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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 3047 Records
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1949 (11) TMI 20 - PRIVY COUNCIL
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... ... ..... e so. 6. In their Lordships' judgment this new ground of appeal does not Involve any question of jurisdiction. If the arguments for the Appellants were well founded it would establish that the proper procedure had not been followed before the making of the order of 8th March. 1943, which authorised the police to investigate the alleged offence. Such a fault in procedure might have important consequences but it could not in their Lordships' judgment deprive the Chief Presidency Magistrate of his jurisdiction to try the Appellants. 7. Their Lordships do not propose to consider whether there was any fault in procedure in this case because it would be entirely contrary to the settled practice of the Board to entertain a question of this character when that question was not argued in the High Court and is not referred to in Appellants' petitions for special leave to appeal. Their Lordships will, therefore, humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be dismissed.
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1949 (11) TMI 19 - FEDERAL COURT
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... ... ..... t view on this matter was taken by a Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Sushil Kumar v. Government of West Bengal (1949) 53 C.W.N. 545 . The contention of Mr. Umrigar, therefore, cannot be accepted as sound. 25. These are the constitutional points which were raised on behalf of the appellants and pressed for our consideration in these appeals. Applications have been filed by some of the appellants under s. 205 (2) of the Government of India Act craving our permission to raise grounds other than those upon which certificates under s. 205 (1) were granted. Learned counsel, however, very frankly admitted that he was unable to say that any substantial error of law was involved in any of these cases or there has been any irregularity in the procedure which has led to miscarriage of justice. This being the position, we declined to enter into questions of fact which were discussed elaborately in the judgments of the High Court. The result is that the appeals fail and are dismissed.
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1949 (11) TMI 18 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nprofitable and was stopped permanently or for a time, the effect of that was not to make the business of the assessees different from what it was previously. The assessees might resume the traffic in grain futures and forward contracts if they think fit ; they might discontinue it if they do not find it paying ; but their business remains exactly what it was, viz., that of traders in rice and other grains. There is authority for this view in the case of Govindram Brothers Limited 1946 14 ITR 764 . For these reasons I hold that the dealings in forward contracts and grain futures carried on by the assessees in the Rangoon market through their agents did not constitute a separate or distinct business from their dealings in ready goods of the same type and their speculations must be held to be a part of the general business of the assessees as rice and grain merchants. I agree with my learned brother in the answer to the question propounded and in the direction as regards costs.
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1949 (11) TMI 17 - FEDERAL COURT
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... ... ..... t of possession of intoxicants in such a way as to encroach upon the right to import and export across the customs frontier," He did not, however, pause to indicate how the Provincial legislature could limit possession at all without encroaching in that sense on the Federal power under item 19. Apparently the learned Chief Justice thought that the test of validity was the degree of encroachment. This view cannot be accepted as correct. It has been pointed out by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the Khulna Bank case (1947 F.C.R. 28 A.I.R 1947 P.C. 60) already referred to, that, whilst the extent of the encroachment by the Provincial Legislature is important for determining what is the pith and substance of the impugned Act, its validity cannot be determined by discriminating between degrees of invasion." 7. For the reasons indicated, we hold that S. 14-B of the Bombay Abkari Act as amended by Bombay Act NO. XXIX 29 of 1947 is valid and dismiss the appeal.
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1949 (11) TMI 16 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t respondent was Santi Nayak, but he died before the hearing of the appeal and his heirs, who seem to have been his grandsons, were brought on record. The present appellant is the eldest of such heirs. Very probably he is the karta of a joint family, but, apart from this point, upon which there is no evidence, all the heirs of Santi Kayak have exactly the same interest and one of them can appeal under Order XLI, Rule 4. Their Lordships think that there is no force in this contention. 16. Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal be allowed; that the order and decree of the High Court at Patna dated May 15, 1945, be set aside and that the judgment and decree of the Court of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Darbhanga dated August 24, 1943, and the judgment and decree of the Court of the First Munsif at Samastipur dated January 25, 1943, be restored. Respondents Nos. 1 to 4 must pay the costs of the appeal to the High Court and of this appeal.
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1949 (11) TMI 15 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... profits but I fail to see on what material it can be held that the assessee decided to treat these sums as profits for the "previous year." From the way that the Income-tax Officer has acted in deducting ₹ 64,469 from the total amount it is clear that the sum of ₹ 1,56,657 was treated as the income made during the whole of the ten years when the partnership business was being carried on. My answer to the question referred to us is that the sum of ₹ 92,188 cannot be deemed to be the income, profits or gains of the previous year which can be assessed to income-tax in the assessment year 1938-39. The assessee is entitled to his costs which we fix at ₹ 500. Seth, J.-I agree and do not wish to add anyting. By the Court.-The answer of the Court to the question referred to us is that the sum of ₹ 92,188 cannot be deemed to be the income, profits or gains of the previous year which can be assessed to income-tax in the assessment year 1938-39.
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1949 (11) TMI 14 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ent, consumed, or expended in the process of the acquisition of the managing directorship or in the earning of the remuneration which has been paid to the managing director. The moneys of the family represented by the shares are still intact as an investment and the shares are giving dividends which go into the coffers of the family. I therefore agree with my learned brother in thinking that the income of Mr. Sankaralinga Ayyar as the managing director of the Indo-Commercial Bank cannot be said to be an asset or income of the joint family of which he is the manager. I also agree that the two decisions of the Patna High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Darsanram 1945 13 ITR 419, Sardar Indra Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar and Orissa 1943 11 ITR 16 , at pp. 30 and 36, and in Dover Coalfield Extension Co. 1908 1 Ch. 65 take the correct view of the legal position. I agree in the answer to the reference and in the direction for costs given by my learned brother.
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1949 (11) TMI 13 - TRAVANCORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ustain the contention. Mere forbearance to sue or take other action against the principal debtor would not discharge the surety. See Pollock and Mulla's Contract Act, 7th Edition p. 464 and Section 137 (Travancore Section 90), Indian Contract Act. Nothing higher than mare forbearance to sue the principal debtor or to enforce the right of sale earlier was pointed out to us from the evidence on the record. It is not simply neglecting to sue the principal which would have any effect upon the surety's liability but there must be a positive agreement with the principal that the creditor will postpone the suing of him or enforcing other remedies to a subsequent period before a surety can claim his discharge. We have found in discussing the other appeal that such agreement there is none in the case. Hence this argument also fails. No other point was urged before us and this appeal like A.S. No. 113 of 1120 must fail. 20. In the result we dismiss both the appeals with costs.
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1949 (11) TMI 12 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pal amount of the death duty has been held to be an inadmissible deduction in computing the business profit of the assessee in the decision in Ramaswami Iyengar v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras 1943 11 I.T.R. 597; I.L.R. 1944 Mad. 635. It has also been held by this Court that costs and expenses incurred by an assessee in resisting the claim of a foreign Government to levy death duty is not an admissible deduction in the computation of his foreign profits, the reason being that the expenditure is not one incurred exclusively or solely for the purposes of the foreign business Arunachalam Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1945 13 I.T.R. 183; 1945 1 M.L.J. 258. The same principle, in my opinion, would also apply to the payment of interest on unpaid death duty by virtue of the provisions of the Ceylon Ordinance. I therefore agree with my learned brother in the answers which he has given to this reference and the direction regarding costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1949 (11) TMI 11 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f such a joint borrowing by the assessee in the present case cannot be relied on as evidence of any such commercial practice. Neither in its inception nor subsequently when the assessee discharged the entire debt due from himself and Lakshmana Ayyar, could the loss be said to arise out of or in the course of the trade or business of the assessee as bookseller. The assessee was not a financier or banker in whose case alone all borrowing of capital for the business could be considered to form part of the stockin-trade of the banker. We consider therefore that the loss in this case was so far outside the scope and purposes of the business of the assessee as to make it impossible for us to sustain the conclusion of the Tribunal. We therefore answer the question propounded to us in the negative and in favour of the Commissioner of Income-tax. The costs of this reference ₹ 250 will be paid by the assessee to the Commissioner of Income-tax. Reference answered in the negative.
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1949 (11) TMI 10 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... expectations of realisation being disappointed and its being obliged to claim an allowance or deduction for bad debts later on as the debtor in this case is the Government of India. The assessee would normally treat the profits and gains arising from these contracts as realised at Chalakudi as soon as the goods were inspected and approved by the Government and delivery was effected by putting them on rail at Chalakudi or other places in the Cochin State. In these circumstances, the question is, where did the operations take place from which the profits in substance arose ? My answer is that both the manufacture and sales of the goods were carried on outside British India and the resulting profits accrued or arose outside British India and were therefore not chargeable to Indian income-tax, the assessee being a non-resident. I agree with my learned brother in the answer he has given to the questions propounded in both the cases and in the direction for costs of the reference.
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1949 (11) TMI 9 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ay, for continued breach, over the maximum fine of Rs. 1,000 for a breach, even that section did not say that a new prosecution can be launched every day and that a fresh fine up to Rs. 1,000 and a penalty of Rs. 50 per day for every day of non-payment after the due date can be imposed. The new section (as amended by Madras Act XXV of 1947) does not contain that provision at all. So, I set aside the conviction and sentence of the petitioner, acquit him in this case, and direct the fine, if paid, to be refunded to him. The tax will, of course, be collected under the old conviction. Petition allowed.
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1949 (11) TMI 8 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pinion, not either a valid or a desirable canon. I hold that an assessment levied on a turnover before 1st January, 1948, can undoubtedly be questioned by the accused both regarding its legality and its quantum. The mere fact of the prosecution being after 1st January, 1948, but relating wholly or partly to a default in the payment of the tax based on a turnover before 1st January, 1948, cannot, in my opinion, alter the position in law and deprive an accused person, who could question the validity of that portion of the assessment before, of that valuable right, especially in a criminal proceeding where he is sought to be convicted and sentenced. In the result, I modify the lower Court s order by allowing the petitioner to contest the validity, including the legality and the quantum of the assessment regarding the turnover for the period before 1st January, 1948, but not regarding the validity of the assessment concerning the turnover after 1st January, 1948. Order modified.
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1949 (11) TMI 7 - HIGH COURT OF EAST PUNJAB
Winding up – Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... ich I can impose, because the Bombay High Court has appointed a receiver and it will be beyond my jurisdiction to interfere with the orders of the Bombay High Court. Finally he submitted that the petitioner should be put on terms and no leave should be given unless he deposits security for his (Mr. Chawla s) cost and that such costs should be deposited in Court. As the bank is in liquidation I think it is a fit case in which I should order that the security should be given for those costs and until such security is given the petitioner should not be able to implead the liquidator of Janda Rubber Works Ltd. I, therefore, direct that security for Rs. 2,000 should be given to the satisfaction of the Deputy Registrar of this Court. For the reasons stated above, I would grant leave to the Official Liquidator of the Exchange Bank Ltd., in liquidation to implead the liquidator of the Janda Rubber Works Ltd., in liquidation. The costs will abide the result of the suit. Costs Rs. 150.
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1949 (10) TMI 10 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ntended to provide that convictions held to have been illegal by the highest judicial tribunal in the country should, nevertheless, be treated as legal legislative enactment. Their Lordships can find nothing in the language of Section 3, Sub-section 1 of the Ordinance of 1943 to suggest that the Governor-General Intended to do more than to render valid the punishment imposed by the special Courts, leaving the validity of the convictions to rest on judicial decisions. and the provision in the Ordinance was upheld. In view of this decision of the highest tribunal it is not necessary to refer to other decisions. The decision in Jnan Prosanna v. Province of West Bengal recognized that it was competent to pass retrospective legislation by an Ordinance. We accordingly hold that Section 3 (b) of the Ordinance is valid and operative. 28. The petitions have now to be heard and disposed of in the light of the observations contained in this judgment, and they will be posted accordingly.
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1949 (10) TMI 9 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on outside Indian States, and it is equally manifest that in ascertaining profits and gains from such business, a consideration of losses incurred in business carried on in an Indian State is absolutely irrelevant. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the loss of ₹ 25,391 in the business carried on in Indian States should be ignored in determining the assessee's income from business in the previous year relevant to the assessment year 1944-45. All that I wish to add to what has been said by my Lord the Chief Justice about the statement of case is, that it is extremely desirable that the statement of a case should contain not only the relevant conclusion of facts arrived at by the Tribunal, but that it should also contain all primary facts found, on which those conclusions are based, and that the statement of a case should have annexed to it at least the order passed on appeal by the Appellate Tribunal. I concur in the order proposed. Reference answered accordingly.
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1949 (10) TMI 8 - PRIVY COUNCIL
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... ... ..... appeal from the assessments under that section reached the Court without any discretion having been exercised in fact, or any statutory discretion conferred for the purpose of S. 24 existing in law. It is impossible therefore to attribute to the Judge dealing with these appeals a position comparable to that which he might occupy if he were dealing with an appeal against an assessment under one of these special sections when the Minister had already exercised his discretion "as to the manner of determining" a proportionate part of certain income. Their Lordships express no view as to the range of the Judge's power on such an appeal. What they are concerned to point out is that there is no useful analogy between such an appeal and those which are the subject of the present case. 14. For these reasons their Lordships think that the appeal must fail and they will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly. The appellant must pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.
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1949 (10) TMI 7 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . D-1 was executed whereby the lands previously gifted were taken back by defendant 1 and 5 acres out of the suit property were given in substitution. The learned Judge has held in Para. 10 that the gift was reasonable and therefore valid. Of course, it can be valid so far as defendant 1 is concerned. But 5 acres of property which belonged both to the plaintiff and defendant 1 had been given in exchange by defendant 1 for property which he had made a gift of under EX. D-1 (a). The plaintiff prayed that in case the exchange was held to be valid, the lands so exchanged might be allotted to the share of defendant 1 in the division to be effected. The plaintiff will certainly be entitled to this relief. 36. We direct that the properties which we have held are partible between the plaintiff and defendant 1 should be divided by metes and bounds but in making such division, the properties in the possession of defendant 5 under Ex. D-1 should be allotted to the share of defendant 1.
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1949 (10) TMI 6 - PRIVY COUNCIL
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... ... ..... k restored with one modification. It contained an order on defendants two and three in the suit to remove their mills, buildings, machinery and other structures from the land within one month, so as to restore the land to its original condition and render it useful as cremation or burial ground. The respondents have pointed out there was no issue in this case as to a burial ground and that the judge ought not therefore to have allowed any right in respect of it. Their Lordships agree with this, and the words "or burial ground" should be struck out of the order accordingly. Any sums which the appellants have paid to the respondents under orders of the courts below must be repaid to them, and the respondent Rangalal must pay to the appellants their costs of the appeal in the High Court. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty to this effect. The respondents Rangalal, Lachminarayan and Balu Ram must pay the appellants' costs of the appeal before this Board.
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1949 (10) TMI 5 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e to add one other reason for being reluctant to change the view already taken by this Court. As observed by Reilly C.J. in 40 Mys. H.C.R. 435 "When there is nothing in the view of the law adopted in such a case which is in itself unjust or opposed to the public interest, and the case was decided many years ago so that it is to improbable that many transactions have been made in the light of that decision, it would be improper to re-open such a question by a reference to a Full Bench and so possibly create confusion and unsettlement". Thus the principle of stare decisis stares us in the face. it cannot be said that there is any need to refer the matter for reconsideration by a Full Bench and we agree with respect with the view taken in 22 Mys. L.J. 27 that Section 20, Limitation Act is applicable to suits mentioned in Section 24, Mysore Agriculturists' Relief Act. The result is that the appeal stands dismissed. Balakrishna, J. 14. I agree. 15. Appeal dismissed.
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