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Showing 121 to 140 of 242 Records

• 1980 (4) TMI 122 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
  

  Review - Applicability of third proviso to Section 36(2) - Interpretation of

  
  
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  ... ... ..... ncorporated in the third proviso to Section 36(2) for the simple reason that the revision under Section 36 (2) is not of the orders of the original assessing authorities but only of the orders passed in appeal/revision under Section 35 or 35A. We have, therefore, calculated the period of six months for the purposes of the application of the third proviso to Section 36(2) from the date of the appellate orders. It may also be mentioned that the same policy of providing a shorter period of limitation, namely, of six months with reference to duties not levied or not paid or short levied or not paid in full or erroneously refunded is to be found in Rule 9. 13. In view of this finding we think it is unnecessary to consider the other contentions raised by the petitioner against the impugned showcause notices. 14. For the above reasons, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned show-cause notices Exhibit I and Exhibit K in the writ petition are quashed with no order as to costs.

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• 1980 (4) TMI 121 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
  

  Import licence - Criteria for grant - `Prohibited goods' - Approbation and reprobation - Applicability of

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• 1980 (4) TMI 120 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
  

  `Import' and `Export' - Baggage

  
  
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  ... ... ..... ly the question whether the petitioner had to be allowed to re-export the goods or to be convicted for violation of any of the provisions of the Act remained to be adjudicated upon. The letter written by the petitioner clearly refers to the fact that he had made the request for re-export. Whatever that might be, the question to be considered is whether the petitioner had been guilty of voilation of Sec. 111(d) of the Act. Once it is found that the petitioner has not violated the provisions of Sec. 111(d) of the Act, then the goods will not be liable to confiscation and he will not be liable to penalty under Sec. 112 of the Act. I have already found that the petitioner has not import or attempted to import the goods into the country since they had not crossed the customs barrier. In the circumstances, the goods shall not be liable to confiscation. No personal penalty also can be imposed on Petitioner. I therefore quash the order and allow the writ petition, but without costs.

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• 1980 (4) TMI 119 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
  

  Pumps - Determination of assessable value - Valuation - Exclusion of excise duty paid on parts - Alternative remedy

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• 1980 (4) TMI 118 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
  

  Import licence - Benefit to importer in case of doubt

  
  
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  ... ... ..... n the decision. The earlier unreported judgment of the Supreme Court obviously stands on the different footing and applies in different circumstances and the same not having been overruled either expressly or by implication, I am bound to follow it. Therefore, if there is an ambiguity or doubt as to the interpretation of the description of the goods in the second licence this must be resolved in favour of the importer i.e. the petitioner particularly when the earlier licence include nickel magnesium alloy as component. 13. Mr. Rana sought to rely on Tarachand Gupta and Bros. v. Union of India - 73 B.L.R. 558 and the judgment of the Supreme Court affirming the said judgment in Union of India v. Tarachand Gupta and Bros., 1971 S.C. 1558. I do not think these judgments threw any light on the principles involved in this matter. 14. Accordingly, I make rule absolute in terms of prayers (a) and (b). In view of the facts of the case I make no order as to the costs of this petition.

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• 1980 (4) TMI 117 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
  

  Steam - Liability to duty

  
  
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  ... ... ..... ndeed exclusively for captive use. In the instant case, the petitioner had been producing steam in order to produce electric light and power. Loosely, therefore, it can be described as an intermediate or component pert of electric light and power. However, we are of the opinion that since steam was produced by the petitioner company only for the purpose of producing electric light and power, production of steam merely represented the process of producing electric light and power. It was nothing more than it. What has been rendered taxable under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, is the final product and not the process of production or manufacture. Therefore, since steam was produced only in the process of producing electric power and light into which it has transferred as soon as it was produced, it did not attract taxability under residuary Item 68. 6. In the view of the matter, the petition succeeds. The impugned order is quashed and Rule is made absolute with vests.

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• 1980 (4) TMI 116 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
  

  Dutiability of goods not removed from the factory - Central Excise - Rate for payment of excise duty

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• 1980 (4) TMI 115 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
  

  Demand notice - Show Cause Notice must precede before issue

  
  
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  ... ... ..... om raising the same contentions as those raised before Rege J., Mr. Dalal contended that if the demand cannot be said to be covered by Rule 10 it can be said to be covered by Rule 10A and a reference to wrong rule cannot invalidate the notice. I do not see the relevance of this contention as it is not contended before me on behalf of the petitioners that Rule 10 is not the applicable Rule. In any event, in view of the specific finding of both authorities that the demand is covered by Rule 10 it is not open to Mr. Dalal to raise this contention. However, it is unnecessary to decide this point as both the rules require issue of a show cause notice before making a demand. In my opinion therefore whether the demand is treated as made under 10 or 10A, the position is the same and in the absence of show cause notice the demand is illegal and void. 6. In the circumstances, Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a). Respondents to pay to the petitioners the costs of the petition.

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• 1980 (4) TMI 114 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
  

  Refund of Advance deposit

  
  
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  ... ... ..... further contend that this rule could not be applied to case of advance deposit as in the case under consideration. Government accept the petitioners contention viz. that such cases of Advance deposit should be governed by the General Limitation Act and not by rule 11 of the Central Excise Rules for purposes of limitation. 3. The Revision Application is accordingly allowed.

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• 1980 (4) TMI 113 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
  

  Rule 9(2) - Scope - Statutory records - Significance

  
  
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  ... ... ..... of excise duty tax is attracted not because the assessee violated some provision of law, but because the manufactured goods which are assessable to excise duty but escaped charge. It follows therefore, that once it is clear that violation is not the basis of assessment, the starting point of limitation can only be from the date of accrial of the cause of action or of an act or an order made under that Act, which, in this case, is either the proceedings started on December 21, 1967, by way of show cause notice, or later the assessment order dated May 16, 1968. Before that date, there is no room for applying Section 40(2). Government, therefore, observe that the plea of limitation under Section 49(2) of the Central Excises and Salt Act is not sustainable in a case where the goods are held to have been removed without payment of duty and which has escaped assessment by the Department. The revision application is, however, allowed for reasons set out in paras 2.1 and 2.2 above.

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• 1980 (4) TMI 112 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
  

  Drawback - Goods for export damaged in ship - Admissibility of - Export goods - Connotation of

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• 1980 (4) TMI 111 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
  

  Valuation - Packing - Manufacture

  
  
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  ... ... ..... and rule is made absolute in each of the two petitions to the aforesaid extent with costs. So far as deduction of trade discount is concerned, we may observe that there shall be no obligation upon the central excise authorities to reopen, those cases in so far as deduction of trade discount is concerned, in which it has been finally held by them that the petitioners have not allowed trade discount to their wholesale buyers but have allowed it only to their branches and depots. 17. Mr. S.N. Shelat who appears on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 applied for a certificate of fitness under Art. 133(1) of the Constitution of India to appeal against this decision to the Supreme Court. In the case of Alembic Glass Industries Limited (Supra), we have granted the certificate. The principles laid down in that case have been applied by us to this case. Therefore, we grant certificate of fitness under Art. 133(1) to the respondents to appeal against this decision to the Supreme Court.

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• 1980 (4) TMI 110 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
  

  `Not elsewhere specified' - Licence - Criteria for - No-excisable goods - Construction of Statutes - Statutes - Canons of interpretation

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• 1980 (4) TMI 109 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
  

  Manufacture for or on behalf of - Use of third party's brand name - Effect

  
  
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  ... ... ..... under section 2(f) of the Act and therefore their production cannot be said to be for and on behalf of Parles. The fact that the goods were sold under the trade marks of Parles would also not male any difference to this position. The Gujarat High Court observed in the judgment cited above that trade mark and manufactured goods are two distinct entities and one can exist without the other. In fact, it appears to us to be an impossible proposition to sustain that in this case the goods could be manufactured only when the last step of affixing a trade mark thereon is taken. 6. In view of the above Government agree that it will not be correct to hold Parles as the manufactures for purpose of Exemption Notification No. 82/74 alone when for all other purposes under the Central Excise law the party is treated as the manufacturer of the goods. 7. For the reasons stated above, therefore Government of India uphold the correctness of the order-in-appeal and drop the review proceedings.

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• 1980 (4) TMI 108 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
  

  Goods consumed within the factory of production not liable to duty - Scope - Place of manufacture - Meaning

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• 1980 (4) TMI 107 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
  

  Valuation - Storage of excisable goods at various depots - Rent on godowns - Advertisement expenses - Cost of packing - Corrugated fibre containers - Constitution

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• 1980 (4) TMI 106 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
  

  Garrard Auto changer - Liability to duty - Manufacture - Appeal - Raising of new points not admissible

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• 1980 (4) TMI 105 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
  

  Nylon Twine - Yarn and Twine - Distinction between - Validity - Fiscal statutes - Criteria for Constitution - Two views - Effect

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• 1980 (4) TMI 104 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
  

  Industrial Undertaking

  
  
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  ... ... ..... f there were two constructions which an entry could reasonably bear, and one of them which was in favour of the revenue was adopted, the court has no jurisdiction to interfere merely because the other interpretation favourable to the subject appeals to the court as the better one to adopt. Again, the same view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in a later decision in V. V. Iyer v. Jasjit Singh, AIR 1973 SC 194. It has been stated already that the revenue has adopted the popular definition of the term ore . We have also come to the conclusion that the said definition should be adopted. In the circumstances, in our opinion, the learned judge was perfectly justified in not accepting the interpretation that was sought to be given on behalf of the appellants for the purpose of getting the tax benefits under the scheme. Accordingly, both these appeals are dismissed, but in view of the facts and circumstances of the cases, there will be no order for costs. SHARMA J.-- I agree.

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• 1980 (4) TMI 103 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
  

  Industrial Undertaking

  
  
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  ... ... ..... h by the assessee in the preceding assessment years where loss has been sustained and there was no profit or gain against which the deduction could be adjusted. In the present case, admittedly, there was no profit or gain against which s. 80J relief can be adjusted for the assessment years 1969-70, 1970-71 and 1971-72. So, the claim for s. 80J relief is admissible for the assessment year 1972-73, even though the assessee has not made the claim for s. 80J relief in the assessment years 1969-70 to 1971-72 when admittedly no profit or gain was derived from the new industrial undertaking. The Tribunal was hence justified in allowing the assessee s claim for deduction of Rs. 1,38,119 under s. 80J relating to assessment years 1969-70 to 1971-72 in the assessment year 1972-73, subject to verification of the details furnished by the assesee. The question referred to is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee is entitled to costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.

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