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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 3054 Records
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1949 (10) TMI 4 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... perfectly clarified by the amount having been fixed under Section 4, sub-section (3), clause (e), of the Muslim Waqfs Act as the pay of the mutawalli. Under that clause the commissioner of Waqfs is required to fix the pay of the mutawalli of each waqf if the waqf is not exempt under Section 2. Section 2 relates to waqfs, which are known as private waqfs. In this case learned counsel for the assessee has given us the fact that the Chief Commissioner of Waqfs has, relying on the old usage, fixed the pay of the mutawalli as 10 per cent. of the total income. Our answers, therefore, to the two questions referred to us are - (1) The one-tenth of the income payable to Syed Jawad Ali Shah as his remuneration for his services rendered as mutawalli is not exempt from assessment. (2) The assessee receives this allowance in his capacity as a mutawalli and not as a beneficiary. The assessee must pay the costs of this reference, which we fix at ₹ 300. Reference answered accordingly.
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1949 (10) TMI 3 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD (LUCKNOW BENCH)
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... ... ..... portion for which special provision was made in the Excess Profits Tax Act itself. Learned counsel has relied on a decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Western India Life Insurance Co., Ltd. 1949 17 ITR 125 , where their Lordships held that the third proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 4 was not applicable to insurance business as the profits had to be ascertained under Rule 2(b) of the Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1922. That case was, however, decided on the special provisions relating to insurance law, and we do not think it is relevant. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the answer to the question referred to us by the Tribunal must be in the negative, that is the deduction of ₹ 4,500 allowed in the assessment of income-tax under the third proviso to Section 4 (1) of the Indian Income-tax Act is not allowable in computing profits chargeable to excess profits tax under Section 5 of the Excess Profits Tax Act.
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1949 (10) TMI 2 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e procedure followed in this country. Without better information on the point it is not possible to say that the same considerations, which applied to Hoystead's case 1926 A.C. 155, apply to decisions in income-tax cases in this country also. Moreover, the precise question, whether the rule of res judicata applies to tax cases also, was not canvassed in Hoystead's case 1926 A.C. 155. It was undisputed that it applied to such cases and the only question canvassed before the House of Lords was whether the requirements of the rule were satisfied or not. For all the reasons mentioned above, I find myself unable to assent readily to the view that the rule of res judicata applies to income-tax cases, even to a limited extent, and as this case can be disposed of without deciding this question, I refrain from expressing any opinion one way or the other. I would reserve it for the future. With these observations, I concur in the order proposed. Reference answered accordingly.
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1949 (10) TMI 1 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ry object of an immediate return or acquisition of assets which are not of lasting value and are likely to get exhausted or consumed in the process of the return or a very limited number of returns. Coming to the facts of the case before us, the amount of ₹ 5,000 was paid out of the income made in the course of the year. The payment was not made once and for all but had to be made every year. Without incurring this expenditure it was not possible for the company to make the profit which it is intended to be taxed, and if the assessee had to pay ₹ 10 per trip per vehicle which was the tax leviable, the company would have had to pay much more. Having taken all these facts into consideration, I am of the opinion that the sum of ₹ 5,000 was in the nature of a revenue expenditure and was deductible out of the income. The assessee must get the costs of these proceedings which are assessed at a sum of ₹ 500. SETH, J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1949 (9) TMI 33 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... dge can be regarded as suits within Clause 13 but even if we assume that the proceedings before the District Judge are suits within that clause, Section 43, Bengal Municipal Act, 1932 would be void only to the extent of the repugnancy, for reasons I have already given. Section 43 would still operate to bar the revisional powers of this Court. 70. For the foregoing reasons I am of opinion that the High Court has no power to interfere in revision with the order complained of. The preliminary objection? therefore, succeeds. In the above view, I express no opinion on the merits of the case. The rule is accordingly discharged with costs. Hearing fee 3 gold mohurs to the opposite party No. 1. As no substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Government of India Act, 1935, or of the Indian Independence Act, 1947 or if any Order in Council under either Act is involved, a certificate under Section 205(1) Government of India Act is refused. Braja Kanta Guha, J. I agree.
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1949 (9) TMI 32 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... upra) and the payment should be treated as expenditure from revenue and not from capital and is a proper deduction in the computation of profits or gains. The payment here cannot be attributed to capital inasmuch as it was not made with a view to bringing a tangible asset or advantage into existence. It is also to be noted that in order to make it a capital payment the asset or advantage is to be for the "enduring" benefit of the trade. As Rowlatt, J., said by "enduring" is meant "enduring the way that fixed capital endures." Romer, L.J., approved of this view in Dale's case (supra). Therefore, the payment or expenditure in question was made or incurred in the conduct of the business of the company and it is not a capital expense. I answer the question framed in the statement of case in the negative and I hold that in the facts of this case the sum of ₹ 22,500 is not taxable in the hands of the applicant company. Harries, C.J.-I agree.
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1949 (9) TMI 31 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uestion does not arise and does not call for any answer. There can be no doubt that the application was not in order and was not in accordance with the Rules 2-6B. Learned counsel for the assessee has urged that as the partnership was registered in the previous years and the application for renewal for the year 1941-42 which had been filed on the 30th March, 1943, had not yet been finally disposed of by the Appellate Tribunal, the application dated the 26th July, 1943, was correctly filed as an application, for renewal. On the facts stated above that Krishna Murari was dead, that the legal representative had not signed the application, that the application did not state that one of the partners had died and his legal representative had been admitted into the partnership nor was any signature obtained of the legal representative who was not a minor and a false certificate was given that the constitution of the firm had not been altered, the answer can only be in the negative.
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1949 (9) TMI 30 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n the case of pending proceedings and in such a case in order to make possible the uninterrupted course of the proceedings before the Tribunal both parties must stay their hands and must not prejudice a fair and impartial settlement or adjudication of the disputes. Therefore, in such a case the prohibition is general and unqualified, If we put that construction on the statute, then obviously there is no substance in the point that cl. (b) should have a limited construction. So long as these proceedings are pending before a Tribunal, whatever may be their ultimate fate, and however they may be delayed, the statute says that there shall be no lock-out and no strike. If you allow the workman to go on strike during the pendency of these proceedings, obviously the employers also will assert their right to enforce a lock-out, and it may be grossly detrimental to the interests of the unfortunate workmen or employees. 34. I agree with the order proposed by the learned Chief Justice.
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1949 (9) TMI 29 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... fore it was open to the assessee to have raised this point at least with regard to the item of ₹ 4,40,878. They did not do so and did not challenge the mode of computation. In our opinion the Tribunal was right in refusing to refer the questions to us. Mr. Kolah contends that the question of law is apparent on the order itself and that it also arises from the facts stated by the Tribunal, but in our opinion there is no suggestion as to this point of law either in the order of the Tribunal or in the statement of the case submitted by the Tribunal to us. We therefore decline to direct the Tribunal to raise this question. The result is that the notice of motion fails. As some of the questions suggested really elucidated the matter and as we have ourselves taken a view that the questions were not properly framed by the Tribunal and had to frame the questions ourselves, we think that a fair order for costs will be that there should be no order as to the costs of the motion.
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1949 (9) TMI 28 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... certain amounts for depreciation. It is difficult to understand what the grievance of Mr. Kolah is He paid no income-tax prior to 1940-41 and therefore he got no deduction for depreciation. Mr. Kolah without paying any tax wants the benefit of the depreciation allowance. He cannot eat his cake and have it too. Apart from the clear language of the section the construction that we are giving to it does not result in any inequitable assessment of the assessee. The result is that we must answer the question in the negative. We frankly confess that it is difficult to understand the second question. We do hope that the Tribunal whose jurisdiction it is to raise questions and submit them to us for our opinion will raise the questions in a manner which makes them clear as to what the contention between the parties is. As neither Mr. Kolah nor Mr. Joshi is in a position to throw any light as to what is intended to be referred by the second question, we refuse to answer the question.
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1949 (9) TMI 27 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... income, i.e., whether their shares were defined and known. In my opinion it is not open to Dr. Gupta at this stage to urge the new point which he now seeks to make. Inasmuch as the assessment has been made on the whole of the income of the Thakurs it is immaterial that the deities through the shebaits have to make payments to other persons and the amount which may be available to the deities is variable or indeterminate. It is equally immaterial that the shebaits as managers of the deities receive the income but have to make payments to or to provide for a large and somewhat indefinite group of persons and charities. Therefore, the question set out in the referring order should be answered in the negative. The income received under the deed of dedication is not chargeable at the maximum rate under Section 41(1) of the Income-tax Act. The assessee is entitled to the costs of this Reference. Certified for two Counsel. HARRIES, C.J.--I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1949 (9) TMI 26 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ble. Only in exceptional cases, for legal necessity or for the benefit or preservation of the property, the shebait can alienate the same. But in my view that does not affect the nature of ownership of the property or the share to which deities are entitled. In my view it is only right and proper that the two deities should be entitled equally to the income derived from the properties bequeathed or settled under the will and the deed of settlement. To attempt to make any other apportionment or to define some other shares as between the two deities would be to make out a new settlement or a new will and that may be quite contrary to the intention of the settlor or testatrix. In the absence of any indication of intention to the contrary it is only just and proper that there should be equal division of the income of the properties concerned as between the two deities. I agree with the order proposed to be made by my Lord the Chief Justice. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1949 (9) TMI 25 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ayments received by them in connection with these leases as ordinary payments in the course of business and actually included the payment of ₹ 9,000 to them as part of their receipts. The fact, of course, that the assessees were taxed on this sum of ₹ 9,000 does not conclude the matter as they may have been wrongly assessed on that sum. However, it does show what was the true nature of these payments. The payment, as I have said, appears to have been made not as a premium but as an advance payment of rent made to assist the Madras Publishing House Ltd. to erect and complete the cinema. If it was such a payment, it is conceded that the amount would have to be allowed as a deduction in computing the assessees' income. For the reasons which I have given the question submitted must be answered in the affirmative. The assessees are entitled to the costs of these proceedings. Certified for two counsel. CHATTERJEE, J.--I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1949 (9) TMI 24 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... any or of the partnership. As a result of the partial success in some appeals the old notices of demand are inoperative & fresh notices will have to be served on the company. Admittedly the alleged debt of over ₹ 35,00,000 mentioned in the petition for winding-up is no longer subsisting. It is not possible to say what is the total debt now justly due by the company to the respondent. In a case where the debt is disputed, the Court has first to see whether that dispute is on the face of it genuine or merely a cloak of the company's real inability to pay its just debts. "Tulsidas Lallubhai v. Bharat Khand Cotton Mills Co., Ltd.', 39 Bom. 47. Recourse should not be had to winding-up proceedings for the purpose of recovering a disputed debt or for stifling proceedings which seek to challenge or impugn such debts. On the facts of this case it Is impossible to say that the defence of the company is a cloak or contrivance to put off payment of its just debts.
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1949 (9) TMI 23 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed in applying Section 42 (3) in assessing the profits of the assessee in this case where part of its operations was carried on outside British India. 38. In my opinion Section 42 (1) and Section 42 (3) apply to both residents and non-residents. Any other construction would lead to the anomalous results. It is to be observed that Section 4, Income Tax Act, is expressly made "subject to the provisions of this Act" which include Section 42. It is to be noted, however, that the marginal note to Section 42 has been changed by Act, XXII 22 of 1947. By Section 12 of that Act for the marginal heading "Non-residents" the following has been substituted--"Income deemed to accrue or arise within British India". It was obviously done to alter the marginal note which was somewhat misleading. 39. I agree with the learned Chief Justice that the question should be answered in the affirmative and that the respondent should be awarded the costs of this reference.
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1949 (9) TMI 22 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d the exercise of the discretion by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was considered to be perverse. In the case before us, however, both the Appellate Assistant Commissioner as well as the Appellate Tribunal considered the case on the merits and both were of the opinion that there were no sufficient grounds for the condonation of the delay. There could be the only decision in view of the fact that the Special Manager had tried to get the delay condoned on a ground which was obviously false. In the circumstances of the case there is no point in having the question further considered by a larger Bench. As we are bound by the decision of this Court in the case of Shivnath Prasad v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Central and United Provinces 1935 3 I.T.R. 200, mentioned above, we must answer this question in the negative. The assessee will pay the costs of these proceedings. We fix the fee at ₹ 500 of the learned counsel for the department. Reference answered accordingly.
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1949 (9) TMI 21 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... we have to determine is whether the company has been pursuing that object and carrying on that business or not, and it is impossible to hold on the facts of this case that by a solitary transaction of an advance of ₹ 5,00,000 to Agrawal & Co., it could be said the in doing so it was pursuing one of its objects and carrying out that business. Therefore, in my opinion, even if we assume that the question referred to us is a question of law, on the facts and circumstances of this case the Tribunal was right in coming to the conclusion that the moneys lent by the company to Agrawal & Co. were not in the ordinary course of business, that that transaction did not constitute part of the businees of the company and therfore the company was not entitled to reply on rule 1 (1) (b) of Schedule II to the Excess Profits Tax Act. The answer therefore to the question submitted to us will be in the negative. the assessee to pay the costs. Notice of motion dismisses with costs.
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1949 (9) TMI 20 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 065 accrued and arose to the assessee in Bombay and not in a Native State. The assessee has taken out a notice of motion for the purpose of raising a question as to his liability to pay excess profits tax on the commission earned and which is the subject-matter of this reference. We do not think it necessary that a separate and further question should be raised in order to meet the application of the assessee. What we propose to do is to amend the question which has been framed by the Tribunal, so as to read as follows - "Whether in the circumstances of the case the commission viz. ₹ 88,065 received by the assessee company from the United Salt Works & Industries Ltd., accrued in the State of Kutch or in British India, both for the purpose of income-tax and excess profits tax?" And we answer the question, in British India. There will be no order as to costs of the notice of motion. Assessee to pay the costs of the reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1949 (9) TMI 19 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... depositors who deposited their moneys with the Bank were at all concerned with what the Bank did with that money. They were only concerned with earning interest on their deposits. It was entirely irrelevant, as far as they were concerned, how the Bank carried on its business with their deposits. Therefore, it is clear that in this case it has not been established that there was any knowledge on the part of the lender that his deposit would be transferred to India for the purposes of earning income on it. If that be so, then the interest earned by the depositors was not chargeable under the Indian Income-tax Act and there was no obligation upon the Bank to deduct tax under Section 18(3A). The result therefore is that the Bank is entitled to the deduction under Section 10(2)(iii) in respect of interest paid by it to its depositors. We therefore answer the question in the affirmative to the extent of ₹ 32,469. Commissioner to pay the costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1949 (9) TMI 18 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... view of the law, we would, after answering the question of law, ask the Tribunal to determine the necessary facts on the evidence before it and come to the conclusion whether the two businesses carried on by the partners in this case constituted two different firms or one firm for the purpose of the Indian Income- tax Act. We will reformulate the first question submitted to us in the following terms "Whether in law common partners can constitute two separate firms in respect of different businesses carried on by these partners for the purpose of the Indian Income-tax Act." Having reformulated that question we answer the question in the affirmative. With regard to the second question, we agree with the Tribunal that it is a question of fact, and we answer it in the affirmative. We therefore direct that the case of the assessee should be dealt with in accordance with the opinion expressed in our judgment. Commissioner to pay the costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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