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Showing 61 to 80 of 1437 Records
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2015 (3) TMI 1387
Discretion of the Magistrate to call for a report Under Section 202 instead of directing investigation 156(3) - controlled by any defined parameters or not - power of Police Officer to arrest an accused - correctness of seeking report Under Section 202 instead of directing investigation Under Section 156(3) - HELD THAT:- The direction Under Section 156(3) is to be issued, only after application of mind by the Magistrate. When the Magistrate does not take cognizance and does not find it necessary to postpone instance of process and finds a case made out to proceed forthwith, direction under the said provision is issued. In other words, where on account of credibility of information available, or weighing the interest of justice it is considered appropriate to straightaway direct investigation, such a direction is issued. Cases where Magistrate takes cognizance and postpones issuance of process are cases where the Magistrate has yet to determine "existence of sufficient ground to proceed" - Subject to these broad guidelines available from the scheme of the Code, exercise of discretion by the Magistrate is guided by interest of justice from case to case.
Power of police to arrest in the course of investigation Under Section 202 with a view to give its report to the Magistrate to enable him to decide whether a case to proceed further existed - HELD THAT:- Careful examination of scheme of the Code reveals that in such situation power of arrest is not available with the police. Contention based on language of Section 202(3) cannot be accepted - Nature of cases dealt with Under Section 202 are cases where material available is not clear to proceed further. The Magistrate is in seisin of the matter having taken the cognizance. He has to decide whether there is ground to proceed further. If at such premature stage power of arrest is exercised by police, it will be contradiction in terms. As regards denial of opportunity to record confession Under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, it has to be kept in mind that admissibility of such confession cannot guide exercise of power of arrest. Source of power of arrest is governed by other provisions and not by Section 27.
Whether in the present case the Magistrate ought to have proceeded Under Section 156(3) instead of Section 202? - HELD THAT:- The answer is in negative - The Magistrate has given reasons, which have been upheld by the High Court. The case has been held to be primarily of civil nature. The accused is alleged to have forged partnership. Whether such forgery actually took place, whether it caused any loss to the complainant and whether there is the requisite mens rea are the questions which are yet to be determined. The Magistrate has not found clear material to proceed against the accused. Even a case for summoning has not yet been found. While a transaction giving rise to cause of action for a civil action may also involve a crime in which case resort to criminal proceedings may be justified, there is judicially acknowledged tendency in the commercial world to give colour of a criminal case to a purely commercial transaction - the Magistrate and the High Court rightly held that in the present case report Under Section 202 was the right course instead of direction Under Section 156(3). The question is answered accordingly.
Thus there are no error in the view taken by the Magistrate and the High Court that direction Under Section 156(3) was not warranted in the present case and the police may not be justified in exercising power of arrest in the course of submitting report Under Section 202 - appeal dismissed.
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2015 (3) TMI 1386
Dishonor of Cheque - insufficiency of funds - It is alleged by the present Respondent (accused) in the petition that Balakrishnan, instead of getting the mortgage deed executed, obtained an agreement of sale from aforesaid two persons with false and incorrect recitals - HELD THAT:- The defence of the Respondent (accused) before the High Court, in the petition filed Under Section 482 of the Code, is nothing but absolutely factual in nature, which is neither admitted by the complainant, nor apparent on the face of the record. Such type of disputed factual defences could have been appreciated only by the trial court, after the parties led their evidence. The High Court committed grave error of law in examining the allegations and counter allegations which are disputed and factual in nature in a proceeding Under Section 482 of the Code.
There are no option but to set aside the order passed by the High Court as it has entered into highly disputed questions of fact and concluded that the material before it was sufficient to cause reasonable suspicion in the case of the complainant. That is not the ground on which powers Under Section 482 of the Code can be exercised by the High Court - appeal allowed.
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2015 (3) TMI 1385
Cheating - It is alleged in the complaint that the loan transaction of the company with IIBI was settled with the efforts of the complainant/Respondent No. 3 herein but the company, Directors and Promoter did not pay him the consultancy fee as promised and they conspired together to deceive the complainant and committed offences as alleged - breach of contract - HELD THAT:- It is not in dispute that the IIBI did not issue any acceptance letter on or before 30.10.2008 with regard to the settlement of disputes of the Appellant company. The 3rd Respondent also did not present the cheque dated 6.8.2008 issued by the Appellant company for encashing a sum of ₹ 30 lakhs. Due to the efforts of the Appellant company IIBI finally agreed and issued letter of acceptance dated 5.1.2009. One year later, the 3rd Respondent sent a letter dated 6.3.2010 to the Appellant company demanding the balance amount of ₹ 70 lakhs towards the consultancy fee. No allegation whatsoever was made against the Appellants herein in the said letter. It was only mentioned in it that the consultation fee remains unpaid and the company is delaying the payment on one pretext or the other.
It is true that a given set of facts may make out a civil wrong as also a criminal offence and only because a civil remedy may be available to the complainant that itself cannot be a ground to quash a criminal proceeding. The real test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose the criminal offence of cheating or not - In the present case there is nothing to show that at the very inception there was any intention on behalf of the accused persons to cheat which is a condition precedent for an offence Under Section 420 Indian Penal Code. The complaint does not disclose any criminal offence at all. Criminal proceedings should not be encouraged when it is found to be malafide or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.
Appeal allowed - decided in favor of appellant.
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2015 (3) TMI 1384
Penalty u/s 271(1)(b) - assessee has not complied with the notices under sections 143(2)/142(1) - HELD THAT:- As decided in SARDARMAL KOTHARI [2013 (3) TMI 815 - ITAT CHENNAI] when an assessment has been made under sec.143(3) and not under sec.144 of the I.T. Act, it means that subsequent compliance in the assessment proceedings was considered as good compliance and the defaults committed earlier were ignored by the Assessing Officer and, therefore, there is no case for levy of penalty under sec.271(1)(b) of the Act - Appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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2015 (3) TMI 1383
Bail application - Bribe - allegation of receiving bribe on behalf of senior officials - abettor to the principal perpetrator, Accused 1 or not - HELD THAT:- The senior accused, A-1, had been requested to issue a patta in favour of the complainant. A-2, A-1's junior officer, was given the trap money in A-1's office and on his behalf by the complainant, who was accompanied by a trap witness. On exiting the office of A-1, A-2 was at once apprehended. Although A-1 had not been entrapped per se, he was found to be conclusively incriminated by the circumstances and evidence of the complainant.
The conviction of Accused 1 perfectly sustainable. It is an argument a fortiori supportive of Accused 1's conviction herein, since in Shamsudhin, A-2's receipt in A-1's office on behalf of A-1 could conceivably have been repudiated by A-1 on the ground that he himself could have taken receipt of the bribe amount in his own office, being physically present there at the time of payment, and need not have relied on his junior officer to take receipt thereof on his behalf. Contrarily, in the case before us, Accused 1's absence from the office at the time of the trap strengthens, rather than weakens, the claim that his junior officer, Accused 2, was receiving part of the bribe amount as a custodian on his behalf.
Bail of both Accused stands hereby cancelled. Consequently, it is directed that the Accused persons are to be taken into custody forthwith, to serve out the remainder of their sentences - Appeal dismissed.
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2015 (3) TMI 1382
Dishonor of Cheque - Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - revision petitioner has contended that filing of the petition under Section 311 Cr.P.C. is only to protract the proceedings - HELD THAT:- Record of proceedings shows that revision case is pending from 2011 onwards. The petitioner has obtained stay of the proceedings in STC.No.590 of 2007 and even after this Court ordered private notice, as early as on 09.09.2011, proof has not been filed for effecting service on the respondent. Thus, it is also evident from the above that it is the petitoner, who has proteacted the proceedings in STC No.590 of 2007 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate No.I, Tiruppur, and not the respondent.
The power of attorney can adduce evidence on the facts relating to issuance of cheque, dishonour, issuance of notice and filing of complaint, and these facts can be deposed with documents. He comes into picture, only after all the legal requirements for instituting a complaint, are met and authorised to speak about the abovesaid facts. Power of attorney is given to institute a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and to conduct the case. It cannot be contended that, whatever transpired between the parties is within the personal knowledge of the power of attorney. On the facts of this case, he cannot speak as to what transpired in the Crime Branch Police Station, Tiruppur, regarding payment, stated to have been made by the drawer, towards the cheque amount. The abovesaid fact can be spoken to, only by the complainant and not by the power of attorney.
The revision petition is liable to be dismissed and accordingly, dismissed.
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2015 (3) TMI 1381
Reversal of amounts already adjusted towards balance of arrears for the assessment year 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 - reversal for the reason that the said adjustment cannot be possible to be made for the demand emanated for the preceding assessment year - Section 19(17) of TNVAT Act and Rule 10(b) of TNVAT Rules - HELD THAT:- Since the impugned order passed is contrary to the provisions of Section 19(17) of the Act, the impugned order dated 20.02.2015 is quashed and the writ petition stands allowed.
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2015 (3) TMI 1380
Rejection of additional grounds in limine by CIT-A - CIT (Appeals) rejected the three additional grounds of appeal on the ground that omission to take these grounds originally in Appeal is wilful and unreasonable. - HELD THAT:- The grounds of appeal nos. 1,2 and 3 as made out before the Tribunal were verbatim repetition as grounds of appeal which were raised by the appellant before the CIT (Appeals) we find that this was not the basis of the Tribunal dismissing the appeal in respect of grounds 1,2 and 3. The submission on the part of the revenue is hypertechnical and not appreciated as it defeats the purpose and object of the hierarchy of authorities created under the Act to redress the grievances of the assessee.
The question as formulated is answered in favour of the assessee and the impugned order of the Tribunal is set aside to the extent it rejects ground nos. 1, 2 and 3 and the same are restored to the file of the Tribunal for fresh disposal. It may be pointed out that the CIT (Appeals) after having rejected the Appellant's additional grounds proceeds further to deal with the ground nos.1, 2 and 3 and rejects the same on merits. This is an additional reason that the Tribunal ought to have considered grounds 1,2 and 3 raised by the Appellant on merits which it failed to do.
On the aforesaid issue alone the appeal is restored to the Tribunal. The Tribunal is directed to hear the Appellant and pass a fresh order on ground nos. 1,2 and 3 urged by the appellant as expeditiously as possible.
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2015 (3) TMI 1379
Deduction u/s 54EC - as per AO second tranche invested in the succeeding previous year, would not be eligible for deduction under section 54EC(1) AND the second investment was for a different financial year - DR submitted that investments made in two years when aggregated exceeded the limit of ₹ 50 lakhs set out in the section and therefore assessee ought not to have been given the relief - HELD THAT:- As relying on case C. JAICHANDER [2014 (11) TMI 54 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] from a reading of Section 54EC(1) and the first proviso, it is clear that the time limit for investment is six months from the date of transfer and even if such investment falls under two financial years, the benefit claimed by the assessee cannot be denied. It would have made a difference, if the restriction on the investment in bonds to ₹ 50,00,000/- is incorporated in Section 54EC(1) of the Act itself. However, the ambiguity has been removed by the legislature with effect from 1.4.2015 in relation to the assessment year 2015-16 and the subsequent years. For the foregoing reasons, we find no infirmity in the orders passed by the Tribunal warranting interference by this Court. The substantial questions of law are answered against the Revenue and these appeals are dismissed.
We therefore find CIT(A) to be justified in giving the deduction under section 54EC to the assessee in full - Decided against revenue.
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2015 (3) TMI 1378
Validity of assessment order passed u/s 143(3) - assessment made on a dead person - HELD THAT:- Assessee expired on 23.12.2007 and this fact was brought to the notice of the AO during the course of assessment proceedings vide assessees’s authorized representative Chartered Accountant, letter dated 1.9.2009. The Bench had called for the assessment record to verify whether the said letter was filed by the assessee and was forming part of the assessment record or not.
DR confirmed during the course of hearing by producing the assessment record that the said letter of the assessee dated 1.9.2009 was there in the assessment record. This proves that the assessee’s AR had brought to the notice of the AO the factum of the death of the assessee - AO, thereafter, instead of taking steps to bring the legal heirs on record, proceeded to frame the assessment of a dead person.
Thus, this issue is covered by the decision of this Bench of the Tribunal in the case of ITO Vs. Shri Akhter Nooruddinahmed Saiyed [2014 (6) TMI 113 - ITAT AHMEDABAD] DR could not bring any material before us to show that the impugned assessment order was passed after issuing any notice to the legal representative of the deceased individual. Therefore, in our considered view, the appeal filed by the Revenue is not maintainable.
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2015 (3) TMI 1377
Registration u/s.12A denied - activities carried on by the trust were meant for members of the Jain community and thus it is established for the benefit of specific religious community attracting the provisions of section 13(1)(b) - whether the trust whose objects were religious as well as charitable would be entitled for registration under section 12A? - HELD THAT:- One of the objects of the assessee trust was to build a temple, prayer hall and maintain the same and further object was to set up a religious library, maintain it and propagate Indian culture and inculcate and study all the cultures of all the religion. Further, to take up research on religious, social and educational in order to uplift the public at large. The objects Nos.3 to 5 of the Trust Deed were admittedly for the propagation of philosophy of Shri Jain Shwetamber Murtipujak. However, object No.7 was to create, encourage and propagate inter-se cooperation, co-living and feeling of co-living in the community of entire public at large. The objects of the assessee trust thus, reflect the activities to be carried on for the purpose of Jain religion and also for the purpose of public at large. In view thereof, it could not be held that the same are meant for the benefit of only Jain religious community. We reverse the findings of the Commissioner in this regard.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in CIT Vs. Dawoodi Bohra Jamat [2014 (3) TMI 652 - SUPREME COURT] while holding the trust eligible to claim exemption under section 11 of the Act. In the totality of the above said facts and circumstances, we hold that the assessee is a charitable religious trust and the provisions of section 13(1)(b) of the Act would not be applicable. In view thereof, we direct the Commissioner to grant registration to the assessee under section 12A of the Act as charitable religious trust. The grounds of appeal raised by the assessee are thus, allowed.
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2015 (3) TMI 1376
Revision u/s 263 - Deduction u/s 80IB(10) - HELD THAT:- It is not in dispute that the AO had taken into consideration the revised certificate issued by the Pune Municipal Corporation while granting the benefit of deduction under section 80IB(10) of the Act.
It cannot be disputed that the view taken by the AO is one of the possible views on the matter. As rightly observed in the case Gabrial India Ltd. [1993 (4) TMI 55 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] as well as case of Sunbeam Auto Ltd. [2008 (11) TMI 348 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT] merely because the Commissioner of Income Tax holds a different opinion on the matter an order passed by the AO cannot be considered as erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of Revenue particularly when it cannot be attributed to lack of enquiry by the AO. We are of the firm view that the learned Commissioner has no jurisdiction to invoke provisions of section 263. - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2015 (3) TMI 1375
Jurisdiction - power of assessing officer to compound the offence - requirement of petitioner agreeing for compounding - HELD THAT:- Without going into the merits of the matter, this Court allows this revision and sets aside the impugned order. The disposal of the Writ Petition is not a bar for the authority concerned to proceed against the petitioner, if so advised.
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2015 (3) TMI 1374
Power driven pump - Exemption under Rule 8(i) of the Central Excise Tariff Rules - contravention of the provisions of Rule 173-C and 173-F - it was held by High Court that the column and shaft assembly as well as the discharge head assembly only contribute to the effectiveness of the bowl assembly, which by itself is not sufficient to claim exemption as a machine under entry 84.13 - HELD THAT:- The judgement is upheld - appeal dismissed.
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2015 (3) TMI 1373
Denial of deduction u/s 10A - HELD THAT:- As following the same parity of reasoning in assessee's own case [2015 (3) TMI 494 - ITAT PUNE] we hold that in the absence of any arrangement having been arrived between the parties which resulted in higher profits, there is no merit in the order of the AO in re-working the profits by invoking the provisions of section 10A(7) r.w.s. 80-IA(10) - Accordingly, we reverse the order of the CIT(A) in restricting the deduction u/s 10A of the Act and direct the AO to delete the addition - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2015 (3) TMI 1372
Prevention from travelling outside the country - violation of fundamental rights or not - Whether the right to travel abroad is a fundamental right protected by Article 21 of the Constitution? And if so, could the violation of that right impact the freedom of speech and expression of a citizen protected under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution? - HELD THAT:- It cannot be argued that the right to travel abroad is not a fundamental right. It is, as a matter of fact, a second generation right which flows from the right to life and personal liberty conferred on the citizens, under Article 21, which can be taken away only by procedure, as established in law. While, it may be true that the right to go abroad is not included the right to freedom of speech and expression - in some cases, the curtailment of right to travel abroad could impact, a citizen's right of free speech and expression.
Whether the 2010 O.M. would constitute a "law" within the meaning of Article 13(3)(a) of the Constitution? - Whether the issuance of an LOC qua Ms Pillai was justified in the given facts and circumstances? - Whether the consequent detention of Ms Pillai on 11.01.2015, at the airport, resulted in violation of her fundamental right, under Article 21, and 19(1)(a) of the Constitution? - HELD THAT:- There is nothing on record to show that Ms Pillai intended to do anything more than this. The argument of the respondents that Greenpeace U.K. and Greenpeace International were fomenting protests in the country with respect to various public projects, especially, in the field of thermal and nuclear power generation, is not backed with actionable material. The record would show that while the respondents may have regulated the inflow of funds to Greenpeace International, by having it put in the "prior approval" category, there is no such directive issued either qua Greenpeace U.K., or Greenpeace India. Ms Pillai, is admittedly, employed with Greenpeace India - The only violation which is brought to fore, in the counter affidavit, qua Greenpeace India, is one concerning certain notices issued by the Income Tax Authorities; which have clearly, some revenue implications. However, the alleged violation of tax laws, which I am informed is contested, would not, in my opinion by itself, be demonstrative of the fact that the activities carried out by Greenpeace India, via its employees, agents and servants, is inimical to the economic interest of the country. While there is no gainsaying that economic security, as against physical security of a nation in today's time and space, is equally vital, if not more - nothing, which is placed before me, in the form of affidavit, or is found in the record, which was shown to me in court, would have me, presently, come to a conclusion that the activities of Ms Pillai, in particular, or those of the organizations, with which she is associated, are activities, which have the potentiality of degrading the economic interest of the country.
The core aspect of democracy is the freedom of an individual to be able to freely operate, within the framework of the laws enacted by the Parliament. The individual should be able to order his or her life any way he or she pleases, as long as it is not violative of the law or constitutes an infraction of any order or direction of a duly constituted court, tribunal or any statutory authority for that matter. Amongst the varied freedoms conferred on an individual (i.e., the citizen), is the right of free speech and expression, which necessarily includes the right to criticise and dissent.
There was no basis for the respondents to issue an LOC qua the petitioner. That being so, the decision taken to detain the petitioner at the airport on 11.01.2015, in my opinion, was illegal being violative of the Ms Pillai's right under Article 21 and 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. 13.9 The actions of the respondents do not fall within the ambit of reasonable restriction, as articulated in Clause (2) of Article 19. Clause (2) of Article 19 protects a "law" which imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of rights conferred upon a citizen under Article 19(1)(a), in the interest of: sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency, morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence.
Petition disposed off.
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2015 (3) TMI 1371
Suit for recovery of money lent and advanced against pledge of shares - security of shares pledged by the defendant with the plaintiff - agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant or not - Did the plaintiff lend and advance any amount pursuant to such agreement? - agreement between the parties or not - HELD THAT:- The nature of transactions between the parties is not disputed. The parties agree that the plaintiff had agreed to grant and did in fact grant a loan of ₹ 1,10,00,000/-to the defendant against the pledge of Himachal Futuristic Company Limited (HFCL) shares. The defendant had pledged the HFCL shares belonging to it with the plaintiff. However, the defendant had transferred the HFCL shares to the plaintiff by transferring such shares to the dematerialized account maintained by the plaintiff - The parties differ as to the rate of interest payable by the defendant to the plaintiff and as to whether or not the payment of ₹ 1,68,000/- made on April 20, 2001 by the defendant to the plaintiff was on account of full and final settlement of the claim of the plaintiff against the defendant or whether the same was payment on account of interest for the period up to March 31, 2001 as contended by the plaintiff.
Both the witness in evidence stated that the plaintiff used to lend and advance sums the defendant against pledge of shares and payment of interest. The rate of interest is however disputed. The plaintiff claims varying rates while the defendant contends that the rate of interest was agreed to be 18% per annum - the issue has to be answered by holding that there was an agreement between the parties.
Existence of money lend and advance exists or not - HELD THAT:- The defendant in its written statement as well as in evidence through its witness admits that the receipt of the sum of ₹ 1,10,00,000/- from the plaintiff as loan. The defendant however claims to have repaid the same - has to be answered by holding that the plaintiff did lend and advance of ₹ 1,10,00,000/- to the defendant pursuant to such agreement - Thus, it can be safely concluded that there exists agreement between the parties.
Service of notice - Did the defendant receive the notice dated 14th January, 2002? - HELD THAT:- Exhibit ‘J’ was sought to be served on the defendant both at his residential address as well as at his office address by Speed Post with the acknowledgement due card. The plaintiff has established that the letter being Exhibit ‘J’ was duly despatched by Speed Post to the correct address of the defendant at his residential and office addresses. The defendant did not claim Exhibit ‘J’ at its residential address and the envelope addressed to the office address was not received by the defendant as its office had remained closed. The facts established allows a finding of deemed service of the notice dated January 14, 2002 on the defendant - Issue answered in the affirmative and against the defendant.
Was the plaintiff entitled to sell the shares pledged by the defendant to the plaintiff as security for the loan rendered by the plaintiff to the defendant of a sum of ₹ 1,10,00,000/-? - HELD THAT:- In the present case, the shares pledged were sold in the stock market within the parameters of the quoted prices for the shares prevailing on the date of the sale. The defendant has not questioned the sale of the shares per se. The defendant questions the date of the sale of the shares. Such question has no substance in the facts of this suit as the sale was undertaken after notice to the defendant - issue is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the plaintiff.
Did the plaintiff receive the letters dated 7th February, 2001 and 20th April, 2001? - HELD THAT:- The witness of the defendant claims himself to be the accountant of the defendant. Such witness claims that Mr. Govind Kedia has told the defendant that Exhibits ‘6’ and ‘7’ were handed over by Mr. Govind Kedia to the plaintiff. The defendant claims that Mr. Govind Kedia to be the agent of the plaintiff. No documentary evidence has been placed on record by the parties to establish that Mr. Govind Kedia was the agent of the plaintiff. The witness for the defendant in its oral testimony says that Mr. Govind Kedia has acted as an agent of the plaintiff. Mr. Govind Kedia has not been called as a witness. The whereabouts of Mr. Govind Kedia is not known to the witness of the defendant. The evidence of the witness of the defendant is hearsay and cannot be relied upon - The defendant has therefore failed to establish that the plaintiff had received the letters dated February 7, 2001 and April 20, 2001 being Exhibits ‘7’ and ‘6’ respectively - issue answered in the negative and in favour of the plaintiff.
Is the plaintiff entitled to decree as claimed in the plaint? - HELD THAT:- The loan for the sum of ₹ 1,10,00,000/- is admitted. The value of the sale of pledged shares is ₹ 8,55,400/-. The defendant is, therefore, entitled to the adjustment of the value of the pledged shares with the principal amount outstanding. Therefore, the principal amount outstanding is ₹ 1,01,44,600/-. The defendant has paid interest upto March 31, 2001. The nature of transactions between the parties is commercial. The nationalized banks charge interest at rates not less than 12 per cent per annum in respect of commercial transactions. In such circumstances, the plaintiff is entitled to interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum on and from April 1, 2001 until realization on the sum of ₹ 1,01,44,600/-. The plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to a decree for ₹ 1,01,44,600/- together with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum on such sum on and from April 1, 2001 until realization.
Other reliefs? - HELD THAT:- The plaintiff has paid a Court-fees of ₹ 10,000/-. The plaintiff will therefore be entitled to a decree of ₹ 20,000/- as assessed costs from the defendant.
Application disposed off.
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2015 (3) TMI 1370
Benefit of payment of taxes at compounded rates - benefit denied on the ground that the petitioner had effected interstate purchases during the assessment year 2009-10 - Section 6(1) of TNVAT Act - HELD THAT:- Petitioner have not effected any inter-state purchases. All the purchases have been effect from local registered dealers upon sufferance of tax. They have also enclosed the purchase list with invoice copies for 2009-10.
Thus, the petitioner has not purchased the goods from other States and there is no need to file separate application under Section 6 of the Act. Admittedly, the respondent has accepted that the petitioner has not made any purchase of the goods outside the country - petition allowed - decided in favor of petitioner.
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2015 (3) TMI 1369
Levying penalty u/s. 271C - assessee had not deducted TDS from the payments made to the State Bank of India as MICR charges during the relevant year u/s.194J - HELD THAT:- Since tax has already been paid by the payee, no penalty could be levied on assessee-payer for failure to deduct tax at source as held by the ITAT Bangalore Bench rendered in the case of Wipro GE Medical Systems Ltd. vs. ITO [2005 (1) TMI 609 - ITAT BANGALORE]. In view of the above, penalties levied by the authorities below u/s.271C are directed to be deleted in all the four years as these pertain to same issue.- Decided in favour of assessee.
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2015 (3) TMI 1368
Deduction u/s 80IB(10) - as per revenue the original commencement certificate was issued to the assessee on 06.09.1991 i.e prior to 01st October 1998 - CIT-A allowed the claim - HELD THAT:- The condition for commencement is a primary condition and if the project is found commenced prior to 1.10.1998, it would not be entitled for deduction u/s 80IB(10), at the threshold without going into the other condition prescribed under the other clauses of section 80IB(10)
There was some dispute at the time of original approval granted by the CIDCO on 6.9.1991 on the point of development charges as well as theatre and shops in the development plan. Accordingly, the original owner of the land in question challenged the action of CIDCO rejecting the modified development proposal vide order dated 18.06.1998 by filing the appeal u/s 47 of the Maharashtra Regional and City Planning Act 1966. The appeal was decided by the appellate authority on 8.9.1999. In pursuant to the order of appellate authority, the amended approval certificate dated 3.10.2005 was issued by the CIDCO. From perusal of the order dated 8.9.1999, we find that there was some construction in the project prior to the amendment proposal in the development plan put forward by the owner of the land which was rejected by the CIDCO vide order dated 18.06.1998.
Therefore, the commencement of the project has to be taken into account as per the actual construction work started in respect of the project and not by taking into consideration the original sanction and amended sanction of the plan. Since the actual work of construction and development of the project has not been examined by the authorities below, therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we set aside this issue to the record of AO for proper verification and examination of the fact and then decide the issue as per law. The issue of completion of project within the prescribed time limit is kept open - Decided in favour of revenue for statistical purposes.
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9911796707
