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Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 3054 Records
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1949 (7) TMI 6 - PRIVY COUNCIL
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... ... ..... the present case, on the same reasoning, though the respondent may have his office in Madras within the limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court, it is clear that the act with reference to which relief was asked took place outside the limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court. It therefore follows that the application under Section 45 of the Specific Relief Act is incompetent and should on that ground alone be dismissed. 23. In the circumstances, it is not necessary to discuss the further question whether, even if an order was made in favour of the appellant, it would be frustrated by a positive direction made under Sub-clause (a) of Clause 18B(1), i.e., in other words, whether the proviso (e) to Section 45 of the Specific Relief Act would be a bar to the granting of the relief asked for in the application. For the above reasons their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.
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1949 (7) TMI 5 - PRIVY COUNCIL
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... ... ..... the award which, it must be remembered, was framed and published as an interim award. The facts with which the arbitrator was faced were themselves complicated and the conception upon which is founded his interpretation of the respective legal rights of the parties in the assets of the partnership or partnerships is a subtle one. But there is neither indefiniteness nor ambiguity in his holding as to the interests of the parties in the firm of Hurdutroy Chamria and Co., which is set out in para. 8, and this is, after all, the essence of the matter. Neither of the Courts below has felt itself faced with any difficulty in interpreting the effect of the award and their Lordships do not think that it would be right for them to entertain an appeal to set aside or remit it on this ground. 15. In the result their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed. The appellants will pay the costs of those of the respondents who have appeared in the appeal.
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1949 (7) TMI 4 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . 4. The order therefore as it stands is vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record and must therefore be quashed. 5. The order is defective also in another material respect and that is that the appellate tribunal did not deal with and give a finding on the really important question which arose on the landlord's application, namely, that the three original tenants sublet the premises to a different firm which consisted of one of them and two other strangers. That was the specific case set up in the landlord's application. This question has not been properly dealt with by the appellate tribunal. The appellate tribunal shall therefore hear the appeal afresh after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, and, if necessary, after making such further enquiry as it thinks fit either personally or through the controller, and shall decide the appeal in the light of the observation which we have made. 6. There will be no costs in this application.
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1949 (7) TMI 3 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... profits earned by the assessee was the rate of gross profit a wool merchant in India would normally make if he supplied goods to the assessee instead of the assessee himself purchasing the wool here.. The contention of the assessee was that there should have been definite material on the record to prove what the margin of the assessee's profits on his purchase was, and that in the absence of any such material there was no material at all. In the circumstances I consider that in calculating the profits, as he has done, the Income-tax Officer has acted well within the powers given to him under rule 33, and that the purchase figures of the assessee company did amount to material on which the proportion of the profits could be reasonably attributable to the acts of purchase of the assessee in British India. I would accordingly also return an answer in the affirmative to the third question, and allow the costs of these proceedings to the respondent. Harnam Singh, J.-I agree.
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1949 (7) TMI 2 - PRIVY COUNCIL
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... ... ..... . In this case there was not sufficient evidence to show why the lessee and his agents made the over payments. They may have acted on inadequate information, they may have taken a wrong view of their legal fights or they may have continued paying at the old rates without giving any thought to the matter. But it is clear that there was no intention to make a present to the lessor of money which was not due. The money was paid under the belief that it was legally due. This belief was mistaken. In their Lordships' view that is sufficient to bring the case within Section 72 and therefore the cross appeal must succeed. That being so the question of interest involved in the appeal does not now arise. 18. Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed and the cross appeal allowed and the plaintiff's suit dismissed with costs in the Courts in India to the defendant. The appellant will pay the costs of the appeal and cross appeal.
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1949 (7) TMI 1 - PRIVY COUNCIL
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... ... ..... he additional growths became ipso jure the property of the company." In the present case the trees were not acquired nor were the leaves acquired until the appellants had reduced them into their own possession and ownership by picking them. The two cases can, in their Lordships' opinion, in no sense be regarded as comparable. If the tendu leaves had been stored in a merchant's godown and the appellants had bought the right to go and fetch them and so reduce them into their possession and ownership it could scarcely have been suggested that the purchase price was capital expenditure. Their Lordships see no ground in principle or reason for differentiating the present case from that supposed. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be allowed and that the respondent should be ordered to pay the costs of the appellants of and relating to the reference to the High Court. The respondent will pay the costs of this appeal. Appeal allowed.
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1949 (6) TMI 2 - PRIVY COUNCIL
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... ... ..... o one Chintayya who "gifted his share to his son-in-law M. Ramayya," and this Ramayya executed a kath S-13 in favour of a member of the Tangirala family (plaintiff's predecessor). This would show that there was even a transfer to an outsider, though a relation, recognized by the inamdar. The neutralizing effect of all these factors has not been given any weight in the consideration of the evidence by Krishnaswami Ayyangar, J. On the evidence that has been placed before them, which is not conclusive, their Lordships are not satisfied that the plaintiff on whom the burden lies to prove that he has a title to evict the defendants, has discharged his burden. 51. For the above reasons, their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be allowed, the decree of the High Court set aside, with costs, the decree of the Subordinate Judge of Masulipatam restored and the plaintiff's suit dismissed. The respondents must pay the costs of this appeal.
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1949 (6) TMI 1 - PRIVY COUNCIL
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... ... ..... me-tax, Madras v. Zamindar of Singampatti 1922 ILR 45 Mad. 518, on which he relied strongly has not been referred to in the judgment of the Board, though as will appear from the arguments reference had been made to it. Their Lordships have no doubt that though the case is not mentioned by name it must have been considered by the Board. In view of the decision in Probhat Chandra Barua v. The King Emperor 1930 LR 57 IA 228, it must now be held that the decisions in Zamindar of Singampatti's case (supra)and Maharajadhiraj of Darbhanga v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1924 ILR 3 Pat. 470, are no longer good law. Following the decision in Probhat Chandra Barua's case (supra), their Lordships hold that the decision of the High Court on the question referred to it is right; and that the tax was rightly levied on the amount of ₹ 7,612 in the present case. For the above reasons, their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be dismissed with costs.
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1949 (5) TMI 23 - FEDERAL COURT
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... ... ..... e contract in the manner contemplated by Section 15, Specific Belief Act, and expressed their readiness to pay the entire consideration for 350 shares, the appellants are not prejudiced in any way. 21. The fourth and the last point is not of any substance. The subject matter of contract in the present case consists of certain shares in a private limited company and a fractional interest in a partnership business. Illustration (iii) under Clause (e) of Section 12, Specific Relief Act clearly shows that when shares are limited in number and are not ordinarily available in the market, lit is quite proper to grant a decree for specific performance of a contract for the sale of such shares. Specific performance is undoubtedly a discretionary remedy but we are totally unable to say that the discretion has been wrongly exercised in the present case by the Courts below. 22. The result is that all the contentions raised by Sir Tek Chand fail and the appeal stands dismissed with costs.
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1949 (5) TMI 22 - PRIVY COUNCIL
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... ... ..... t by Mr. Page, that those cases are cases in which there had been a conviction at the earlier trial but their Lordships see no distinction for the present purpose between a conviction and an acquittal. Unless the earlier trial was a lawful one which might have resulted in a conviction, the accused was never in jeopardy. The case of R. v. Simpson (1914) 1 K.B. 66, on which Mr. Page relied, is distinguishable because the first order on which the plea of autrefois acquit was based was held by a majority of the Court to be voidable, and not void. This argument therefore fails on the facts, and it is not necessary for their Lordships to consider whether Section 403, Criminal P.C., constitutes a complete code in India upon the subject of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict, or whether in a proper case the Common Law can be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the section. 19. For these reasons their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal be dismissed.
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1949 (5) TMI 21 - FEDERAL COURT
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... ... ..... shall remain in force till 3lst March 1950 from the date of its commencement" fully sup-port this construction. It does not seem to me to be necessary to deal with these arguments, because, for the reasons stated by me while dealing with the first point, I am of the opinion that the notification of 11th March 1948, is valid. 71. Several other constitutional points were raised in this case on behalf of the appellants, but it seems to me to be unnecessary to deal with them, as I am in complete agreement with the opinion expressed by the learned Judges of the Special Bench in regard to them. 72. In my opinion, these appeals should be dismissed. 73. In accordance with the opinion of the majority, all the eleven appeals are allowed; and the cases are remitted to the High Court of Judicature at Patna with the declaration that the orders made by the High Court shall be vacated and in their place there shall be substituted orders directing that the appellants be set at liberty.
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1949 (5) TMI 20 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... at ₹ 10 per ton for 6 wagons comes to ₹ 1,143 as pleaded in paragraph 8 of the plaint. That has not been challenged in cross-examination and it is conceded that the minimum weight of each wagon is 19 ton 1 cwt., so that 6 wagons altogether make 114 tons 6 cwt. As I hold the rate of damage is at ₹ 19 per ton the value of six wagons of coal at that rate comes to ₹ 2,171-11-2 leaving out the fraction of a pie. The damages that the plaintiff is entitled to will be the sum of ₹ 1,028-11-2 being the difference between the market price of ₹ 2171-11-2 and the contract price of ₹ 1,143. It is admitted that the plaintiff paid ₹ 500 in advance to the defendant towards the supply of six wagons of coal as will appear from the receipt dated 15th April 1943. The plaintiff is entitled to the return of the said money. 27. There will therefore be judgment for the plaintiff for the sum of ₹ 1,528-11-2 and costs. I do not allow any interest.
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1949 (5) TMI 19 - PRIVY COUNCIL
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... ... ..... cluded the widow also among those who were to take lot No. 1 allotted to Kunjalal’s share. I fail to see how a bona fide misconception as to the heirship of the widow which could not have possibly affected her interest and which too was discovered and rectified before the award was finally pronounced can be a ground for setting aside the award. 67. I am convinced that Bhusan Moyee’s suit is but an attempt by her sons, who are dissatisfied with the portion of the dwelling house allotted to them, to get rid of the award, and their mother is only a tool in their bands. There are no merits in their claim nor any substance in the complaint against the arbitrator who obviously could not satisfy all the parties, howsoever he might divide that house. 68. I would allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore the decree and order of the Subordinate Judge. In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs.
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1949 (5) TMI 18 - FEDERAL COURT
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... ... ..... oting of our conclusion. 18. We therefore allow the appeals with costs and remit the cases to the High Court at Madras with a direction to substitute, in its decree in Civil Appeal No. III of 1948, the words that the mortgagor has a right to redeem in the suit filed by him and pass the appropriate decree on that footing. In the mortgagee's suit also, apart from technicalities, the trial should proceed on the footing that the mortgagor had a right to redeem and, if so, it will have to determine whether the mortgagees had any right now to the possession of the (sic) or payment of the rents or mesne profits. If they were held entitled to receive any money from the lessee the High Court will determine how they have in account for the same in the account between themselves and the mortgagor. Having regard to the inordinate delay in the disposal of these two suits we trust that tile matter will be dealt with very expeditiously so as wend these two litigations at an early date.
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1949 (5) TMI 17 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in the manner contemplated by Section 15 of the Specific Relief Act and expressed their readiness to pay the entire consideration for 350 shares, the appellants are not prejudiced in any way. 20. The fourth and the last point is not of any substance. The subject matter of contract in the present case consists of certain shares in a private limited company and a fractional interest in a partnership business. Illustration (iii) under Clause (c) of Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act clearly shows that when shares are limited in number and are not ordinarily available in the market, it is quite proper to grant a decree for specific performance of a contract for the sale of such shares. Specific performance is undoubtedly a discretionary remedy but we are totally unable to say that the discretion has been wrongly exercised in the present case by the Courts below. 21. The result is that all the contentions raised by Sir Tek Chand fail and the appeal stands dismissed with costs.
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1949 (5) TMI 16 - FEDERAL COURT
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... ... ..... ly a privilege is created for the benefit of one party. It was conceded that such relief could be given when the agreement aid not create a mere privilege. In the present case, my opinion is that as no privilege or indulgence merely was created in favour of the plaintiffs, there is no reason why the principles of equity Courts which grant relief against penalty should not be applied in the case before us. The terms upon which the decree was given by the trial Judge seem to me to be very fair and proper. The defendants were not only given full interest at the rate of 12 per cent, per annum but they were allowed all other expenses which they had to incur on account of the property in suit. 59. In my opinion, the appeal should be allowed, the judgment of the High Court should be set aside and that of the trial Judge restored with costs to the plaintiffs appellants in all the Courts. 60. In accordance with the opinion of the majority of Court, the appeal is dismissed with costs.
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1949 (5) TMI 15 - FEDERAL COURT
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... ... ..... ored. 44. Several other questions were argued in the case, namely, whether a pledgor can enter into a contract to the contrary against the provisions of s. 176 of the Indian Contract Act and can waive notice, or whether a sale by a pledgee of pledged shares without notice to the pledgor is a mere irregularity and cannot affect the title of a bona fide purchaser for value. None of these contentions require consideration in the view of the case that I have taken. Fazl Ali, J. 45. I agree with Mahajan J. Mukheejea, J. 46. I concur in the judgment delivered just now by my learned brother Mahajan J. and I hold on the reasons given by him that this appeal should be allowed with costs. 47. In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the appeal is allowed, with costs and the case is remitted to the High Court with a declaration that in place of the judgment and decree of the Division Bench passed in the appeal made to it the judgment and decree of the trial Judge be substituted.
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1949 (5) TMI 14 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... definition of "business" must be construed so as to avoid conflict. If by the definition a company holding property does not carry on a business unless the holding of such property is its whole or main function, then the rule cannot extend the definition so as to make a company which holds property as a minor function, carry on business with regard to such property. In my view, the income derived from the holding and letting of property by the assessee company was income derived from property and it could not be regarded as the profits and gains of a business as there is no finding that the holding and letting of such property was the sole or the main function of the company. For these reasons, the question stated by the Tribunal in the case submitted should be answered in the negative. The assessee company will be entitled to its costs and the return of the deposit of ₹ 100. Certified for two counsel. CHATTERJEE, J.--I agree. Reference answered in negative.
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1949 (5) TMI 13 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to give further evidence for defence as he liked. The learned Judges observed Although the terms of Section 540 are very wide, the wider the power, the more cautious should be the exercise of discretion on the part of the Magistrate. We do not think that it was the intention of the learned Judges in that case to lay down, as a hard and fast rule, that in no circumstance, can a Court examine witnesses under Section 540, Criminal P.C. once the defence evidence had been closed and arguments had been heard. In our opinion, therefore, there is no force in this contention of the learned Counsel. 34. Learned Counsel has further urged that in any case the sentence was too severe and that a sentence of imprisonment was not called for. In our opinion, the sentence imposed by the Court below is not severe and we see no reason to interfere. 35. We dismiss this revision application. 36. The applicants are on bail. They must surrender to their bail and serve out the rest of the sentence.
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1949 (5) TMI 12 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Compromise and arrangement ... ... ... ... ..... held on 25th June, 1949. Mr. Sankar Banerjee will be the chairman at the meeting. He will separately record, (a) the votes of creditors whose claims are admitted, (b) votes of creditors whose claims may be disputed but whose names appear in the books of the company, (c) votes of creditors whose names do not appear in the books of the company. The disputed creditors whose names do not appear in the books of the company and whose debts are disputed by the company will file before the Special Officer, a statement of their claims with particulars on or before 15th June, 1949, and I will decide at the time of the hearing of this application whether they are to be treated as creditors or not for the purposes of this application. I also direct the Special Officer to make a report as to the financial position of the company and as to the workability of the scheme, the report to be filed on or before 2nd July, 1949. The rest of the judgment is the scheme and is not therefore printed.
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