1994 (8) TMI 19 - HC - Wealth-tax

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the assessment orders for the years 1970-71 to 1976-77.
2. Legality of the notices issued by the Valuation Officer under section 16A of the Wealth-tax Act.
3. Jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer post-remand by the appellate authority.
4. Finality of the original assessment orders for the years 1976-77 and 1977-78.
5. Technical objection regarding the filing of separate writ petitions for each assessment year.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Validity of the Assessment Orders for the Years 1970-71 to 1976-77:
The assessments for the years 1970-71 to 1974-75 were initially made on May 31, 1979, and for 1975-76 on March 12, 1980. These assessments were challenged by the petitioner and subsequently remanded by the appellate authority. The appellate order for 1973-74 directed a fresh assessment, while the orders for 1974-75 and 1975-76 followed the earlier order for 1970-71 to 1972-73, directing the Wealth-tax Officer to refer the valuation of agricultural lands to the Valuation Officer and to reassess the extent of land owned by the petitioner at Luz Church Road, Mylapore, Madras. The court held that the Assessing Officer exceeded his jurisdiction by revaluing properties not mentioned in the appellate orders, rendering the assessments for these years invalid.

2. Legality of the Notices Issued by the Valuation Officer under Section 16A:
The Valuation Officer issued notices dated September 13, 1982, and September 14, 1982, proposing to determine the market value of various assets for the assessment period from March 31, 1970, to March 31, 1982. The court found these notices to be illegal for the years 1976-77 and 1977-78, as the original assessments for these years were pending appeal and thus could not be reopened. For the years 1970-71 to 1975-76, the court held that the notices were invalid as they went beyond the scope of the appellate orders, which only directed the valuation of agricultural lands and not other properties.

3. Jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer Post-Remand by the Appellate Authority:
The court emphasized that the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer post-remand is confined to the points mentioned in the appellate order. The Assessing Officer cannot reopen the entire assessment or revalue properties not specified in the remand order. This principle was supported by various judicial precedents, including decisions in CIT v. Khemchand Ramdas, ITO v. S. K. Habibullah, and Katihar Jute Mills (P.) Ltd. v. CIT. The court concluded that the Assessing Officer acted beyond his jurisdiction by reassessing properties not mentioned in the appellate orders.

4. Finality of the Original Assessment Orders for the Years 1976-77 and 1977-78:
The court held that the original assessments for the years 1976-77 and 1977-78, which were pending appeal, had attained finality and could not be reopened by the Assessing Officer. The notices issued by the Valuation Officer for these years were therefore deemed illegal. The court reaffirmed the principle that finality attaches to an assessment order, and it cannot be reopened except under specific circumstances and within the time limits prescribed by law.

5. Technical Objection Regarding the Filing of Separate Writ Petitions for Each Assessment Year:
The Department raised a technical objection, arguing that separate writ petitions should have been filed for each assessment year. The court rejected this objection, noting that the Department itself had issued a single notice covering multiple years. The court deemed the objection to be highly technical and not deserving of serious consideration.

Conclusion:
The court quashed the notices dated September 13, 1982, and September 14, 1982, for the assessment years 1970-71 to 1975-76 and for the years 1976-77 and 1977-78. The assessment orders dated March 23, 1984, for 1970-71 and March 24, 1984, for the years 1971-72 to 1976-77 were also quashed. The Assessing Officer was directed to act according to the appellate orders and make assessments in terms of the directions contained therein. The petitions were allowed with no costs.