted into electricity power with the use of a turbine. Thus, the boiler has a dual utility i.e. as standalone item and also a part of cogeneration system. High efficiency boilers are required for generation of power. Therefore, RCC Chimney and Bagasse drier forming part of boiler system are eligible for higher depreciation.
Coming to DC Drier which are energy saving devices, we are of the view that this cannot be used independently in a cogeneration system. These are energy saving device and are eligible even on standalone basis for higher rate of depreciation. They fell within one of the specific category in energy saving device. Hence, higher rate of depreciation should be allowed on this equipment also.
Steam Piping is part of the boiler. We do not appreciate the findings of the revenue authorities that steam piping cannot be considered as part of cogeneration system. Even applying the test laid down by various courts, we have to necessarily hold that steam piping cannot be used independently or standalone basis. It is an integral part of cogeneration system, hence, eligible for higher depreciation.
Coming to the coal & gas feeding system and coal handling system, we apply the decision of Hon’ble M.P. High Court in the case of Vippy Solvex Products Ltd (2007 (3) TMI 746 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT) and come to our conclusion that this is an integral part of high efficiency boiler. The very description of nature of the equipment demonstrates that it cannot be independently used and has to be used along with the boiler. Thus, we direct the AO to treat the coal & gas feeding system and coal handling system as integrated part of cogeneration system and allow higher depreciation on the same.
With regard expenditure on Sub-station power line, we cannot agree with the contention of the appellant that expenditure incurred on sub-station power line is also part of the cogeneration system. This expenditure is necessary for onward distribution of the power generated in a cogeneration system and hence cannot be considered as an integral part of the cogeneration system.
We now consider the additional ground raised by the assessee on the issue of expenditure incurred on sub-station power line, which was ultimately handed over to APTRANSCO. Both the parties agreed that this is legal claim and that the facts are on record. Under these circumstances, we hold that the ld CIT(A) should have admitted this additional ground of the assessee and adjudicated the same following the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of NTPC Ltd., (1996 (12) TMI 7 - SUPREME Court).
We direct the AO to treat the expenditure incurred by the assessee on construction of sub-station power lines as incurred in the revenue field and allow the claim of the assessee. Needless to say that since the entire expenditure incurred by the assessee is allowed as revenue expenditure the question of allowance of depreciation does not arise.
Claim of the assessee that the expenditure incurred for sanction of HT power line is in the revenue field. The amount is paid as non-refundable amount to obtain approval of power distribution company ltd., for extension of power supply. No asset has been created and hence, the question of treating the expenditure as capital in nature does not arise. Consistent with the view taken by us in the case of Substation power line, which was handed over to APTRANSCO, we direct the AO to allow this expenditure as in the revenue field.
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2014 (12) TMI 1309
Direction to grant refund which has been allowed by the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) by virtue of his order dated 29.01.2014 - interest on delayed refund - Held that: - order was passed on 29.01.2014. Till date the verification process has not been completed. The petitioner had written to the respondents for granting the refund yet that has not been done - we are disposing of this writ petition with the direction that the concerned Assistant Commissioner of Service Tax shall complete the verification of the relevant documents and sanction the refund claimed by the petitioner within a period of four weeks from today provided there is no stay order granted by the said Tribunal - petition disposed off.
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2014 (12) TMI 1308
Proceedings under Section 153A/C - Amalgamation of two companies - Assessment to be made on which entity – Held that:- This appeal by the Revenue has to be dismissed in view of the decision of this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax-III versus Dimension Apparels Private Limited [2014 (11) TMI 181 - DELHI HIGH COURT ].Noticeably, the Assessing Officer during the course of the proceedings under Section 153A/C of the Income Tax Act, 1961 was informed about the amalgamation, which resulted in dissolution of the respondent-assessee, but no remedial or effective steps were taken. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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2014 (12) TMI 1307
Offence under PMLA - allegation of forgery - Held that:- In the instant case, the alleged incidents occurred prior to June, 2009. Prior to June, 2009, the relevant provisions of Indian Penal Code were not included in schedule appended to the Act 2002. These provisions were not listed as offences under the Act admittedly when the alleged incidents have taken place. The only provision that is invoked which was in the schedule to the Act is Section 467. The illegal activities committed by the persons in the helm of affairs cannot be attributed to petitioner company, more particularly the allegation of forgery as all those illegalities were committed by them behind the back and without the involvement of the petitioner company. Thus, if the allegations made are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, they do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the petitioner company. In accordance with the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Bajan Lal [1990 (11) TMI 386 - SUPREME COURT] the petitioner company cannot be proceeded against under Section 3 of Act 2002. Thus, filing of complaint and taking cognizance thereof is unsustainable.
In view of the above findings, the writ petition is allowed.
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2014 (12) TMI 1306
Pre-deposit - building construction activity for educational institution - Held that: - Considering such aspect and also interest of revenue, as an interim measure, the appellant is directed to deposit ₹ 12,00,000/- and report compliance on 30.1.2015.
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2014 (12) TMI 1305
Addition u/s 68 - transaction of shares - Held that:- There is complete absence of such material according to which it can be said that assessee infact had made investment in the purchase of shares. The books of accounts maintained by M/s Alliance Intermediaries and Network Private Limited would have been proper evidence to come to such conclusion that whether or not any investment is made by the assessee in the purchase of shares which is not done by the AO. The addition cannot be upheld on the basis of presumptions and assumptions when the assessee has discharged primary onus by submitting all the details. Without bringing any material on record to suggest the transaction made by the assessee with M/s Alliance Intermediaries and Network Private Limited are bogus, the addition could not be sustained in the hands of the assessee.
One of the solution can be that matter may be restored back to the file of the AO for proper examination of the case but that would amount to give second inning to the revenue. Before confirming the addition, CIT(A) also could made further enquiries as he is vested with these powers so that addition could be sustained on the proper basis. But learned CIT(A) did not do so. Keeping in view all these facts and also the fact that matters in the present cases are very small, that addition in the present case has wrongly been sustained by learned CIT(A) for which there is no basis except assumption and presumptions. The additions sustained by learned CIT(A) is deleted in both the cases and the appeals filed by the assessee are allowed.
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2014 (12) TMI 1304
ALV determination - basis on which a self-occupied property is valued - Held that:- The issue is covered by the decision of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of Smt. Smitaben N. Ambani Vs. CWT, reported in (2009 (1) TMI 430 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT) as held that the basis on which a self-occupied property is valued under rule 1BB of the Wealth-tax Rules and municipal ratable value is arrived at under the municipal law is the same i.e. “a reasonable amount of rent that can be expected by the owner from a hypothetical tenant”. That while arriving at such reasonable amount of rent that can be expected by the owner from a hypothetical tenant, the amount of statutory deduction, if any, permissible under the local municipal law must be added to the ratable value. Thus, the Hon’ble High Court held that while applying the provisions of rule 1BB for valuing the self-occupied property, municipal rateable value with addition of statutory deductions, if any, may be adopted instead of standard rent, for arriving at the gross maintainable rent. Respectfully following the order of jurisdictional High Court, matter is restored back to the file of AO with a direction to recompute the ALV in terms of above decision
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2014 (12) TMI 1303
Scope of Cigarettes Act and the Rules - Hookah smoking - smoking area dimensions - whether the impugned circular dated 4th July, 2011 travels outside the Cigarettes Act and the Rules or merely seeks to implement the said Act and the Rules as they stand? - Held that: - Section 6 of the Cigarettes Act permits the sale of cigarettes and any other tobacco products, except to persons under 18 years of age and in an area within a radius of 100 yards of any educational institution. It is clear that any condition which prohibits the sale of cigarettes or any other tobacco products in premises licenced by the Municipal Corporation would amount to adding another exception which would be impermissible in law.
Scope of the word 'sale' and 'service' - case of Revenue is that the sale of tobacco or tobacco related products would amount to a service that cannot be so allowed - Held that: - the definition of tax on the sale or purchase of goods has been artificially expanded more particularly by sub-clause (f), with which we are concerned, where the distinction between "sale" and "service" has been done away with. In the present case, the well established distinction between "sale" and "service" would continue to apply in view of the definition of "sale" contained in Section 3(m). It will be noticed that the definition is a "means" and "includes" one. It is well settled that such definition is an exhaustive definition. There is thus, no scope to include "service' in such a definition - even if we were to accept Mr. Bhatt's contention, Rule 4(3) would become ultra vires Section 6 of the Act inasmuch as it would prohibit the sale of cigarettes and other tobacco products in a smoking area in hotels, restaurants and airports, thus, adding one more exception to the two exceptions already contained in Section 6. It is, thus, clear that this condition would be ultra vires the Cigarettes Act and the Rules properly so read.
Rule 3(1)(c) and Rule 4(3) have to be harmoniously construed - What is expressly allowed by Rule 4(3) cannot be said to be taken away by Rule 3(1)(c).
Appeal allowed - decided in favor of appellant.
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2014 (12) TMI 1302
Auction - higher bid/offer made by the appellant herein of ₹ 148 Crores for the land/property of the Company in liquidation - Rule 9 of the Company (Court) Rules - interpretation of statute.
Held that: - it emerges that the learned Company Court has specifically observed and held that while accepting the higher bid of the appellant of ₹ 148 Crores on the date of auction i.e. on 17.12.2013, the relevant factor such as potential development of the land which can be said to be a relevant factor while determining the market price was not considered by him. That the learned Company Court has also specifically observed that the highest price offered by the appellant of ₹ 148 Crores which came to be accepted vide order dated 17.12.2013 was an inadequate price. That the factum of change in the FSI was in offing and the aforesaid relevant factor of change in the FSI which would have a direct bearing on the potential development of the land was not considered by the Court which has resulted into irregularity and injury. While observing as stated herein above, the learned Company Court has taken everything upon itself and has accepted that the relevant factors like potential development of the land even as on 17.12.2013 were not considered by him which has resulted into accepting the inadequate price and irregularity and injury and therefore, this is a fit case to exercise the inherent powers conferred under Rule 9 of the Companies (Court) Rules. Therefore, as such the learned Company Court has tried to correct the error committed by it and has recalled its earlier order dated 17.12.2013 accepting the higher offer of the appellant of ₹ 148 Crores [market price of ₹ 148 Crores which is held to be grossly inadequate and substantially low] and has passed the order to reauction the land by fixing the upset price at ₹ 214 Crores.
In the present case the learned Company Court has in exercise of inherent powers under Rule 9 accepting and/or taking upon itself that certain relevant factors like potential development and the change in the FSI which had a direct bearing on the determination of the market price was not considered by him on 17.12.2013 when the offer of the appellant of ₹ 148 Crores was considered. Under the circumstances, the aforesaid aspect is not required to be considered and/or gone into detail.
Appeal dismissed - decided against appellant.
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2014 (12) TMI 1301
Revision u/s 263 - huge claims of expenditure allowed despite castigating the assessee and huge revaluation amounts have been allowed as exempt u/s 10(2A) in the hands of the firm or partners which in the event of noncooperation ought to have been disallowed - Held that:- The assessment in question was consequent to a search; assesses non cooperation has been adversely viewed by AO and at the end of the day search assessment was framed without co operation of the assessee. Assessment order refers to various frequent reconstitution of the firm and transfer of land rights therein; instances of revaluation of land; claim of their exemption from the taxation are not addressed in the ex parte search assessment order. The issues raised by ld. CIT for non inquiry are found to validly raised and ought to have been inquired by AO more particularly when assessee was non cooperative. For this purpose necessary field inquiries were necessary besides cross verification of record of other search entities. This exercise was required from the AO to have been conducted as a sensible quasi judicial officer. Thus all the deficiencies referred to by ld CIT make the impugned assessment order erroneous as well as prejudicial to the interest of revenue. The reliance on the judgments of Smt. Taradevi Agrawal [1972 (11) TMI 2 - SUPREME Court] and Smt. Renu Gupta [2007 (5) TMI 188 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT] is well placed by ld CIT. We uphold the order passed u/s 263. - Decided against assessee.
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2014 (12) TMI 1300
Prayer of the appellant to be added as a party in a suit for specific performance filed by Respondent No.1-plaintiff - Held that:- High Court erred in interfering with the order of the trial Court impleading the appellant as a party defendant. Admittedly, the appellant is a beneficiary of the Trust and under the provisions of the Trusts Act, the Trustee has to act reasonably in exercise of his right of alienation under the terms of the trust deed. Appellant cannot thus be treated as a stranger. No doubt, it may be permissible for the appellant to file a separate suit, as suggested by Respondent No.1, but the beneficiary could certainly be held to be a proper party. There is no valid reason to decline his prayer to be impleaded as a party to avoid multiplicity of proceedings.
Thus, the appellant could not be held to be a stranger being beneficiary of the Trust property. The trial Court was justified in impleading him as a party. The High Court erred in interfering with the order of the trial Court.
Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned order of the High Court and restore that of the trial Court dated 10th August, 2010, impleading the appellant as a party defendant in the suit.
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2014 (12) TMI 1299
Disobeyed the directions of the Telugu Desam Party whip in relation to the election for the offices of the Chairperson and Vice - Chairperson, Zilla Praja Parishad, Prakasam District - Whether the petitioner should have invoked the remedy of appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 CPC read with Section 104 CPC instead of filing Writ Petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the impugned orders? - Held that:- In the present case, the District Court relied on certain newspaper reports (Exs.B -15 and B -16) to hold that there is press coverage regarding the election to the post of Chairperson/Vice Chairperson to the ZPP, Prakasam District and therefore the petitioner is deemed to have constructive knowledge of the whip. A reading of these two news items shows that there is no mention of issuance of a whip by the TDP party directing to vote in favour of any candidate in the said election. In this view of the matter, it has to be held that this finding of the District Court is based on no evidence/deliberate misreading of evidence and perverse.
We also do not agree with contention of Counsel for 3rd respondent that in his explanations dt.04 -08 -2014 to the show cause notice dt.28 -07 -2014 issued by the 1st respondent, the petitioner had not raised the plea that his signatures were forged on the acknowledgments of the whips. The petitioner had clearly stated that he was not in Ongole town on 12.7.2014 and there was no possibility for him to sign the alleged whips. Thus petitioner has implied that his signatures were forged on acknowledgements. I do no agree with plea of 3rd respondent that a reading of the explanations of petitioner suggest that the petitioner is implying that blank whip forms on which his signatures were obtained for the election scheduled on 05 -07 -2014 and which later got postponed to 13 -07 -2014 were misused by filling them up. I have read the explanations and it does not appear to be so.
When the petitioner had disputed his signatures on the acknowledgments of whips and contended that they are forged and the whips are fabricated, by wrongly placing the burden of proof on the petitioner to prove that he did not sign the whips, the District Court appears to have come to a wrong conclusion.
In this view of the matter, prima facie, the impugned order passed by the District Court suffers from error apparent on the face of record in as much as it has not considered mandatory statutory Rules 21 and 22 of the Rules; has given findings based on no evidence/deliberate misreading of evidence perversely; and also wrongly placed burden of proof of petitioner to prove that he did not sign the acknowledgements of whips. This, in my opinion, has resulted in grave injustice to the petitioner warranting interference in Writ jurisdiction.
Since the Writ Petitions satisfy the parameters for interference in a Writ of Certiorari by this Court; they are accordingly allowed and the orders on the file of the I Additional District Judge, Ongole are quashed; consequently, the orders of the 1st respondent disqualifying the petitioner as ZPTC Member, Ponnaluru and consequently, as Chairperson, Zilla Praja Parishad, Prakasam District, are suspended. The District Court is directed to dispose of both E.O.Ps in accordance with law uninfluenced by the order dt.11.7.2014 or its order dt.7.10.2014 or this order, expeditiously within 6 months from date of receipt of copy of this order.
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2014 (12) TMI 1298
Nature of interest received by the landowner-assessee - enhanced compensation - whether the interest which is received by the assessee-landowner partakes the character of income or not? - Held that:- No legal and valid ground for interference. The Special Leave Petitions are dismissed. HC order confirmed [2015 (12) TMI 1123 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT]
HC has held that the compensation awarded by the Court includes the additional compensation awarded under Section 23(1A) and the solatium under Section 23(2) of the said Act. Section 28 is applicable only in respect of the excess amount, which is determined by the Court after a reference under Section 18 of the 1894 Act.
Under Section 34 of the 1894 Act, the Collector awards interest on the compensation offered at the rate of 9% per annum for a period of one year from the date of taking possession and thereafter at the rate of 15% per annum from the date of expiry of one year on the amount of compensation or part thereof which remains unpaid or deposited before the date of such expiry.
A plain reading of Sections 23(1A), 23(2) as also Section 28 of the 1894 Act clearly spells out that additional benefits are available on the market value of the acquired lands under Section 23(1A) and 23(2) whereas Section 28 is available in respect of the entire compensation
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2014 (12) TMI 1297
Mismanagement, oppression and misappropriation - grievance of the Plaintiff briefly put is that Defendant No. 2 has obtained and/or applied for several patents in his own name whereas the patents ought to have been obtained and/or applied for in the name of Defendant No. 1 - Held that:- Plaintiff though holding 12% of the shares of the Company, is all alone in this action particularly when the other minority shareholders, who collectively own about 13% of the shares of Defendant No. 1, are against the action and do not consider it in best interest of Defendant No. 1. Therefore, such a Plaintiff should not be entitled to maintain this derivative action or any relief on this ground.
It is the Plaintiff's case that the patents have been wrongly applied for or obtained by Defendant No. 2 though he is not entitled to the same and in fact it is Defendant No. 1 who is entitled to the same but if we accept the Plaintiff's contention then any person, it may include the Plaintiff himself, who is a competitor as explained later, or any other competitor may apply for revocation/cancellation of the patent. If the patent is cancelled then Defendant No. 1 also will not be able to use the patents, which it is now using, royalty free. It will cause a tremendous loss to the Company-Defendant No. 1. Therefore, this action can never be considered to be in the interest of Defendant No. 1
Plaintiff being a competitor with the seemingly malicious intent against Defendant No. 1, cannot be believed when the Plaintiff says that the derivative action is bona-fide and in the best interest of Defendant No. 1. On this ground also the Plaintiff cannot maintain this action and reliefs sought by the Plaintiff cannot be granted.
In the case under consideration, the suit in the garb of a derivative action is really prompted by family hostilities and personal anger that the Plaintiff had against Defendant No. 2. In fact the Plaintiff/his mother had also filed a criminal complaint against Defendant No. 2 and the police whilst closing the case observed that having regard to her age and physical and mental state, the criminal complaint has not been filed by her (the mother) but at the instance of the Plaintiff and there appears to be a family dispute. Even previous litigations initiated by the Plaintiff is also evidence of family disputes/disputes of a personal nature now being again sought to be litigated in the garb of a derivative action.
Therefore on this ground also, the Plaintiff will not be entitled to any relief as sought.
It is also quite obvious that the Plaintiff having not succeeded in his earlier actions against Maharukh Murad Oomrigar, his sister and the Defendant No. 2, he is re-agitating the same points in the garb of a derivative suit.
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