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1986 (9) TMI 429
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of appointments of certain Assistants.
2. Assignment of seniority to the petitioners.
3. Preliminary objection on the ground of laches.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of Appointments of Certain Assistants:
The officials who had been directly appointed as Assistants in the Intelligence Bureau in 1957 filed a writ petition in 1976 questioning the validity of the appointments of certain other Assistants. These Assistants had been appointed either prior to 1.2.1954 or before the induction of the writ petitioners into service. The High Court's Division Bench held that the posts of Assistants existing on 1.2.1954 should have been filled by eligible persons as per Paragraph 15 of the 1955 reorganization Scheme, and found an infringement of these terms in the appointments in question. However, the Supreme Court found it distressing that the validity of appointments made over 32 years ago was still being contested, emphasizing that government servants should not have to defend their appointments and seniority after such a long period.
2. Assignment of Seniority to the Petitioners:
The seniority of Assistants in the Intelligence Bureau was initially fixed based on the 1949 Office Memorandum, which prioritized length of service. This was later superseded by the 1959 Office Memorandum, which based seniority on the date of confirmation. The petitioners, recruited through the Union Public Service Commission in 1955, joined in 1957 and were assigned seniority based on the 1959 Memorandum. However, the Supreme Court in a previous case (Union of India & Ors. v. M. Ravi Varma & Ors.) clarified that the 1959 Memorandum did not have retrospective effect. Consequently, the seniority list was revised in 1975, reverting to the principles of the 1949 Memorandum, which placed the respondents above the petitioners. The petitioners challenged this revised seniority list in 1976, but the Supreme Court noted that the seniority list had been issued in 1958 and no objections were raised by the petitioners until much later.
3. Preliminary Objection on the Ground of Laches:
The respondents raised a preliminary objection to the writ petition on the ground of laches, arguing that the petitioners had delayed unreasonably in challenging the seniority list. The Supreme Court agreed with this objection, noting that the first draft seniority list was issued in 1958 and no objections were raised by the petitioners until 1976. The Court emphasized that satisfactory service conditions require stability and that government servants should not face uncertainty due to delayed legal challenges. The Court cited previous judgments, including R.S. Makashi & Ors. v. I.M. Menon & Ors., and Maloon Lawrence Cecil D'Souza v. Union of India & Ors., to support its position that challenges to seniority should be made promptly to avoid administrative complications and ensure efficiency in public service.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court, and dismissed the writ petition on the ground of laches. The Court directed that all promotions in the Intelligence Bureau be reviewed in accordance with the seniority list dated January 28, 1976, and made no order as to costs.
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1986 (9) TMI 428
Issues:
1. Application for appointment of Receiver in a mortgage suit.
2. Rejection of ad interim appointment of Receiver.
3. Delay in filing the application for appointment of Receiver.
4. Just and convenient grounds for appointing a Receiver.
5. Consideration of expert Receiver to run the business.
Analysis:
1. The State Bank of India filed a Mortgage Title Suit against a company and its directors for recovery of a loan. The application for appointment of a Receiver was based on the endangerment of securities due to non-payment by the defendants. The court considered the nature of the securities and the terms of the credit facilities agreement in determining the necessity of a Receiver.
2. The rejection of the ad interim appointment of the Receiver by the Assistant District Judge was based on the lack of evidence showing imminent danger to the securities. The appellate court admitted the appeal and directed a contested hearing for the application, emphasizing the need for prompt action in such matters.
3. The delay in filing the application for appointment of the Receiver was noted by the court, both in the lower court and the appellate court. The absence of material indicating immediate threat to the securities further weakened the case for an urgent appointment of a Receiver.
4. The court discussed the principles guiding the appointment of a Receiver, emphasizing the need for a strong case by the plaintiff, imminent danger to the property, and prompt application. The court referred to legal precedents to support the decision-making process regarding the appointment of a Receiver.
5. The consideration of appointing an expert Receiver to run the business was deliberated upon. The court highlighted the potential negative impact of appointing a Receiver on the functioning of the defendant's business, especially when the company was still operational. The court deemed it unjust and inconvenient to appoint a Receiver that could potentially disrupt the business operations.
In conclusion, the court upheld the rejection of the ad interim appointment of the Receiver, emphasizing the lack of immediate threat to the securities and the ongoing business operations of the defendant. The appeal was dismissed, and the application for the appointment of the Receiver was rejected. The court advised expeditious disposal of the pending application in the lower court, emphasizing the need to protect the interests of all parties involved.
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1986 (9) TMI 427
Issues: Jurisdiction of civil court under Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961
Analysis:
The plaintiffs filed a suit seeking a declaration of ownership of land and injunction against Gram Panchayat interference. The Panchayat contended that the civil court lacked jurisdiction under section 13 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961. The trial court initially held it had jurisdiction based on the title issue. However, the High Court concluded that the suit was not maintainable before the civil court due to Act provisions.
The Act defines 'Shamlat deh' and post-amendment, sections 11, 12, and 13 govern rights and jurisdiction. Section 11 allows claims on land vested in Panchayat, with Collector deciding and Commissioner hearing appeals. Section 12 mandates finality of Collector/Commissioner orders, barring court challenges. Section 13 restricts civil court jurisdiction on shamlat deh matters or actions under the Act.
The plaintiffs avoided claiming the land wasn't shamlat deh but challenged Panchayat's right based on revenue records. Despite not directly raising shamlat deh issue, the civil court couldn't assert jurisdiction as the Act bars such suits. A cited case allowed a civil court suit as the plaintiff didn't claim land ownership against Panchayat, unlike the present case.
The High Court's decision was upheld, emphasizing that the Collector, not the civil court, must decide shamlat deh matters under the Act. The plaintiffs' failure to address shamlat deh directly prevented civil court jurisdiction. The petition was dismissed, affirming the High Court's judgment.
In conclusion, the judgment clarifies the limited jurisdiction of civil courts under the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, emphasizing the exclusive authority of the Collector to decide shamlat deh issues, thereby upholding the Act's provisions and restricting civil court interference in such matters.
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1986 (9) TMI 426
Issues:
1. Validity of the order appointing a Commissioner under Order 26, Rule 9, C.P.C.
Analysis:
The judgment revolves around the challenge to an order appointing a Commissioner under Order 26, Rule 9, C.P.C. The plaintiff sought a mandatory injunction for the removal of a wall obstructing his passage, while the defendant claimed the disputed land as part of his backyard. The Court allowed the plaintiff's application for a Commissioner for local investigation despite the defendant's resistance. The defendant challenged this order, arguing that the trial Court erred by not providing reasons for the appointment. The Court emphasized that the power to appoint a Commissioner is discretionary and must be supported by reasons to ensure the proper exercise of discretion. The absence of reasons rendered the order liable to be set aside for material irregularity, even though the report of the Commissioner is just one piece of evidence in the case.
The judgment delves into the purpose of appointing a Commissioner under Order 26, Rule 9, C.P.C. It highlights that the Court appoints a Commissioner to collect evidence for a just decision, but this power should not be used liberally. The appointment depends on the nature of the dispute and the specific circumstances of each case. The Court should ensure that appointing a Commissioner does not unduly assist a party who can present evidence independently. The judgment emphasizes that a Commissioner's report is not inherently more reliable than other evidence and should be used judiciously based on the case's requirements.
The judgment cites precedents to illustrate the principles governing the appointment of a Commissioner. It emphasizes that a local investigation by a Commissioner can be ordered when a visit to the spot is necessary to clarify or explain points left doubtful by existing evidence. The Court must be judicially satisfied that a local investigation is requisite or proper based on reason. The judgment underscores that interference with an order appointing a Commissioner may not be warranted in all cases, especially when the order is discretionary and does not prejudice any party. However, where the Court fails to provide reasons for the appointment or when immediate commissioning is unnecessary, the order may be set aside.
In conclusion, the Court allowed the civil revision, setting aside the order appointing a Commissioner and directing the trial Court to reconsider the application for the commission and objections afresh. The judgment underscores the importance of judicial satisfaction and reasoned decision-making in appointing Commissioners under Order 26, Rule 9, C.P.C.
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1986 (9) TMI 425
Issues Involved:
I. Constitutionality of Rule 31(v) of the ITDC Conduct Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1978.
II. Entitlement to reinstatement or compensation if the rule is unconstitutional.
III. Appropriate amount of compensation in lieu of reinstatement.
Detailed Analysis:
I. Constitutionality of Rule 31(v) of the ITDC Conduct Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1978
The primary issue was whether Rule 31(v) of the ITDC Conduct Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1978, which allows termination of an employee by giving notice or payment in lieu thereof, is constitutional under Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India. The court held that such a rule is unconstitutional as it is arbitrary and discriminatory. The rule allows termination without any rational ground, enabling the authority to act on whims, personal likes, and dislikes, or other prejudiced considerations. This violates the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16(1), which ensure equality before the law and equal opportunity in public employment. The court cited previous judgments, including State Electricity Board v. D.B. Ghosh and Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited v. Brojo Nath Ganguly, where similar rules were struck down for being arbitrary and capable of vicious discrimination.
II. Entitlement to Reinstatement or Compensation
The court then addressed whether an employee whose services are terminated under an unconstitutional rule is always entitled to reinstatement. The judgment clarified that reinstatement is not an automatic consequence of declaring a termination void. For 'blue-collar' and 'white-collar' employees, reinstatement would generally be the rule, with compensation being an exception. However, for high-level managerial cadre employees, the court emphasized a broader perspective considering national interest and the success of public sector undertakings. The court acknowledged that public sector undertakings must not be compelled to retain personnel in whom they have lost trust or faith. Therefore, the court has the discretion to sculpt the relief, allowing the employer the option to pay reasonable compensation instead of reinstating the employee.
III. Appropriate Amount of Compensation in Lieu of Reinstatement
In determining the appropriate compensation, the court considered the appellant's claim for full salary and allowances until retirement, which was more than eight years away. The court found this unreasonable as it would result in a 'bonanza' rather than fair compensation. The court decided that compensation equivalent to 3.33 years' salary, including allowances based on the last drawn pay, would be reasonable. This amount, if invested at the prevailing interest rate, would yield 50% of the appellant's annual salary and allowances, providing financial security without working. Additionally, the appellant could seek other employment, and the corpus of the lump sum would remain intact. The court directed the respondent corporation to either reinstate the appellant with full back wages or pay the compensation as determined, along with provident fund and retirement benefits.
Conclusion
The court declared Rule 31(v) of the ITDC Conduct Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1978, unconstitutional and void. It provided the respondent corporation with the option to either reinstate the appellant with full back wages or pay compensation equivalent to 3.33 years' salary. The court also addressed the tax implications of the lump sum payment and directed the corporation to assist the appellant in obtaining relief under Section 89 of the Income-tax Act. The appeal was allowed, and the High Court's order was set aside.
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1986 (9) TMI 424
The Supreme Court held that the judgment of the High Court granting permission to the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution under Section 494 of the CrPC, 1898 cannot be sustained. The Court emphasized that the ultimate guiding consideration for granting permission to withdraw must be the interest of administration of justice. In this case involving employees of the Posts & Telegraph Department, the State Government decided to withdraw prosecutions not involving serious violence or destruction of property, leading to acquittals by the Magistrates. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the High Court's judgment and restoring the acquittal orders by the Magistrates.
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1986 (9) TMI 423
Issues:
Challenge to the taking over of management under the Sick Textile Undertakings Act and the constitutional validity of the Act.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Taking Over of Management:
The petitioner challenged the taking over of management of its textile mills under the Sick Textile Undertakings Act. The mills were closed, and a provisional liquidator was appointed due to financial difficulties. The High Court directed the handover of the mills to a corporation to which the petitioner owed a significant sum. The mills were leased to another company, and the petitioner's undertakings were specified as sick textile undertakings under the Act. The petitioner argued that they should have been given an opportunity to be heard before the takeover. However, the court held that once an undertaking is specified as sick in the Act, the owner's right to be heard does not apply.
2. Constitutional Validity and Separation of Powers:
The petitioner contended that the legislature determining an undertaking as sick without allowing the owner to represent damages the separation of powers. They argued that legislative judgment should comply with principles of natural justice. The court disagreed, stating that the legislature's inclusion of undertakings in the Act's schedule is not a judicial or quasi-judicial determination. The criteria for a sick undertaking were laid down in the Act, and owners could challenge the inclusion in court. The court dismissed the argument that the separation of powers was compromised.
3. Inadequacy of Compensation under Nationalisation Act:
The petitioner challenged the Nationalisation Act's compensation for the acquisition of their undertakings as inadequate. The court held that since Article 31 of the Constitution was not repealed when the Act came into force, the validity cannot be challenged based on compensation. The court also noted that the Act aligns with the Constitution's directive principles. The compensation specified was deemed reasonable considering the company's financial history, and the challenge on inadequacy was rejected.
4. Conclusion:
The writ petition was dismissed, and the rule nisi was discharged. The court found no merit in the petitioner's arguments regarding the takeover, constitutional validity, or compensation under the Nationalisation Act. No costs were awarded in the matter.
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1986 (9) TMI 422
The Rajasthan High Court disposed of a reference made by the Revenue under the IT Act, 1961 regarding the cancellation of a penalty under section 271(1)(c). The Court held that the penalty was not applicable due to the exclusion of a certain amount from the assessee's income, as decided in Sukhdeo Charity Estate, Ladnu v. CIT. The reference was disposed of with no costs.
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1986 (9) TMI 421
Issues Involved:
1. Conflict between two decisions of the Supreme Court by co-equal Benches.
2. Maintenance of an application for being impleaded as a party under Order I, Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) in reference proceedings before the District Judge under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Conflict between two decisions of the Supreme Court by co-equal Benches:
The judgment addresses the situation where there is a direct conflict between two decisions of the Supreme Court rendered by co-equal Benches. It was argued that the earlier judgment should be followed if the latter one missed consideration of the former. However, the court concluded that the High Court must follow the judgment that appears to state the law more elaborately and accurately, irrespective of the time of its delivery. The court emphasized that the weight of the judgment should be considered by its rational and logic rather than the date it was rendered. The court cited various precedents and legal authorities to support this view, including the observations of Jessel M. R. in Hampton v. Holman and the Full Bench judgment in Indo Swiss Time Limited v. Umrao.
2. Maintenance of an application for being impleaded as a party under Order I, Rule 10 of the CPC in reference proceedings before the District Judge under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act:
The court examined whether a person who was not before the Land Acquisition Officer can maintain an application to be impleaded as a party in the reference proceedings before the District Judge under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The court concluded that the concept of 'person interested' in the Land Acquisition Act has to be construed widely. However, the mere fact that a person was not before the Land Acquisition Officer does not conclusively bar them from being a 'person interested'. The court referred to various statutory provisions and precedents, including the Supreme Court's decision in Himalaya Tiles and Marble (Private) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho, which emphasized a liberal construction of the term 'person interested'.
Despite this, the court held that even if a person is considered a 'person interested', they cannot be impleaded as a party in the reference proceedings if they were not before the Land Acquisition Officer. The court emphasized that the jurisdiction of the District Judge in reference proceedings is special and limited, confined to the matters specifically referred by the Collector. The court referred to Sections 18, 19, and 21 of the Land Acquisition Act, which indicate that the parties before the court are those who were before the Collector. The court also highlighted the need to prevent the conversion of reference proceedings into complicated title suits involving intricate disputes.
The court concluded that a person who was not before the Land Acquisition Officer cannot successfully maintain an application for being impleaded as a party under Order I, Rule 10 of the CPC in the reference proceedings before the District Judge under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The court affirmed the decision of the lower court in rejecting the application under Order I, Rule 10 of the CPC.
Separate Judgments:
All three judges (S.S. Sandhawalia, C.J., Nagendra Prasad Singh, and M.P. Varma, JJ.) agreed with the conclusions and reasoning provided in the judgment.
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1986 (9) TMI 420
Issues: Interpretation of examination rules regarding minimum passing marks in each subject vs. aggregate marks
In this case, the main issue revolves around the interpretation of the examination rules concerning the requirement of minimum passing marks in each subject versus aggregate marks. The appellant challenged the decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal) which upheld the view that passing an examination does not necessitate securing minimum passing marks in each subject, as long as the candidate achieves the minimum passing marks in aggregate.
The controversy arose in the context of Rule 2 in Appendix III of the Telegraph Engineering Service (Group 'B') Recruitment Rules, 1981, for the Limited Departmental Qualifying Examination. The rule stipulated different subjects with varying marks allocation and set the minimum pass marks at 50% for general candidates and 45% for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribe candidates. The Department interpreted this rule to require candidates to secure the minimum pass marks in each subject. However, the Tribunal disagreed and opined that the rule referred to aggregate marks rather than individual subject marks.
The Court analyzed the implications of interpreting the rule in either manner by providing an illustrative example involving a medical degree examination. The Court emphasized that since the rule did not specify a different passing standard for each subject, the prescribed minimum passing standard should apply to each subject or item. Therefore, the Tribunal erred in overturning the Department's decision and imposing its interpretation, which would lead to absurd results and contradict established principles of interpretation.
Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, reversing the Tribunal's decision and emphasizing that the minimum passing standard should be applied to each subject or item, not just in aggregate. The judgment highlights the importance of interpreting rules sensibly and in line with established legal principles to avoid impractical outcomes.
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1986 (9) TMI 419
Issues Involved:
1. Financial viability of Neomer Ltd.
2. Valuation of Neomer shares.
3. Disclosure of material facts.
4. Voting process and alleged fraud.
5. Benefit to Alembic from the amalgamation.
6. Representation of shareholders at the meeting.
7. Dividend entitlement for Neomer shareholders.
8. Impact on Alembic employees.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Financial Viability of Neomer Ltd.
Neomer Ltd. faced significant financial difficulties since its inception, with production levels consistently below capacity and substantial losses. As of May 31, 1985, Neomer's liabilities were Rs. 721.82 lakhs against tangible assets of Rs. 537.01 lakhs. The financial institutions proposed the amalgamation to revive Neomer by leveraging Alembic's resources, enabling diversification into multifilament yarn and non-woven products, and offering concessions such as waiving compound and penal interest.
2. Valuation of Neomer Shares
The objector, Mr. Pujara, contended that the chartered accountants' report on the break-up value of Neomer shares did not consider various factors and lacked transparency. The court noted that the valuation of Rs. 4.62 per share was based on stock market quotations, which is a generally accepted method. The court found the valuation reasonable and not grossly exaggerated, dismissing the objection that Alembic was taking over liabilities without corresponding benefits.
3. Disclosure of Material Facts
Mr. Pujara argued that the explanatory statement sent to shareholders lacked necessary details, preventing them from fully understanding the scheme. The court reviewed the explanatory statement and the speech by Mr. Chirayu Amin, concluding that all material facts were disclosed, enabling shareholders and creditors to make an informed decision. The court rejected the contention of material non-disclosure.
4. Voting Process and Alleged Fraud
Mr. Pujara alleged that the voting process was manipulated, with proxies collected unfairly and a non-existent shareholder, Geetaben B. Patel, participating. The court found no evidence of unfair proxy collection, and it was clarified that Geetaben Patel voted as a creditor, not a shareholder. The court concluded that the voting process was conducted properly under the supervision of a high officer of the court.
5. Benefit to Alembic from the Amalgamation
While acknowledging that the scheme primarily aimed to revive Neomer, the court found that Alembic would benefit from diversified production lines, tax benefits amounting to almost three crores of rupees, and optimal utilization of Neomer's infrastructure. The court dismissed the argument that Alembic would not gain any significant benefit from the amalgamation.
6. Representation of Shareholders at the Meeting
The objector claimed that the attendees of the meeting did not truly represent the shareholders of Alembic. The court noted that the meeting was attended by a substantial number of shareholders, creditors, and other stakeholders, and the scheme was approved by an overwhelming majority. The court found no merit in the contention that the representation was inadequate.
7. Dividend Entitlement for Neomer Shareholders
Mr. Pujara argued that Neomer shareholders should not receive dividends from 1983, as they were not members of Alembic at that time. The court clarified that once the scheme is sanctioned, it relates back to the effective date, making Neomer shareholders entitled to dividends from that date. The court found no violation of Section 205 of the Companies Act.
8. Impact on Alembic Employees
The objector expressed concerns about potential disadvantages to Alembic employees, including possible transfers and retrenchments. The court noted a statement from Alembic assuring no employee transfers to the Neomer unit and no retrenchments due to the amalgamation. Additionally, Alembic committed to keeping the Neomer unit operational for at least ten years. The court found these assurances sufficient to address the objector's concerns.
Conclusion:
The court sanctioned the scheme of amalgamation, finding that it complied with statutory requirements, was approved by a bona fide majority, and was beneficial for both companies. The court ordered the transfer of all assets, liabilities, and proceedings from Neomer to Alembic, with specific conditions to protect Alembic employees and ensure the continued operation of the Neomer unit. The scheme was deemed to rejuvenate an industry in a backward area, aligning with governmental objectives. No costs were awarded.
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1986 (9) TMI 418
The High Court of Allahabad issued a judgment regarding an ex parte assessment order against M/s Cawnpore Chemical Works Private Limited. The Directors of the company filed a writ petition to quash recovery proceedings, arguing that recovery should be made from the company's assets, not their private assets. The court ruled that recovery should proceed against the company's assets, not the directors' private assets, citing a relevant precedent. The writ petition was disposed of accordingly.
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1986 (9) TMI 417
Issues involved:
The issue involves the selection process for the Haryana Civil Service (Judicial) Branch, specifically regarding the selection of candidates based on merit and adherence to the rules governing the appointment process.
Judgment Summary:
Qualifications and Selection Process:
Miss Neelima Shangla, a candidate for the Haryana Civil Service (Judicial) Branch, had an outstanding academic record and participated in various extracurricular activities. She appeared for the competitive test and secured qualifying marks. The rules stipulated that candidates must obtain at least 55% aggregate marks to qualify for appointment, with merit determined strictly by marks obtained. The Public Service Commission was responsible for conducting the written and Viva-Voce tests, publishing the results in the Gazette, and providing a list of qualified candidates to the Government for selection.
Duty of Public Service Commission and Government:
The Public Service Commission's role was limited to conducting tests and arranging candidates in order of merit. The Government was then required to select candidates strictly based on the Commission's list. The Government and High Court could decide not to fill all vacancies, but any restriction on the number of appointments required a valid reason and conscious decision-making.
Violation of Rules and Entitlement of Candidates:
In this case, the Public Service Commission failed to communicate the full list of qualified candidates to the Government, leading to the exclusion of deserving candidates like Miss Neelima Shangla. The Court held that she was entitled to be selected and appointed as a Subordinate Judge, directing the Government to include her name in the list of selected candidates and maintain her seniority. The Court also awarded costs to the petitioner.
Additional Candidates and Disposition:
While a few more candidates were found entitled to inclusion in the select list, the Court refrained from making a general order due to the elapsed time and potential disruption to subsequent selections. Candidates who had not challenged the selection earlier were barred from doing so in the future due to delay.
In conclusion, the petition was allowed, and Miss Neelima Shangla was granted the rightful selection as a Subordinate Judge in the Haryana Civil Service (Judicial) Branch.
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1986 (9) TMI 416
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of invoking section 17(1) and (4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
2. Delay between notification u/s 4 and declaration u/s 6.
3. Acquisition of land with existing structures.
4. Provision of relief to expropriated persons.
Summary:
1. Validity of invoking section 17(1) and (4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894:
The Supreme Court upheld the State Government's decision to invoke section 17(1) and (4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for the acquisition of land for housing in Meerut. The Court noted that the urgency for housing was well-documented through certificates and letters from the Collector and the Secretary of the Meerut Development Authority. The Court emphasized that providing housing accommodation is a matter of national urgency and justified the invocation of section 17(1) and (4) to expedite the process.
2. Delay between notification u/s 4 and declaration u/s 6:
The High Court had quashed the acquisition on the ground of a nearly one-year delay between the notification u/s 4 and the declaration u/s 6, suggesting that the urgency was not genuine. The Supreme Court, however, found that the delay was due to administrative errors and not due to a lack of urgency. The Court held that the delay did not vitiate the State Government's decision to dispense with the inquiry u/s 5-A, given the urgent need for housing.
3. Acquisition of land with existing structures:
The respondents contended that some parts of the acquired land had buildings, making the use of section 17(1) unjustified. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that the general nature of the land was arable and the presence of a few structures did not invalidate the acquisition. The Court also referred to section 17(1-A) of the Act, which allows the acquisition of land with structures for planned development, reinforcing the legality of the acquisition.
4. Provision of relief to expropriated persons:
The respondents argued that the acquisition would prejudice landowners without houses or shops. The Supreme Court suggested that the Meerut Development Authority should consider providing house or shop sites to the expropriated persons on reasonable terms, following the principle in section 21(2) of the Delhi Development Act, 1957, although it was not directly applicable.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, upheld the validity of the acquisition process, and dismissed the writ petitions filed by the respondents. The appeals were allowed with no order as to costs.
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1986 (9) TMI 415
Issues involved: Competence of a Single Judge to hear and decide an appeal requiring a Division Bench, jurisdiction under relevant rules of the High Court.
In the judgment, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a learned Single Judge had the authority to hear and decide an appeal that should have been heard by a Division Bench, specifically in the context of an appeal by the State of Maharashtra challenging an order of acquittal under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954. The Court highlighted the requirement for certain appeals to be heard by a Division Bench as per the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, emphasizing the importance of adhering to procedural rules for fair adjudication. The Court clarified that when a matter necessitates a Division Bench but is decided by a Single Judge, the judgment rendered is considered a nullity due to lack of jurisdiction, thereby denying the accused the right to a proper hearing by two Judges. The judgment underscored that even if the decision is correct on substance, it loses validity if rendered by an incompetent forum, emphasizing the significance of procedural compliance in upholding the rule of law. The Court cited a previous case to support its stance and ultimately allowed the appeal, setting aside the Single Judge's order and remanding the matter to a Division Bench for proper adjudication in accordance with the law. The Court also criticized the High Court Registry for not recognizing the procedural error, leading to unnecessary wastage of court resources and emphasized the need for efficient case management in light of the backlog of cases burdening the judicial system.
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1986 (9) TMI 414
Issues Involved:
1. Legality of the Vice-Chancellor's actions u/s 13(6) of the Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act.
2. Constitution and authority of the Admissions Committee.
3. Requirement for Academic Council's approval for the entrance test.
4. Validity of the resolution dated May 6, 1986, introducing an entrance test.
Summary:
1. Legality of the Vice-Chancellor's Actions u/s 13(6):
The High Court quashed the resolution dated May 6, 1986, on the ground that there was no emergency to justify the Vice-Chancellor's recourse to s. 13(6) of the Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act. However, it was clarified that the resolution was that of the Admissions Committee and not the Vice-Chancellor, thus negating the need for invoking s. 13(6).
2. Constitution and Authority of the Admissions Committee:
The Admissions Committee was constituted by the Vice-Chancellor in 1973 due to the absence of an Executive Council, which was later approved by the Executive Council. The Committee, consisting of educationists holding ex-officio positions, had been functioning for over a dozen years without question. The argument that the Committee was not legally constituted was rejected, as the necessity for action and the failure of the competent authority to act justified the Vice-Chancellor's actions u/s 13(6).
3. Requirement for Academic Council's Approval:
The principal submission was that any proposal for an entrance examination should originate from the Academic Council and take the form of an ordinance by the Executive Council. However, it was held that s. 28(3) empowered the Admissions Committee to provide for an entrance test, subject to the superintendence of the Academic Council. The Academic Council could exercise its power by proposing an ordinance, which the Executive Council could then enact. There was no statutory requirement for the Admissions Committee to seek prior approval from the Academic Council.
4. Validity of the Resolution Dated May 6, 1986:
The resolution introducing an entrance test was attacked on several grounds, including the legality of the Admissions Committee's constitution and the necessity of Academic Council's approval. The Supreme Court held that the Admissions Committee had the authority to prescribe an entrance test and that the Academic Council could exercise its superintendence powers subsequently. The resolution was not tainted by any illegality, and the High Court's judgment was set aside. The University was directed to announce the names of the candidates selected for admission.
Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the writ petition was dismissed. The University was directed to announce the results of the entrance test, leaving the Academic Council to take any future actions as deemed fit. No order as to costs was made.
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1986 (9) TMI 413
Issues:
Assessment validity under section 263(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961
Application of scheme for new taxpayers in small income groups
Cancellation of assessment order by the Commissioner
Principles of natural justice violation
Validity of Commissioner's order based on surmises and conjectures
Setting aside assessment under the scheme by the Commissioner
Cancellation of consolidated order by the Tribunal
Analysis:
The judgment by the Patna High Court, delivered by Uday Sinha and Ashwini Kumar Sinha, JJ., pertains to a reference under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for the assessment year 1971-72. The key issues revolve around the validity of the assessment order under section 263(1), the application of a scheme for new taxpayers in small income groups, and the actions of the Commissioner in cancelling the assessment order. The questions referred for opinion include whether the assessment order was erroneous, whether natural justice principles were followed, and if the Commissioner's order was based on surmises and conjectures.
The case involves an assessment under a scheme by the Board, allowing assessees who had not filed returns until 1972 to do so, with assessments made on the spot by the ITO without recourse to section 143(1) provisions. The scheme had specific criteria, excluding ladies and minors, with income not exceeding Rs. 15,000 and initial capital investment not exceeding Rs. 25,000. The Commissioner cancelled the assessment order upon learning of it, directing a fresh assessment under section 143(1). The Tribunal later set aside the Commissioner's order, stating that the assessments were done after proper verification, and the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to cancel them.
The High Court's analysis, based on previous decisions, emphasized that the scheme did not apply to ladies and minors, and the ITOs were required to follow section 143(1) procedures. It was held that the Tribunal's decision in a related case was incorrect, and the reference must favor the revenue. The Court ruled in favor of the revenue on various questions, including the validity of assessments, violation of natural justice principles, and the basis of the Commissioner's order. The Tribunal's decision to cancel the consolidated order under section 263(1) was also deemed incorrect.
In conclusion, the High Court answered all questions in favor of the revenue, citing reasons such as incorrect application of the scheme, lack of natural justice violation, and improper cancellation of the Commissioner's order. Despite the ruling in favor of the revenue, no costs were awarded due to special circumstances in the case.
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1986 (9) TMI 412
Issues Involved:
1. Whether Rule 3 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration (Punjab) Rules, 1958 is ultra vires the State Government.
2. Whether the Food (Health) Authority could sub-delegate its powers to the Food Inspector.
Summary:
Issue 1: Ultra Vires of Rule 3
The appellants contended that Rule 3 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration (Punjab) Rules, 1958, framed under s. 24(2)(e) of the Act, was ultra vires the State Government. They argued that the rule allowed the Food (Health) Authority to sub-delegate its power to launch prosecutions, which was not permissible under s. 20(1) of the Act. The Supreme Court held that the rule must be read subject to the provisions of s. 20(1) of the Act, which does not envisage further delegation by the person authorised. Therefore, Rule 3 could not be construed to authorise sub-delegation of powers by the Food (Health) Authority to the Food Inspector. Consequently, the notification dated October 10, 1968, delegating powers to the Food (Health) Authority, and the subsequent notification dated September 7, 1972, authorising the Food Inspector to launch prosecutions, were declared ultra vires and void.
Issue 2: Sub-Delegation of Powers
The appellants argued that even if Rule 3 was considered a general order under s. 20(1) of the Act, the Food (Health) Authority could not sub-delegate its powers to the Food Inspector. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that the terms of s. 20(1) do not postulate further delegation by the person authorised. The Food Inspector, Faridkot, was not a person authorised by any general or special order issued by the Central Government or the State Government. The Court emphasised that the requirements of s. 20(1) are imperative and must be strictly followed. The Food Inspector's authority to launch prosecutions was invalid as it was not conferred by the State Government directly.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court concluded that the Food Inspector, Faridkot, was not competent to lodge the complaint against the appellants for an offence under s. 16(1)(a)(ii) read with s. 9 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The appeal was allowed, and the judgments of the High Court and the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate were set aside.
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1986 (9) TMI 411
Issues Involved:
1. Legality of the auction sale of urban agricultural property in the absence of specific rules.
2. Validity of the order extending time for depositing the auction sale money.
3. Violation of principles of natural justice.
Summary:
Issue 1: Legality of the Auction Sale
The High Court held that the sale of urban agricultural property, part of the compensation pool, could only be conducted in accordance with rules framed u/s 8 and u/s 40 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. Since no rules were framed for the disposal of such property, the auction sale held on August 24, 1959, was deemed illegal. However, the Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the absence of rules does not preclude the exercise of statutory powers. The Central Government had the authority to issue administrative directions for the auction sale of urban agricultural property. The auction sale held in the appellant's favor on August 24, 1959, was therefore legal.
Issue 2: Validity of the Order Extending Time
The High Court quashed the order of Shri Rajni Kant, who extended the time for the appellant to deposit the auction sale money, on the grounds that it amounted to a review of the earlier order and was done without jurisdiction. The Supreme Court found this to be incorrect, stating that the power conferred u/s 33 of the Act is broad and includes the authority to extend time for depositing the auction sale money. The extension did not amount to a review but was a procedural order intended to ensure compliance. The High Court erred in holding that the extension of time was beyond jurisdiction.
Issue 3: Violation of Principles of Natural Justice
The High Court held that Shri Rajni Kant's orders were in violation of natural justice as no notice or opportunity of hearing was given to the respondents, Sohan Lal and Sunder Lal, who were the highest bidders in a subsequent auction. The Supreme Court agreed with this finding, stating that the respondents had sufficient interest in the proceedings and should have been afforded an opportunity to be heard. The failure to do so justified the High Court's decision to quash the orders of Shri Rajni Kant.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal in part, modifying the High Court's order. The Central Government or the authority exercising its power u/s 33 of the Act is directed to reconsider the appellant's petition afresh, after giving notice and affording an opportunity of hearing to the respondents, Sohan Lal and Sunder Lal. No order as to costs was made.
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1986 (9) TMI 410
Issues:
The validity of toll tax imposition by Municipal Board u/s 128(1)(vii) of U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916.
Summary:
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of the toll tax imposed by the Municipal Board, Pilkhwa on vehicles and other conveyances, animals, and laden coolies entering the municipal limits u/s 128(1)(vii) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916. The High Court upheld the levy based on a previous decision, but the Supreme Court found that the toll tax was not compensatory in nature as the Municipal Board did not provide any facilities to justify the tax. The National Highway was maintained by the Government, and the toll tax could not be justified as a compensatory tax. The Court held that the toll tax imposed by the Municipal Board was ultra vires and must be struck down.
The State Government later withdrew the transit tax on vehicles and conveyances passing through the municipal limits, further supporting the Court's decision. As a result, the appeals were allowed, the judgment of the High Court was set aside, and the toll tax imposition was declared ultra vires.
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