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2023 (12) TMI 1337
Direction to the respondent to restore the petitioner's GST Registration - HELD THAT:- It appears that the present issue was already covered by the aforesaid judgement of this Court in W.P. No. 25048 of 2021 [2022 (2) TMI 933 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] where it was held that 'Therefore, if such a person is not allowed to revive the registration, the GST will not be paid, unless of course, the recipient is liable to pay tax on reverse charge basis. Otherwise, also there will be no payment of value added tax. The ultimate goal under the GST regime will stand defeated. Therefore, these petitioners deserve a right to come back into the GST fold and carry on their trade and business in a legitimate manner.'
This Court is inclined to allow this petition - it is made clear that if the petitioner is liable to pay any tax or penalty, he is required to pay the same in accordance with law - Petition allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1336
Seeking grant of regular bail - illegal availment of ITC - Section 132(1)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Act, 2017 - HELD THAT:- It appears that the present applicant has been arrested in connection of the offence punishable under Section 132(1)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Act, 2017 for which punishment is five years of imprisonment. The applicant is arrested on 13.10.2023 and since then the applicant is in custody. The investigation appears to be virtually over. The case of the prosecution rests upon documentary evidence. All the documentary evidence and other material appears to have been seized by the Investigating Agency. Therefore, presence of the present applicant does not appear to be necessary for the purpose of investigation. The trial is not likely to commence and conclude in the near future.
Considering the nature of allegations made in the FIR and without discussing the evidence in details as well as without going into details, prima-facie, this Court is of the opinion that this is a fit case to exercise the discretion to enlarge the applicant on bail. Hence, the application is allowed and the applicant is ordered to be released on bail in connection with the aforesaid FIR, on executing a bond of Rs.10,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial Court and subject to the conditions.
Application allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1335
Scope of jurisdiction exercised by this Court under Section 37(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act - true purport and nature of the Term Sheet, based upon interpretation of its various clauses - HELD THAT:- Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, pertains to appealable orders and it provides for filing of an appeal before the Court, inter alia, to challenge an order granting or refusing interim measure under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act. In the very same provision under Section 37 (1)(c) of the Arbitration Act, an appeal can be filed against an order setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
So long as the learned Arbitrator has considered the relevant material and a plausible view has been adopted in the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court would be loathe to interfere with the order passed by the learned Arbitrator. This Court would not interfere with the order of the learned Arbitrator passed under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, merely because another view is possible in the matter. The discretion exercised by the learned Arbitrator, based upon a plausible view and upon taking into consideration all relevant material, cannot be lightly interfered with by this Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 37(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act - This Court intends to consider the impugned order passed by the learned Arbitrator in this backdrop and based upon the material available on record, in the light of the rival submissions made on behalf of the parties.
The findings rendered by the learned Arbitrator that the Term Sheet was prima facie an agreement to enter into an agreement, was not even a plausible view. This Court finds that the learned Arbitrator took into consideration all the relevant material, including the clauses of the Term Sheet in detail, while rendering findings on the said aspect of the matter, which cannot be termed as wholly implausible. Therefore, on the said aspect of the matter, no ground is made out on behalf of the petitioner for holding that the finding rendered by the learned Arbitrator could be said to be perverse or illegal, to warrant exercise jurisdiction under Section 37 (2)(b) of the Arbitration Act.
Applying the law pertaining to the scope of jurisdiction while considering the present petition filed under Section 37(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act, akin to considering an Appeal from Order, this Court does not find any ground for interference with the impugned order and hence, the present petition deserves to be dismissed.
Petition dismissed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1334
Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) - bogus LTCG on penny stock - CIT(A) deleted addition - HELD THAT:- As observed by the CIT(Appeals), and rightly so, as the assessee had offered LTCG on sale of 2500 shares of M/s. Blueprint Securities Ltd. as a part of her total income in the return of income filed in response to the notice u/s. 148 of the Act, therefore, the AO without establishing that the assessee had concealed her income, could not have saddled her with penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act. We, thus, concur with the view taken by the CIT(Appeals), who had rightly vacated the penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act and uphold the same. Decided against revenue.
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2023 (12) TMI 1333
Time Limitation - Review Petition under Section 5 of Limitation Act - HELD THAT:- As per opinion of the Board vide letter dated 04.05.2023, the Review Petition is filed only for limited purposes for expunging the remarks and waiver of the cost. In para 26, this Court has deprecated the action of the respondents/authority in this matter and left it open to the Higher Officers of CGST to take appropriate action against the responsible Officers, therefore, it is for the Department to examine the conduct of their Subordinate Officer for taking appropriate action.
So far as waiver of cost is concerned, Review Petition is not liable to be entertained because after the date of raid, two years, the seal was not removed and assessee was not permitted to operate the machines and Manufacturing Unit which has suffered the loss to assessee as well as to the revenue loss to the Government.
Review petition dismissed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1332
CENVAT Credit - Goods Transport Agency [GTA] (outward Transport) service - whether the hearing and resolution of the issue referred to the Larger Bench be continued at the instance of the intervener or as the case of the appellant has been settled under SVLDRS subsequent to reference, the appeal be returned to the Referral Bench for disposal without answering the reference?
HELD THAT:- The present reference to the Larger Bench is on the issue of admissibility of CENVAT credit on the service tax paid on GTA (outward transportation of goods) service after delivery of the judgment of the Supreme Court in COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE SERVICE TAX VERSUS ULTRA TECH CEMENT LTD. [2018 (2) TMI 117 - SUPREME COURT] and the Circular of the Board dated 08.6.2018. Thus, resolution of the reference by the Larger Bench would not be limited to the appeal in which the reference has been made, but would have implication on all appeals pending before other Benches of the Tribunal involving same issue and are awaiting the outcome of the present reference.
The decision in M/S KARAIKAL PORT PVT LTD. VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, PUDUCHERRY [2015 (1) TMI 87 - CESTAT CHENNAI] is neither relevant nor applicable to the present circumstances. In that case, the applicant sought permission to be impleaded as a necessary party in the appeal filed by the Port Department, Karnataka on the ground that on confirmation of the service tax demand against the Port Department a notice was issued for recovery of the confirmed service tax. Consequently, the applicant approached the Tribunal to allow them to intervene in the appeal. The application was filed under Order 1 Rule 8A of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure.
In a case where clearances of goods are against FOR contract basis, the authority needs to ascertain the ‘place of removal’ by applying the judgments of the Supreme Court in COMMISSIONER CENTRAL EXCISE, MUMBAI-III VERSUS M/S. EMCO LTD. [2015 (8) TMI 200 - SUPREME COURT] and COMMISSIONER, CUSTOMS AND CENTRAL EXCISE, AURANGABAD VERSUS M/S ROOFIT INDUSTRIES LTD. [2015 (4) TMI 857 - SUPREME COURT], the decision of the Karnataka High Court in BHARAT FRITZ WERNER LTD. AND MAPAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED VERSUS THE COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL TAX, BANGALORE [2022 (7) TMI 352 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT], and the Circular dated 08.06.2018 of the Board to determine the admissibility of CENVAT credit on the GTA Service upto the place of removal.
The reference is answered, accordingly. The appeal shall now be listed before the Division Bench for hearing.
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2023 (12) TMI 1331
TP adjustment - price of the power transferred by the captive power plant of the assessee eligible for deduction u/s 80IA to the non- eligible manufacturing units of the assessee and thereby reducing the claim of deduction claimed by the assessee u/s 80IA of the Income Tax Act - DR has strongly relied upon the observation made by the Transfer Pricing Officer and has submitted that for determination of arm’s length price in relation to power supply by the captive power plants of the assessee, the average market rates at which the other power generating units sell the power to distribution companies is required to be taken
HELD THAT:- Assessee’s main business is not of generating of power to further sell the same to the distribution companies/State Electricity Boards. The point to be noted here is that the respective captive power plants were established by the assessee for its own needs i.e. for the purpose of supply uninterrupted powers to its manufacturing units as well as to save the cost of power purchased from State Electricity Boards.
Here, in the facts and circumstances, in our view, the arm’s length price could not be determined by taking the average market rates of power supply units to distribution companies as the assessee is not into the said business of selling of power to distribution companies. The arm’s length price in this case, in our view, has to be determined taking into mind the business perspective of the assessee which was to get uninterrupted power and to save cost of electricity paid to the State Electricity Boards.
When we look into the facts in this perspective, the relevant factor in this case would be the market price of the power at which the assessee’s manufacturing units purchased the power from the market or from the State Electricity Boards. Moreover, as per the Electricity Act, 2003 the captive power plants are kept outside of the regulatory mechanism and are free to supply electricity to its associate enterprises/manufacturing units or to the contracting parties and consumers, at the rates mutually settled between them. The said captive power plants are not mandatorily required to supply the electricity to the distribution companies and even are exempt of other charges which the other generating companies/distribution companies has to pay to the Government/ State Electricity Boards. The captive power plants are required only to pay wheeling charges if they use the distribution lines of the State Electricity Boards/distribution companies.
Sale of electricity by the generating companies to the distribution company/state electricity board - The consumer /contracting parties will certainly want to purchase the electricity at somewhat lesser rate than the rates of the State Electricity Boards, whereas, the captive power plants/generating companies would try to get maximum rate on the sale of power in unregulated and uncontrolled transactions and under the circumstances, both the parties would settle at the mutually agreed rates, irrespective of the rates at which the State Electricity purchases power from the other generating units. When we consider this bargain power of captive units and other generating companies in uncontrolled and unregulated transactions, then market value to determine arm’s length price, in our view, would not be dependent upon of the average market value electricity sold by other generating units to the distribution companies in controlled and regulated transactions. As observed above, the very purpose and objective of the installation of captive units by an assessee is to supply of electricity to its own manufacturing units for uninterrupted power supply and saving of electricity expenses and whatever expenses are saved that certainly would be the profit of the captive unit which, in our view, will be eligible for deduction u/s 80IA of the Income Tax Act.
Considering this aspect, the contention of the Revenue that the rates determined by the Regulatory Commission for generating units for supply of electricity to the distribution companies should be taken as benchmark, in our view, would not be accurate benchmarking of the price.
Thus, as discussed in the preceding paras of this order in context to the provision of Electricity Act 2003, that the market value of the power in case of supply by generating units to the distribution units cannot be said to be an uncontrolled market conditions and under the circumstances, the aforesaid observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court M/s Jindal Steel & Power Ltd.[2023 (12) TMI 417 - SUPREME COURT] is squarely applicable in this case also wherein held the market value of the power supplied by the State Electricity Board to the industrial consumers should be construed to be the market value of electricity. It should not be compared with the rate of power sold to or supplied to the State Electricity Board since the rate of power to a supplier cannot be the market rate of power sold to a consumer in the open market. The State Electricity Board’s rate when it supplies power to the consumers have to be taken as the market value for computing the deduction under Section 80-IA of the Act.That being the position Tribunal had rightly computed the market value of electricity supplied by the captive power plants of the assessee to its industrial units after comparing it with the rate of power available in the open market i.e., the price charged by the State Electricity Board while supplying electricity to the industrial consumers. Therefore, the High Court was fully justified in deciding the appeal against the revenue.
In view of the above observations, we do not find any merit in the appeal of the revenue and the same is hereby dismissed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1330
Extension of stay of outstanding demand - assessee took us through the ITAT’s order [2023 (5) TMI 1349 - ITAT RANCHI] and submitted that on the last occasion, stay was extended on the ground that there is no change in the facts and circumstances - HELD THAT:- As the assessee has not sought any adjournment, rather applied for early hearing so that appeal could be disposed of on an early date. Due to certain unavoidable circumstances, namely non-functionality of the Bench or adjournment request at the end of the Revenue, this appeal could not be disposed of. Apart from the above fact, there is one more important fact brought to our notice, namely the assessee has filed a rectification application before the ld. DRP, whose disposal is still pending.
According to the assessee, if that application is allowed, then, instead of any payment, assessee will be entitled for a refund. Therefore, while earlier extending the stay, Bench has observed that adjudication of that application has a bearing on the ultimate disposal of the appeal. We allow this application and extend the stay on the recovery of demand for a period of 180 days or till the disposal of the appeal, whichever event occurs first. The assessee will not seek any adjournment without unavoidable circumstances. The appeal be listed on the date already fixed. Stay Application of the assessee is allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1329
Levy of penalty u/s 272A(2)(e) - delay of 851 days in filing the return of income for the assessment year 2014-15 - main contention of the ld. A.R. is that as per section 275(1)(c) order u/s 272A(2)(e) of the Act is to be passed before the expiry of financial year in which the proceedings, in the course of which action for the imposition of penalty has been initiated, are completed or 6 months from the end of the month in which action for imposition of penalty is initiated, whichever period expires later
HELD THAT:- The assessee has filed return of income for the assessment year 2014-15 on 31.3.2017. There was no regular assessment and the return of income has been accepted as it is. In our opinion, copy of the return of income itself serve as an assessment order for all practical purposes. So the penalty proceedings has been initiated vide notice dated 21.12.2020, which is approximately after lapse of 45 months. Therefore, the penalty order passed by ld. AO u/s 272A(2)(e) of the Act is not within reasonable time.
As considering Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of JKD Capital & Finlease Ltd. [2015 (10) TMI 1281 - DELHI HIGH COURT] we are of the opinion that penalty order has not been passed within reasonable time. Accordingly, we quash the penalty order on this reason. Decided in favour of assessee.
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2023 (12) TMI 1328
Dismissal of appeal for no-prosecution - notice was sent to the appellant’s address, but returned as undelivered by the postal authority with the remark of “No Such Person” - HELD THAT:- It is seen from the records that the matter has been adjourned on previous occasions also i.e. on 29.08.2023, 29.09.2023, 30.10.2023, 24.11.2023 and is listed today i.e. 18.12.2023. On all the occasions, none appeared for the appellant nor any request for adjournment has been made. It seems that the appellant is not serious in prosecuting their appeal.
Consequently, the appeal is dismissed for non-prosecution.
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2023 (12) TMI 1327
Disallowance u/s 80P - assessee violated the principle of mutuality by dealing with non-members and not deducting tax at source on interest payments to nominal members - HELD THAT:- We direct the AO to examine whether the interest income received on investment with Central Co-operative Bank is out of compulsions under the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959, and the relevant Rules. If it is so, the same may be considered as ‘business income’ and entitled to deduction u/s 80P(2)(a)(i). If assessee society does not comply with the relevant provisions of the Act, and the Rules of Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959, it cannot carry on its cooperative activities, namely carry on the business of banking or providing credit facilities to its members. Therefore, if the investments are out of compulsion under the Act and relevant Rules, necessarily it is part of assessee’s business activity entailing the benefit of section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act.
Entitlement to cost of funds with respect to interest income that is assessed as income from other sources - HELD THAT:- We find that this contention of the assessee is also covered by the order of case of M/s. Deepa Credit Cooperative Society Ltd [2023 (12) TMI 1326 - ITAT BANGALORE] The Bangalore Bench of the Tribunal had followed the dictum laid down by the Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court in the case of Totgars Co-operative Sale Society Ltd., [2015 (4) TMI 829 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] - we restore the matter to the AO. AO is directed to follow the dictum laid down in judicial pronouncements cited supra and take a decision in accordance with law. AO is also directed to afford a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee, before a decision is taken in the matter. It is ordered accordingly. Appeal filed by the assessee is allowed for statistical purposes.
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2023 (12) TMI 1326
Deduction u/s 80P - interest income received from co-operative banks / scheduled banks - limited prayer of the assessee before the Tribunal is to allow the interest cost as a deduction u/s 57 for earning interest income which is to be assessed under the head ‘income from other sources’ - HELD THAT:- Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Totgars Co-operative Sale Society Ltd.[2015 (4) TMI 829 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] had categorically held that where an assessee, a co-operative society, earns interest on deposits kept with scheduled banks; only the net interest income can be taxed u/s 56 of the Act (i.e., the interest income reduced by the administrative expenses and other proportionate expenses to earn the said income).
We restore the matter to the AO. AO is directed to calculate the cost of funds for earning the interest income which has to be assessed u/s 56 of the Act and allow the same as deduction u/s 57 of the Act. Appeal filed by the assessee is allowed for statistical purposes.
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2023 (12) TMI 1325
Addition u/s 69A r.w.s.115BBE - excess cash found from the business premises of the assessee during the survey - HELD THAT:- During statement recorded in survey the assessee clearly declared that the assessee had not made any investment in immovable property within 6 years and the entire amount of the excess cash was generated from undeclared sale of medicine. So, the source of excess cash is from business. Therefore, we are setting aside the impugned appeal order. Accordingly, the application of section 115BBE is bad in law. Hence, the assessee will be assessed related to excess cash under normal rate of tax not U/s 115BBE of the Act. Appeal of assessee allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1324
Refund on export of scientific and consultancy service received from M/s. SPIL and M/s. SPARC for manufacture of final product under Rule 5 of Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 read with Notification No. 27/2017-CE (NT) dated 18.06.2012 - HELD THAT:- It is found that in respect of same input service in the same set of facts, in the appellant’s own case refund was allowed by this Tribunal in Pushpendra Kumar Jain and Unimed Technologies Ltd Versus C.C.E. & S.T. -Vadodara-II [2020 (1) TMI 996 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD], where it was held that 'it cannot be correct to say that the service provided by the SPIL was not used by the appellant. The revenue’s argument is that the entire service was provided on the date of invoice is totally fallacious and illogical. Thus, we hold that the appellants received and consumed the service while they were participating in the development of technology by supervising and monitoring the same.'
From the above decision in the appellant’s own case it can be seen that the issue in the present case and the case cited above is identical. In view of above decision the issue in hand stands settled and the issue is no longer res-integra. Accordingly, following the above decision of this Tribunal in the present case impugned orders are not sustainable. Hence the same are set aside.
Appeal allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1323
Dishonour of Cheque - non-speaking order - requirement of speaking order to impose a condition to deposit the amount as per Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act - HELD THAT:- In JJAMBOO BHANDARI VERSUS M.P. STATE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD. AND ORS. [2023 (9) TMI 560 - SUPREME COURT] the Apex Court considered the powers of the appellate court under Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and held that 'When an accused applies under S.389 of the CrPC for suspension of sentence, he normally applies for grant of relief of suspension of sentence without any condition. Therefore, when a blanket order is sought by the appellants, the Court has to consider whether the case falls in exception or not.'
In the light of the above principle laid by the Apex Court, it is the duty of the Appellate court to give reason for imposing the condition to deposit 20% of compensation for suspending the sentence. There cannot be any blanket order to deposit 20% of the compensation for suspending the sentence in all cases.
When a blanket order is sought by the appellants, the Court has to consider whether the case falls within the exception or not. The appellate court while suspending a sentence cannot pass a blanket order in all cases to deposit 20% of the fine or compensation without assigning any reason. Moreover, once the court has decided to order deposit as per Section 148(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the amount of deposit ordered by the Court can be varied from the minimum 20% of the fine or compensation to a higher percent of the fine or compensation. That also shows that a speaking order is necessary. Even if the court is imposing 20% of the fine or compensation as a condition for suspending the sentence, in the light of the principle laid down by the Apex Court in Jamboo Bhandari's case (supra), a reason is necessary.
Thus, the Sessions court has not applied its mind before imposing 20% of the compensation amount. In the light of the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in Jamboo Bhandari's case, the above order is unsustainable. Moreover, there is no order requiring the appellant to execute a bond for suspending the sentence. This court called for the remarks of the appellate court for not directing the appellant to execute bond.
The direction to deposit 20% of the compensation amount before the trial court as per order dated 24.06.2023 in CMP No. 44/2023 in Crl.Appeal No. 109/2023 on the file of the Additional District & Sessions Judge, Pala is set aside - criminal case allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1322
Seeking a direction for investigation into the affairs of the Company and those of the related parties - Section 213 of the Companies Act, 2013 - HELD THAT:- There have been specific allegations about the irregularities stated in this application u/s 213 and the RP’s reply does not take care of any of these allegations which is with reference to the specific details and documents. There is no denial in the RP’s reply with respect to 164 Buyers listed in Page 25 onwards of CP, comprising of sale of 2,43,037 sq. ft. in total by the R-1 Company, whereas, they were entitled to ownership of only 82,216.30 sq. ft. as per the JDA. This excessive sale, three times of their entitlement by the R-1 Company, has neither been explained nor has any denial been filed. Furthermore, there has been allegation regarding the fake Lease Agreement with R-16 and R-17 to lure the Buyers with a false promise of assured rental return which was non-existent, for which, the Petitioners have also filed the specific documents for such Lease Agreements with R-16 and R-17. However, in the reply filed by RP on behalf of the R-1 Company, no explanation has been furnished about the same.
The investigation under Section 213 of the Companies Act, 2013 is possible in respect of the Company which is undergoing the process of liquidation. Therefore, by exercising powers under Section 213 of the Companies Act, 2013, the instant Petition deserves to be allowed.
Petition allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1321
Application of Government's Litigation Policy on appeal amount threshold - HELD THAT:- On perusal of the record, we find that amount involved is less than Rs. 50 Lakh. In terms of Board’s circular on Government’s Litigation Policy instruction vide F. No. 390/Misc/30/2023-JC dated 02.11.2023, Revenue is not supposed to file appeal where the amount involved is not exceeding Rs. 50 Lakhs.
Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed in view of aforesaid Government’s Litigation Policy. Cross also stand disposed of.
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2023 (12) TMI 1320
Levy of penalty u/s 271(1)(c) - estimation of income on bogus purchases - HELD THAT:- It is admitted position that in the present case, penalty notice was issued u/s 274 r/w 271 of the Act without deleting or striking off the inapplicable part. Thus, the statutory notice issued to the Appellant does not inform the Appellant about the charge against the Appellant – whether penalty u/s 271(c) of the Act was sought to be levied for concealment of particulars of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income.
Therefore, penalty levied u/s 271(1)(c) cannot be sustained as per the judgment of Mohammed Farhan A Shaikh [2021 (3) TMI 608 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT (LB)] Further, we note that in the quantum proceedings, the AO made addition of the entire alleged bogus purchases. CIT(A) and thereafter, the Tribunal restricted the addition to 12.5% of the alleged bogus purchases. The addition has been made in the hands of the Appellant on account of bogus purchase was on estimation basis and therefore, we hold that CIT(A) was not correct in rejecting the contention of the Appellant that no penalty u/s 271(1)(c) of the Act can be levied in the present case as the additions in the quantum proceedings were made/sustained on estimate basis.
Our view draws strength from the decision of the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal has, in the case of Orient Fabritech Pvt. Ltd. [2022 (6) TMI 829 - ITAT MUMBAI] wherein in identical facts and circumstances, penalty levied under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act was deleted.
Thus we delete the penalty levied u/s 271(1)(c) - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2023 (12) TMI 1319
Addition u/s 14A - Expenditure incurred on exempt income - whether expenditure can exceed the exempt income earned by the respondent/assessee? - HELD THAT:- There is no dispute that the issue raised, hereinabove, is covered by the following judgments in Cheminvest Limited [2015 (9) TMI 238 - DELHI HIGH COURT] and Chettinad Logistics (P.) Ltd. [2017 (4) TMI 298 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] also confirmed by SC [2018 (7) TMI 567 - SC ORDER] as held that Section 14A will not apply if no exempt income is received or receivable during the relevant previous year. No substantial question of law arises.
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2023 (12) TMI 1318
Money Laundering - predicate offence - condition u/s 45 of PMLA satisfied or not - the revenue officials misused their official position and wrongly allocated shamlat land amongst the residents of village Seonk - HELD THAT:- In the present case, considering the custody of more than 03 months and the benefit which the petitioner took was just Rs. 50,000/-, it would be a perversity of justice if this Court continues further pre-trial incarceration. Thus, given the amount attributed to the petitioner viz-a-viz pre-trial custody and the other factors peculiar to this case, there would be no justifiability of further pre-trial incarceration at this stage, subject to the compliance of terms and conditions mentioned in this order.
The possibility of the accused influencing the investigation, tampering with evidence, intimidating witnesses, and the likelihood of fleeing justice, can be taken care of by imposing elaborative and stringent conditions - In Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), [2020 (1) TMI 1193 - SUPREME COURT], the Constitutional Bench held that unusually, subject to the evidence produced, the Courts can impose restrictive conditions.
The petitioner shall not influence, browbeat, pressurize, make any inducement, threat, or promise, directly or indirectly, to the witnesses, the Police officials, or any other person acquainted with the facts and the circumstances of the case, to dissuade them from disclosing such facts to the Police, or the Court, or to tamper with the evidence - Petitioner to comply with their undertaking made in the bail petition, made before this court through counsel as reflected at the beginning of this order. If the petitioner fails to comply with any of such undertakings, then on this ground alone, the bail might be canceled, and the victim/complainant may file any such application for the cancellation of bail, and the State shall file the said application.
Any Advocate for the petitioner and the Officer in whose presence the petitioner puts signatures on personal bonds shall explain all conditions of this bail order in any language that the petitioner understands - If the petitioner finds bail condition(s) as violating fundamental, human, or other rights, or causing difficulty due to any situation, then for modification of such term(s), the petitioner may file a reasoned application before this Court, and after taking cognizance, even to the Court taking cognizance or the trial Court, as the case may be, and such Court shall also be competent to modify or delete any condition.
Petition allowed.
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9911796707
